

M E D E D E L I N G E N D E R K O N I N K L I J K E N E D E R L A N D S E  
A K A D E M I E V A N W E T E N S C H A P P E N , A F D . L E T T E R K U N D E  
N I E U W E R E E K S - D E E L 38 - No. 1

---

## MISCELLANEOUS NOTES ON PLATO

G. J. DE VRIES

**ISBN 72048294 1**

**AANGEBODEN IN DE VERGADERING  
VAN 16 SEPTEMBER 1974**

A few of the notes presented here repeat in a slightly expanded form remarks made (in Dutch) in *Spel bij Plato* (1949). Nos. 15, 20 and 38 appeared in *Zetesis*, the volume of essays presented in 1973 to Professor E. de Strycker; no. 17 is a shortened version of my contribution to *Kephalaiion*, the volume published in 1975 in honour of Professor C. J. de Vogel. I thank the editors and publishers for their permission to reprint these notes in this collection.

Wolfheze, January 1975

G. J. DE VRIES

## CONTENTS

page	page
1. Phaedo 115 b . . . . .	5
2. Cratylus 402 c d . . . . .	5
3. Sophist 225 d . . . . .	6
4. Sophist 243 b . . . . .	6
5. Politicus 285 c . . . . .	7
6. Parmenides 141 e . . . . .	8
7. Philebus 53 c d . . . . .	9
8. Philebus 62 b . . . . .	9
9. Symposium 180 b, 191 c d	10
10. Symposium 194 a-d . . . . .	11
11. Phaedrus 237 c . . . . .	12
12. Phaedrus 250 d . . . . .	13
13. Phaedrus 257 c . . . . .	14
14. Phaedrus 270 a . . . . .	15
15. Phaedrus 275 d . . . . .	16
16. Phaedrus 276 e . . . . .	16
17. Phaedrus 278 c . . . . .	17
18. Charmides 155 a . . . . .	18
19. Charmides 157 c d . . . . .	19
20. Laches 189 c . . . . .	19
21. Lysis 210 c . . . . .	20
22. Lysis 215 e, 216 a . . . . .	20
23. Lysis 218 a b . . . . .	21
24. Lysis 219 b . . . . .	22
25. Lysis 219 c d . . . . .	22
26. Lysis 220 c d . . . . .	23
27. Lysis 223 b . . . . .	24
28. Protagoras 316 d . . . . .	24
29. Gorgias 484 b . . . . .	25
30. Gorgias 494 e . . . . .	26
31. Hippias Maior 292 b . . . . .	28
32. Menexenus 245 e . . . . .	28
33. Republic 328 c . . . . .	29
34. Republic 414 b c . . . . .	30
35. Republic 501 b . . . . .	30
36. Republic 508 e . . . . .	32
37. Republic 515 c . . . . .	38
38. Republic 538 a . . . . .	38
39. Republic 617 d e, 620 a-d	39
40. Laws 635 b . . . . .	40
41. Laws 682 a . . . . .	41
42. Laws 689 d . . . . .	41
43. Laws 909 a . . . . .	42
44. Laws 944 a . . . . .	43
45. Laws 967 b c . . . . .	44

1. *Phaedo* 115 b. In his Budé edition Robin translates b 3–4<sup>1</sup> by “cette tâche serait, par amour pour toi, notre tâche principale” (similarly De Win). *Μάλιστα*, however, bears on *ἐν χάριτι* (a rendering like Bluck’s “anything that you would particularly like us to do” is, on this point at least, adequate). In the Pléiade version Robin has “c'est par amour surtout que nous le ferions”. Both times he renders *ἐν χάριτι* by “par amour”. So does R. Schaeerer (*Le héros, le sage et l'événement dans l'humanisme grec*, 1964, p. 171, n. 2) in his rendering of b 7: “... tout ce que vous ferez, vous le ferez par amour”—this has an almost Augustinian ring.

Before risking generalizations one should keep in mind that *ἄττ’ ἀν ποιῆτε* in b 7 bears on Crito's question *δτι . . . ποιοῦντες* in b 3: Crito has asked to be instructed about a very specific conduct. Further it must be stated that *ἐν χάριτι* can certainly mean “par amour”, but that the “objectivistic” Greek, when using the reciprocal concept *χάρις*, would first and most think of the recipient (though Denniston-Page are undoubtedly right in their note on Aeschylus, *Ag.* 787, “... it is hard to tell whether the reference is to the *service* given by him who thanks, to the intrinsic *grace* of gratitude, or to the *pleasure* of him who is thanked”; cp. further for discussion and “literature”, for instance, Fraenkel's notes on Aeschylus, *Ag.* 182, 354, 787, 1206, Barrett's additional note on Euripides, *Hipp.* 513–515, Kannicht's note on Euripides, *Hel.* 1397). Finally one may argue that more consolation would be found for Crito and the other friends of Socrates in the certainty that their act would have pleased their revered master than in the conscience that it was inspired by their love for him.

In a note to his translation (p. 187, n. 1) Hackforth says that *ἐν χάριτι* in b 3–4 and b 7 is “difficult to render, because for Socrates it means something different from what it means for Crito. The disciple is anxious to do the master some more or less trivial ‘kindness’: but Socrates catches up his word *χάρις* and gives it a deeper meaning”. Yet he uses the same word (“service”) both in b 3–4 and in b 7—rightly, for there is no “deeper meaning” given to the word *χάρις*. The unmistakable “deepening” is produced by making the qualification of *ἄττ’ ἀν ποιῆτε* dependent from the condition contained in *ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι* (b 6).

2. *Cratylus* 402 c d. Manzoni's comment makes nonsense of c 6 by confusing *αὐτό* and *τὸ αὐτό*. Robin's translation in this passage

---

<sup>1</sup> Where line-numbers are used, they are Burnet's.

lacks its usual limpidity; but its import is well brought out by (e.g.) Stallbaum, Méridier and De Win.

P. Vicaire, *Platon critique littéraire* (1960), p. 29, n. 1, thinks that Hermogenes' reply *τοῦτο μέν, ὃ Σώκρατες, κομψόν* (d 3) shows that he does not believe the etymology of the name Tethys to be right. Here intimate acquaintance with Plato's idiom has made Vicaire slip: he knows that Plato uses the word *κομψός* practically always with an ironical connotation ("nie ohne deutliche Ironie", according to E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*,<sup>3</sup> 1915, p. 69, n. 1). In the present passage, however, Plato makes Hermogenes use it without such a connotation. Hermogenes remains in character: he has grown more and more enthusiastic about Socrates' etymologies (396 d 1–2, 397 a 2–3, c 3, d 8, 398 c 5–6, 400 b 4–5, 401 b 5–6), and he is much pleased by this "refined" specimen.

Socrates' rejoinder *τί δ' οὐ μέλλει*; is a formula of assent. The assent could have been given to the criticism or doubt which Socrates might have felt in Hermogenes' words; then, however, at least a few words would have followed for justification or explanation of the etymology. Actually Socrates reacts to Hermogenes' enthusiasm with a dry "of course" and without more ado passes on to the next item.

3. *Sophist* 225 d. There is now, I think, sufficient agreement upon the point that with the word *ἀδολεσχικοῦ* (d 10) the true dialectician is meant, not the "Megarian" semi-eristic. Proclus says so, too; and Proclus may have had some difficulty in recognizing a member of the "divine" tribe in such an undignified disguise. The use of the term points, in my opinion, to self-irony (cp. *Spel bij Plato*, pp. 331 ff.; I was glad to find the same interpretation in the note to De Win's translation). It may especially be pointed out that the words *περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀκονόμενον* have a tinge of the same self-irony. Plato who knew the secret of *ψυχαγωγία* by means of the word as few authors have known, knew also how unattractive severe philosophical style might be for the common hearer or reader. Perhaps he would not have needed to draw the moral from Aristoxenus' famous, too famous, report on his "popular" lecture.

4. *Sophist* 243 b. In *Symbolae Osloenses* VI (1928) G. Rudberg published a paper on Plato's portrayal of characters. It showed a novel and fruitful approach to the question. The author asked how Plato saw and portrayed young, middle-aged and old people,

when he himself was a young, a middle-aged and an old man.

In the Eleatic Stranger's words *ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτό τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὅπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς φύμην συνιέναι· νῦν δὲ δρᾶς ίν' ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας* (*Soph.* 243 b 7–10) Rudberg heard Plato's "Seufzer über die verlorene logische Beweglichkeit und Euphorie" (*I.l.*, p. 29). This is wrong for two reasons. In the first place the "biographical fallacy" has not been avoided. This was perhaps only to be expected: Rudberg was strongly influenced by Wilamowitz, and in the work of this very great scholar the biographical fallacy occurs time and again (cp. *Lampas* IV, 1971, pp. 226, 232). In the second place, the import of the passage has not been grasped: there is nothing of a sigh in it, no nostalgic looking back, but a rather superior smile at uncritical speculations. It is in the same key as *ἐνκόλως* (242 c 4) and *μῆθόν τινα* (242 c 8).

5. *Politicus* 285 c. In *τὴν περὶ γράμματα συνονοίαν τῶν μαθανόντων* (c 8–9) Lewis Campbell (in his note on the passage) thought that *συνονοία* was "used in something of a technical sense". Disagreeing with Campbell on points of Greek idiom is a risky enterprise; yet I think that his assumption was not necessary (indeed he formulated it cautiously enough: "something of").

The topic of teaching in an elementary school had been introduced at 277 e 3. At 285 c 8 the Stranger touches again on it. The use of the word *συνονοία* has been called forth by the occurrence of *διατριβῆς* in the preceding paragraph (c 6): perhaps a desire of *variatio* is sufficient to explain its occurrence. Anyhow, the "primary" meaning of the word will do, as it will in all its occurrences in Greek of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; the rendering "conversation" fairly well covers all of them: simply "being together" may be meant, but the element of discussion which may be present can be taken account of by it.

Now in late Antiquity Simplicius and Philoponus speak about Plato's *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ συνονοία*, meaning thereby his famous "public" lecture or lectures on the Good. Probably for them the word has an entirely technical sense, meaning "discussion"; this is the more probable as they use *αἱ ἀγραφοὶ συνονοία* as equivalent to *οἱ ἀγραφοὶ λόγοι*.

The passages in Simplicius and Philoponus are referred to by H. J. Krämer (*Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles*, 1959, p. 407 with notes 50, 51; p. 462, n. 162; *Idee und Zahl*, 1968, p. 118, n. 43) in order to prove that in Plato the word *συνονοία* is used for denoting a "Lehrgespräch" (and that the lecture or lectures—Krämer's

choice—on the Good consisted of a series of such “Lehrgespräche”).

In the seventh *Platonic Letter* (which, as might be expected, he regards as undoubtedly genuine) Krämer finds the wanted meaning at 345 a 1 ἐκ τῆς μίας συνονοσίας. Here “meeting” or “conversation”, to wit between Plato and Dionysius, would, in my opinion, be a fairly adequate rendering, though Krämer might adduce 340 b 1 as a support of his interpretation. But it is difficult to find this support in 327 d 1, also referred to by Krämer, as he does to 341 c 6–7 ἐκ πολλῆς συνονοσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό. These words are to be found in the passage which is the *locus classicus* for those who find a “mystical” side to Plato, or even a mystical core in him. Whatever may be the validity of this tenet (it is, in my opinion, not valid, at least not as it is usually held), its adherents are right to point to the passage in question: *συνονοσία* (coupled with *συζῆν!*) there is certainly not a “Lehrgespräch” but a “commerce répété” (Robin’s translation).

From the authentic works Krämer quotes *Laws* 968 c 6 διδαχὴ μετὰ συνονοσίας πολλῆς. Here the element of discussion is certainly present and even predominant; but there is no need to find a “Lehrgespräch” denoted. Further 652 a 3–4 τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ συνονοσίας(!), and 950 e 7 ἐν ἱεραῖς τε καὶ εἰρηνικαῖς συνονοσίαις, where certainly no discussions can be meant. Other passages referred to by Krämer are *Laches* 201 c 2–3, where τὴν συνονοσίαν διαλύσωμεν rather points to “meeting” or “conversation” than to “discussion”, let alone to “Lehrgespräch”. Even *Protag.* 338 c 6–7, ἦν . . . συνονοσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γένενται, is only apparently a support of Krämer’s interpretation. The references to *Sympos.* 172 a 6, b 7, 173 a 4, b 3 are, of course, entirely otiose.

6. *Parmenides* 141 e. εἰη γὰρ ἀν ἥδη ὅν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον (e 11) presents a clear instance of ἥδη used in a “logical” sense. The usage is not unknown: it is listed in several dictionaries (Liddell-Scott-Jones I 4; Bailly-Séchan-Chantraine III 4; Montijn-Rogge 3 a; Bauer c 2) and indexes (Bonitz’s Aristotle 314 a 10 ff.; Powell’s Herodotus III) and discussed in Kühner-Gerth’s grammar (II, pp. 122 f.). Yet time and again commentators and translators seem to forget it, and it is necessary to point it out, cf. W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 1962, p. 345 (on Euripides, *Bacch.* 359), G. J. de Vries, *ibid.* 1965, p. 245 (on *De Sublim.* XV 1), A. M. Wolters, *Plotinus On Eros*<sup>1</sup>, 1972, pp. 44 f. (on Plotinus III 5, 3, 28). Wolters

---

<sup>1</sup> Typescript of the Philos. Inst., Free University, Amsterdam. A book edition is forthcoming.

disagrees with Verdenius' statement that the cases where the usual meanings of *ἡδη* fail are special aspects of the idea "matters have gone so far as"; still, if it is perhaps slightly too sweeping, this covers most of the cases. The turn occurs in Shorey's (adequate) rendering of *Rep.* 398 c 4, *ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἡδη ἀν εὑροι*, "having gone thus far, could not anybody discover . . ."; this is certainly preferable to Chambry's "immédiatement", Robin's "dès à présent" and De Win's "van nu af reeds". Cp. further *Phaedr.* 241 a 1, *Protag.* 316 c 2, *Gorg.* 486 e 6, *Rep.* 516 b 9, 532 a 1.

7. *Philebus* 53 c d. The anti-hedonist argument is reported that pleasure is always a becoming and serves for the sake of something else which results from the becoming, and so depends for its worth from it. In assessing the degree to which Plato is willing to endorse this argument, special attention should be paid to two expressions. The argument is ascribed to *κομψοί . . . τινες* (c 6), and in Plato *κομψός* has practically always an ironical tinge (cp. above, n. 2). And the privileged term is called *σεμνότατον* (d 6); again a word which Plato very seldom uses without very clear ironical connotation (cp. below, n. 15). These may serve as indications that Plato wants to mark his distance from the argument in question. The words *οἷς δεῖ χάρων ἔχειν* (c 7) serve the same end.

8. *Philebus* 62 b. G. Vlastos' paper, *A Metaphysical Paradox*, originally published in *Proc. and Addresses of the Amer. Philos. Assoc.* 39 (1966), pp. 5 ff., is now more easily accessible in the author's *Platonic Studies* (1973, pp. 43 ff.). One need not to agree with it on all its points to find it lucid, stimulating and helpful. Towards its end (p. 56 in the book edition) Vlastos discusses what he regards as flaws in Plato's metaphysical theories. Once more, no full agreement is needed in order to learn from Vlastos' argument. He thinks that Plato might have "understood his own theory better" and so "have saved his readers some unprofitable misinterpretations and spared himself some quite gratuitous errors. For instance, he could have shown us that his Forms are not meant to be more real in every possible way. Thus, would he not have been the first to agree that, if what we want is a good night's sleep, the ordinary, bedroom variety is considerably more real?"

In my opinion, a highly important problem is here formulated in a not entirely satisfactory way; this, however, I will not discuss. As to the last question (with its allusion to the bed in *Rep.* X),

some kind of answer to it is perhaps provided in *Philebus* 62 b 8–9 with its dry remark that into the good life also the “impure” are to be included, “if we are going to find the way home when we want it” (Hackforth’s translation).

Some lines by Hackforth (*Plato’s Examination of Pleasure*, 1945, pp. 127 f.) may be added: “It would be foolish to suppose that Plato is now for the first time struck by the thought that you cannot build a home by the light of pure mathematics and nothing else. If he had not pointed this out before, it was because he had no occasion to do so: to emphasize the nature of, and the need for, exact science seemed more important. But now, when it is a question what kinds of cognition, if any, are to be excluded from the good life, the occasion obviously arises”.

9. *Symposium* 180 b, 191 c d. A survey of what has been written about Aristophanes’ speech in the *Symposium*, either as comment or as elaboration, would provide instructive reading matter, both amusing and depressing. Recently M. Landmann, in *Ursprungsbild und Schöpfertat* (1966), pp. 38 ff., has discussed parts of the speech. His comment on 191 c 8–d 3 runs: “Das könnte metaphorisch heiszen: ursprünglich waren Seele und Idee eins, wegen eines Frevels (das alte orphische Motiv) wurden die Seelen vom Lichtreich der Idee abgeschnitten (es ist derselbe “Schnitt”, den wir sonst bei Platon als den zwischen Idee und Wirklichkeit kennen), und nun gilt ihr ganzes Streben der Rückkehr zur alten Ganzheit, der Wiedervereinigung mit der Idee (ein Psychoanalytiker würde sagen: mit der Mutter). Im Aristophanischen Sündenfallmythos verriete sich demnach, was sonst im “Symposion” unausgesprochen bleibt, was jedoch Platons gefühlter Tendenz entsprach, die sich blosz im grellen Licht der Argumente nicht mehr vorwagen durfte. Eros beruht auf einer Scheidung, und sein tiefstes Streben gilt weder dem Anblick der Idee noch der Unsterblichkeit der Seele: dies beides sind nur Symbole, ja nur Vorstufen für das (scheiternde) Streben, in dem Seele in Idee zurückmunden will”.

It is rather depressing to see such a paragraph published by a scholar who has done serious work (on Plato, too). Nearly everything in it is mistaken; nearly every word in it could, and perhaps should be criticized. Only the very worst traits will be pointed out: a) the failure to understand the intermediate position of the soul; b) the un- Platonic opposition between idea and “reality”; c) the cheap “depth-psychology” (the “gefühlte Tendenz” recalls Howald at his worst; the reader might at least have been spared the psychoanalytic quip about the mother); d) the lack

of clarity (contemplation of the idea and immortality—or longing for immortality?—are both and at the same time symbols of an effort and preparation for it).

Landmann continues: "Ist wohl Platon in der Einsicht, dasz ihr diese Rückkehr und diese Verschmelzung ewig versagt bleiben, einmalig der das Griechentum sprengende Gedanke aufgestiegen, dasz darin nicht nur eine Zurücksetzung liegen könnte, sondern dasz die Seele vielleicht gerade als bedürftige and strebende, als *nicht* schöne und gute, vor der strahlenden, autarken und ruhenden Idee etwas voraus haben sollte, dasz also die Seele, wiewohl sich nach der Idee sehnd, im Grunde doch über ihr steht? Deutet darauf der in der Rede des Phaidros aufblitzende Satz, der Liebende sei göttlicher als der Geliebte (180 b?)".

Now several of Plato's thoughts are far from being "typically Greek", and of some of them it may be said that they "das Griechentum sprengen"; but giving aspiration pride of place above its goal, just because it does not attain its goal, is quite definitely not Platonic; it is rather full-blown romanticism.

Before referring to 180 b, Landmann should have remembered a trenchant saying by one of the foremost Platonic scholars of our century, Auguste Diès, to wit: "Tout est dieu ou divin chez ce trop divin Platon" (*Autour de Platon*, 1927, p. 555). The lover is said to be "more divine" than the beloved; this statement is immediately explained: "for he is inspired". Here, as in *Ion* and *Meno*, this is a left-handed compliment—it is a long time before *μαντία* in *Phaedrus* undergoes its philosophical "transposition" (the felicitous concept which we owe to Diès, *o.l.*, pp. 400 ff.). The compliment is rightly gauged by J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ chez Platon* (1956), p. 73: "Précisément en raison de cette inspiration irrésistible, son acte devient moins méritoire que celui de l'aimé". Of course, the speaker, Phaedrus, is not supposed to think so; but Plato would have supposed his readers to understand that he himself did.

A remark may be added on the first five speeches in *Symposium*. They are sometimes regarded as having no merit in themselves and serving only to make stand out more clearly what Diotima and Socrates have to say. This, however, would have been a grave artistic mistake: the dialogue would have been built without any sense of proportion. Actually, each of the speeches contributes something to the clarification of the subject, even the ones by Phaedrus and Agathon.

10. *Symposium* 194 a-d. At the beginning of his party Agathon appears as the perfect host. He is fully master of what might

have developed into a rather awkward situation when putting the unexpected guest, Aristodemus, at his ease (174 e). Probably the reader is meant to feel that, in the orders given to the servants, his acting the genial host is slightly overdone (175 b). His words of welcome to Socrates are rather gushing, and it is significant that Socrates' answer, though very complimentary, contains some bubble-pricking too; Agathon's reaction (175 e 7) shows that he has felt it.

Agathon is piqued by Socrates' remark. This should be remembered in order to understand 194 a-d. G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (21948), pp. 131 f., thinks that there Agathon has lost his confidence: "Agathon . . . wird unsicher, sobald sein Können und Ansehen ins Spiel kommt. Er ist ein empfindlicher, reflektierter Mensch". The last sentence is right; but I do not think that Agathon shows a lack of confidence. He is vainglorious; this makes him touchy when his art or his reputation is at stake. From Socrates' words in 194 a 1-4 he only picks up the turn which he can explain as expressing the company's expectation of his, Agathon's, success; to Socrates' feelings he pays no attention. In *πολλῶν ἀργόνων* (b 8) one hears the "lofty contempt for the bourgeois of the pit and the gallery . . . quite in keeping with A.'s position as the artistic aristocrat" (Bury *ad locum*). Certainly the *ἀλτύοι ἔμφρονες* are distinguished from these, but when Socrates points out that, after all, the present company were part of the *πολλοί* at the performance of the previous day, Agathon leaves it at that: apparently the distinction is not too important. Now self-assertion may serve to cover diffidence; so the psychologists tell us. But I do not think there is any lack of confidence to be felt in Agathon's speech in which the first and almost the last word is *ἔγώ* (194 e 4, 197 e 6).

11. *Phaedrus* 237 c. D. Mannsperger's *Physis bei Platon* (1969) is a valuable contribution to Platonic scholarship. Pointing out an error in it means no detracting from its merits.

The author holds (p. 168) that "Physis bezeichnet . . . einen Sachverhalt als Gegenstand der Erforschung, des Verstehens, *οὐσία* als Gegenstand der Definition, der Festlegung". This statement, in my opinion, is open to objections, at least in such a general form as the author has given it. But at present I will not enter upon it; I will rather look at the passage which immediately follows it and serves as an illustration for it. According to Mannsperger, *Phaedrus* 237 c treats of the "Verhältnis der Rhetorik zu ihrem Gegenstand". In *τοῦς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι*

*τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστου. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐδὲ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκός ἀποδίδοσιν* he finds technical terminology used: “*Oὐσίᾳ* steht hier in der Beziehung zum Wissen, zur festen Verfügbarkeit, die zur Aussage, *ἀπόδοσις*, hindrängt, aber der *σκέψη* keinen Raum mehr lässt” (as a contrast he quotes 270 c 10: there, it is said, *διανοεῖσθαι* takes the place of *εἰδέναι*, and “die Physisvorstellung bringt Beweglichkeit, Bereitschaft zum Suchen mit sich”).

Now there is certainly some theorizing in the passage just quoted, but it is rather elementary, far below the sophisticated and technical level which Mannsperger's interpretation presupposes. Especially the use of the terms “Aussage, *ἀπόδοσις*” is misleading. Neither the verb *ἀποδίδονται* nor the substantive *ἀπόδοσις* are found in Plato with the logical or grammatical uses which they can have in Aristotle. Moreover, even if they were used by Plato in these senses, the combination *τὸ εἰκός ἀποδίδονται* can in no way have them.

In Ast's lexicon one finds *s.v.* *ἀποδίδωμι* the entry “*pendo, h.e. patior, experior*”, with reference to the present passage and to *Theaet.* 175 d. This is a translator's recipe, and not a very good one at that, because the force of *ἀπό* is not brought out. There is no need to introduce penal terminology, as in Fernandez Gil's “reciben el natural castigo” (comparable are the translations by Ritter, Salin-Bollack, Rufener, De Win, Hackforth and Robin); a rendering like the one by Helmbold-Rabinowitz, “the result is what one might expect” (similarly Vollgraff and L. Cooper), is fully satisfactory.

12. *Phaedrus* 250 d. The position of beauty is privileged, it is not unique. M. Fuhrmann, *Einführung in die antike Dichtungstheorie*, 1973, p. 77, asserts that “nicht allen Erscheinungsformen kommt es nach Platon zu, zwischen der Realität und den Ideen, zwischen Sinnlichem und Geistigem zu vermitteln; diese Funktion, heiszt es im *Phaidros*, sei ein Privileg des Schönen, und das Schöne allein ermögliche den Aufstieg der Seele von den veränderlichen Erscheinungen zu den unveränderlichen Wesenheiten”<sup>1</sup>. The terminology which the author uses is sufficient to make his readers shy: an opposition between “reality” and the ideas in definitely not Platonic. His statement is immediately refuted by what is said some few lines before (250 b 3) about *δημοιώματα*, and it runs counter to everything that Plato said about “imitation” of the

<sup>1</sup> In his next sentence he contends that art has no part in beauty's evoking power; it can only show deficiency. This statement is based exclusively on *Rep.* X (Fuhrmann's only reference).

ideas or “participation” in them and the function of the *μεταξύ*.

G. Krüger does understand Plato's thought; but he, too, fails to grasp the import of the present passage, as is shown by his translation (*Einsicht und Leidenschaft* 21948, p. 229) of d 5–6: “... wenn etwas dieser Art ein helles Abbild seiner selbst auf dem Wege über das Gesicht darbieten würde ...” (apparently *τι τοιοῦτον* is taken as subject!).

Right understanding of the passage is not helped, rather it is obstructed by assuming and sometimes marking a parenthesis, beginning at *δεινούς* in d 4. If it is assumed, it should by all means be made to end with *έραστά*, not with *ἰόν* in d 6.

Actually it is said in the passage that *δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς* (b 1–2, = *τὰλλα ὅσα έραστά*, d 6) do evoke *ἔρωτες*. Only their *δμουάματα* do not possess the *φέγγος* which the *δμουάματα* of beauty show (b 2–3 ~ d 1). If *φρόνησις* could be clearly seen, it would evoke *δεινούς* *ἔρωτας*. So would *τὰλλα ὅσα έραστά*. But as it is (*νῦν δέ*), beauty is privileged.<sup>1</sup>

How easily the (more or less correctly marked) parenthesis can cause misunderstanding of the passage is shown by the mistake made in the translation by Hackforth (certainly a perceptive and a careful translator!). He couples *φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται* with *καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα έραστά*, and translates “nor yet any other of these beloved objects” (which would require *οὐδέ*, not *καὶ*, in the Greek text). The same mistake is to be found in the translations by Buchwald and Salin-Bollack. Several existing translations of the passage are not sufficiently clear; of those which I have checked, the renderings by Ritter, L. Cooper and Helmbold-Rabinowitz are correct.

13. *Phaedrus* 257 c. In their interesting and stimulating paper on “The Middle Speech in Plato's *Phaedrus*” in *Journ. Hist. Philos.* IX (1971), pp. 405 ff., M. Brown and J. Coulter state that in their argument “the terms sophist and rhetor have been used more or less interchangeably” (p. 414, n. 16). They argue that this is justified by Plato's statements in *Gorgias* 465 c and 520 a; then they add: “Much the same lack of concern about the two terms is in evidence at *Phaedrus* 257 C–D, where logographer and sophist are clearly the same”. In fact, however, the concept of sophistry does not enter into the discussion of *Phaedrus* 257 c 4 ff.; politician and logographer are identified—in this process there is certainly no “lack of concern about the two terms”. The discussion

<sup>1</sup> Nothing in this paragraph is new. Everything in it is to be found in commentaries published more than a hundred years ago and rightly still consulted. But apparently it must be repeated. *Τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὑτυχές.*

is on writing *qua* writing, and it serves as a preparation for the generalization which will occur at 278 b c (cp. n. 17 below).

14. *Phaedrus* 270 a. In his translation of the dialogue, with an introduction and notes, *Platon, Phèdre* (1972), P. Vicaire suggests (p. 143) that a translator should in his rendering attenuate the pejorative sense of the words *ἀδολεσχία* and *μετεωρολογία* in 270 a 1 (in *Platon critique littéraire*, 1960, pp. 356 f., he argued in the same way; he is mistaken in claiming support from Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, 1952, p. 150).

The suggestion is not so good; but Vicaire is right in thinking that the words in question have an unfavourable meaning in the passage referred to. This seems to have escaped the lexicographers. From ten dictionaries which I have checked, nine, for *ἀδολεσχία* and cognate words, besides translations like "garrulity", "bavardage", give a rendering like "keenness, subtlety", "subtilité ingénieuse", to wit Passow (2<sup>1</sup>841), Alexandre (2<sup>0</sup>1880), Pape-Sengebusch (3<sup>1</sup>914), Montijn-Rogge (2<sup>1</sup>927), Muller (3<sup>1</sup>933), Liddell-Scott-Jones (9<sup>1</sup>948; no entry in the supplement, 1968), Bailly-Séchan-Chantraine (1<sup>6</sup>1950), Bartelink (1958), Muller-Thiel-Den Boer (1<sup>1</sup>969). As often, Passow-Crönert (1912) is a pleasant exception.

Now for the supposedly favourable meanings the lexicographers can, for classical Greek at least, only refer to Platonic passages, especially to *Phaedrus* 270 a 1 (references to other authors or generalities like "Att." are erroneous). The presupposition of the listing is that Plato used in a favourable sense what clearly originated as a term of abuse. This has been offered several times as an explanation; recently by P. Steinmetz in the introduction to his comments on Theophrastus, *Charact. III* (1962).

An interesting position is taken by D. Mannsperger, *Physis bei Platon* (1969), pp. 257 ff.; he thinks that Plato, by using rather high-flown language combined with terms of abuse in 269 e 4–270 a 9, wished to make clear the distance between his own projected rhetoric and the Anaxagorean inspiration of Pericles' oratory.

Mannsperger's interpretation is, in my opinion, untenable; but he has rightly gauged the import of terms like *ἀδολεσχία*, *μετεωρολογία* and their cognates. Wheresoever these terms occur in the works of Plato, to wit at *Phaedo* 70 c, *Crat.* 396 c, 401 b (404 c), *Theaet.* 195 b c, *Soph.* 225 d (cp. above, n. 3), *Polit.* 299 b, *Phaedr.* 270 a, *Rep.* 489 c (*Tim.* 91 d hardly counts), they are terms of abuse, as they were used by the Athenian people. Plato either quotes the abusing words or takes them up. The latter possibility was clearly seen and pointed out by W. H. Thompson

in his note on 270 a 1: "The word ἀδολεσχία—endless chatter, garrulity—applied by the vulgar in contempt to philosophic διάλεξις, is accepted by Plato and paraded with a kind of defiance . . . It is characteristic of the proud humility which formed so considerable an element in the Socratic εἰρωνεία . . .". This is an excellent interpretation; I would only add that in the use of the terms in question a tinge of self-irony may be present (cp. above, n. 3, and *Spel bij Plato*, 1949, pp. 331 ff., 346 ff.).

15. *Phaedrus* 275 d. Towards the end of the *Phaedrus* the discussion turns to the value of writing. Then the famous comparison of writing to painting occurs and it is said καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης (to wit, ζωγραφίας) ἔχοντα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα· ἐάν δὲ ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάντα στῆῃ (275 d 5–6).

Now P.-M. Schuhl, in *Platon et l'art de son temps* (21952), p. 49, n. 4, believes that "ces derniers mots évoquent le silence religieux des mystiques". In my opinion, this was hardly a notion current with Greeks of the fourth century B.C. (cp. the material collected in O. Casel, *De philosophorum graecorum silentio mystico*, 1919). And Socrates' long silence, described in *Sympos.* 220 c d, was neither religious nor mystical.

In a little monograph, *Die schweigenden Götter* (1966), which deserves more attention than it has earned, Klaus Schneider rightly contends that Plato's gods are not silent. He argues (p. 42) that "da Platons Dialoge keine religiöse Schriften sind, kann gar nicht erst danach gefragt werden, ob die Stille eine der Bedingungen der Erkenntnis Gottes sei". Then he continues: "Das Schweigen wird an einer Stelle als ästhetische Kategorie erwähnt", referring to the passage quoted above. The shift is not warranted.

Both authors have been led astray by the occurrence of the word σεμνῶς. As I pointed out long ago (*Mnemosyne* 1944, pp. 151 ff.), σεμνός and cognate words are used by Plato practically always with an ironical connotation.

16. *Phaedrus* 276 e. H. J. Krämer's summarizing of the passage (*Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles*, 1959, p. 25) is tendentious. With him λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν (276 e 6) becomes "der dialektische Lehrer wählt unter den Adephen die Geeigneten aus". This, of course, in order to support his esoteric interpretation. Now there are in the context some passages which might be thought to admit of such an interpretation; 275 e 2, for instance, or 276 a 7 (*might*; quite definitively no more than that, and taken into a

larger context the interpretation would prove to be wrong) But certainly not the present passage: *λαμβάνειν* is never "to choose" or "to pick out".

Hackforth, too, renders by "selects"—an inadvertence, I think, of a great scholar; certainly without the slightest esotericist tendency. Other translations vary; not all of them are felicitous (Vollgraff's "geschickt bevonden" is definitely wrong). "Finds" (Helmbold-Rabinowitz; similarly De Win) is quite satisfactory.

17. *Phaedrus* 278 c. In 257 c 9 ff. Socrates has argued that politicians are to be regarded as writers, though their *συγγράμματα* are called by another name. At first Phaedrus is greatly astonished by this statement (257 e 7); but at last he is convinced. In the concluding pages of the dialogue Socrates returns to the subject. He lays down the main condition for good writing. Phaedrus is bid to deliver the message about it to "Lysias and all other composers of discourses" (meaning rhetorical compositions), to "Homer and all others who have written poetry", and also to "Solon and all such as are authors of political compositions under the name of laws" (278 c, Hackforth's translation).

Here a generalization appears which attains a high level of abstraction<sup>1</sup>. Later, explicit, theory falls below it. Aristotle uses distinctions which led to the disjunction poetry-rhetoric. This was very popular with theoricians, and it is still influential. Yet many literary critics, both ancient and modern, have ignored it, taking their examples equally from poetry, history and oratory; but the literary relevance of legal texts remains outside their ken. It is only in quite recent times that one finds a generalization comparable to Plato's, to wit in the doctrine held by Jan Mukařovský, the Czech theorician, that literature is to be found where the way in which the linguistic medium is handled is part of the "message".

The passage is regarded (and rightly so) as highly important by the Tübingen scholars (Krämer has printed *Phaedrus* 278 b–e as a motto in front of his *magnum opus*). They are not interested in literary theory, but they use the passage as one of the most explicit testimonies in favour of their esotericist interpretation and their assessment of the philosophical value of the dialogues. Here I will not discuss their (in my opinion, mistaken) interpretation, but only two passages in H. J. Krämer's work which touch upon literary criticism, or theory.

---

<sup>1</sup> One wonders why P. Vicaire in his highly valuable *Platon critique littéraire* (1960) has omitted to discuss it; neither 257 c nor 278 c are even so much as mentioned.

According to Krämer (*Idee und Zahl*, 1968, p. 122, n. 54, pp. 128 f.), in the sentence *ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμοντος ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν* a work like Plato's *Republic* is also meant: it is "eine staatstheoretische Programmschrift, die sich in die Nachfolge der Phaleas, Hippodamos, Protagoras, Kritias, Thrasymachos, Antiphon und bestimmter Sokratiker stellt". The words *νόμοντος ὀνομάζων*, however, tell against this statement. The development in 257 c ff. is recalled, and Socrates states once more definitely the subsumption of laws and decrees under literary composition.

In *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (1959), p. 23, n. 22, Krämer points out that Plato in the *Phaedrus* "sich . . . offensichtlich als Schriftsteller in eine Reihe stellt" mit den Rednern, Dichtern und Gesetzgebern, von denen er sich als *Philosoph* distanziert" (here the tripartition of 278 c is rightly reported) He argues that when *Phaedrus* was published Plato had composed works of all the three types: oratory in the "Redeagon" in *Rep.* I (bk. II would have been a better choice), *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, the fifth discourse in *Symposium* and the speeches in *Phaedrus*; poetry in the myths and in *Symposium*, taken as a whole; "political discourses" in *Republic*. All this is rather strained (and as to *Rep.* wrong; cp. the preceding paragraph). Moreover, where does a dialogue like *Cratylus* fit in?

If Plato was interested in classifying his own writings, he may have regarded them as mimes, classifying them under poetry (for this one cannot refer to *Laws* 811 c d, where the point of view is not literary). Probably he would not have cared. Certainly not at the stage of the dialogue where the implicit general theory of literature is found. Plato is passionately interested in literary craftsmanship; but at the end of the *Phaedrus* his main interest is centred on the philosophical basis of writing; as so often in Plato, the "theory" is offered in a passing hint.

18. *Charmides* 155 a. After more than a century and a half G. Groen van Prinsterer's *Prosopographia Platonica* (1823) is still indispensable. In this book (p. 214) the author proposed to read in *Charm.* 155 a 1 not the transmitted *ἴαντῷ* but *ἐμαντῷ*, because to say that Charmides regarded himself as poetical "nec Charmidis moribus erit, nec Critiae Charmidem laudantis consilio accomodatum". Leaving alone the fact that the emendation would yield indifferent Greek, one must reject it; regarding himself as poetical need not be out of character for Charmides (how many boys may have dreamt of becoming great artists?); to say so might be. Moreover, it is only Critias' assertion that Charmides thinks about himself

as being poetical. As to Groen van Prinsterer's second point, Critias certainly praises Charmides warmly, but some friendly teasing can easily be mixed with the praise. At least at this stage in the dialogue; not at 162 cd.

19. *Charmides* 157 c d. Mrs. Rosamond Kent Sprague (*Plato, Laches and Charmides*, transl. with introd. and notes, 1973) translates c 9-d 1, ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν . . . βελτίων γενέσθαι, by "he will be forced to improve his wits", adding in a note that "Critias has not quite understood Socrates". Apparently she takes *διάνοια* in its intellectual meaning. But in the present context, as in numerous other passages in Plato, it has a moral import. This is made clear by the next sentence, especially if one takes with Mrs. Sprague (and Croiset) *μέρτοι* in the adversative sense (if it is taken as confirmative, as is done, for instance, by Robin and De Win, Critias is made to add something which is loosely connected and rather superfluous). Critias says in c 7-d 3: Charmides' headache will prove to be a piece of good luck, if together with his head his soul will be improved. However, [this is hardly possible, because] Charmides is already a moral paragon. This squares with the stress on *σωφροσύνη* (d 3, 6) which clearly at the start of the discussion is taken in its moral sense (cp. 158 c 5 ff.).

So why slander Critias? He has perfectly well understood Socrates.

20. *Laches* 189 c. Old Lysimachus has started a discussion with Melesias, a man of equally ripe age. But at a given moment things become too difficult for them and they withdraw, begging Socrates to take their part in the discussion with Nicias and Laches. They will make their decision concerning the education of their sons depend from the outcome of this discussion. As an excuse for his withdrawal Lysimachus pleads his age: ἔγώ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἥδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὃν ἀν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι καὶ αὗτ ἀν ἀκούσω· ἐὰν δὲ μεταξὺ ἀλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐδὲ πάντα μέμνημαι. These are Burnet's text and punctuation. Schanz, however, has changed the transmitted ἐὰν δέ into ἐάν γε, putting a comma after ἀκούσω. Croiset and several translators (Robin and De Win, for instance) have accepted Schanz's emendation, taking αὗτ ἀκούσω as the object to *μέμνημαι*.

Wilamowitz was not pleased by the emendation. He argues rightly that "das Vergessen van Frage und Antwort ein Glied ist", and "dass er in einem Gespräche, wie es hier von mehreren geführt

wird, den Faden verliert, das zweite” (*Platon II*, 21920, p. 368). He might have added the remark that with Schanz’s reading  $\muέν$  and the first  $\kappa\alpha\lambda$  are difficult to explain (cp. J. D. Moore, G. J. de Vries, J. B. Skemp, *Mnemosyne* 1969, pp. 225 ff.; 230 ff.; 1970, pp. 302 ff.).

But then Wilamowitz overshoots his mark. He says: “Dies aber ist schwerer” (meaning, of course, that it is more difficult not to lose the thread of a complicated conversation: so much can be understood from his argument—hypomnematic style may require some special effort, but it is far preferable to prolixity). If this is more difficult, is Wilamowitz’s argument, it cannot “durch  $o\delta\piάρν$   $\muέμηματ$  eingeschränkt werden, sondern fordert eine Steigerung:  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\piάρν o\delta\muέμηματ$ ”.

This, however, is a mistake. The climax which Wilamowitz requires is to be found in the text as it has been transmitted:  $o\delta\piάρν$  occurs fairly often as a litotes—it is incredible that the usage should have been unknown to the great scholar Wilamowitz (cp. Kühner-Gerth, *Griech. Gramm.* II, 31904, p. 180; H. Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek*, 1954, p. 80; J. Riddell, *Digest of Platonic Idioms*, 1867, § 139; Jebb on Soph., *Oed. Col.* 144; Wyse on Isaeus IV 12,4).

21. *Lysis* 210 c. G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (1973), p. 7, n. 17, rightly points out that in the rendering of c 5–8  $\deltaρ'$   $o\deltaν$   $\tauω\varphiίλοι$   $\epsilon\sigma\muεθα$   $\kappa\alpha\lambda$   $\tauις\etaμας$   $\varphiιλήσει$   $\epsilon\nu$   $\tauούτοις$ ,  $\epsilon\nu$   $o\iota\varsigma$   $\delta\nu\omegaμεν$   $\dot{\alpha}\nuωφελεῖς$ , . . .  $\nu\tilde{\nu}n$   $\ddot{\alpha}\rhoα$   $o\delta\delta\epsilon$   $\sigma\epsilon$   $\delta$   $\piατηρ$   $o\delta\delta\epsilon$   $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\lambda\lambda$   $o\delta\delta\epsilon\epsilon\epsilon$   $\varphiιλεῖ$ ,  $\kappa\alpha\theta'$   $\delta\sigma\sigma\sigma\sigma$   $\delta\nu\tilde{\nu}$   $\ddot{\alpha}\chi\varrhoηστος$ , additions like Jowett’s and Robin’s to their translations of  $\dot{\alpha}\nuωφελεῖς$  and  $\ddot{\alpha}\chi\varrhoηστος$ , to wit “useless to them” (“to him”), “ne lui sert à rien”, spoil the argument by making what Socrates calls love coincide with what in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is described as utility-love.

It is remarkable that A. W. Begemann in his very careful analysis of the dialogue (cp. below, n. 24) has not pressed the point. But he would have protested against Vlastos’ term “love” in “what Socrates calls love”—one of his main points is that  $\varphiιλία$  should not be identified with love.

Vlastos rightly praises Croiset’s rendering of the passage in question for its correctness. The translation by Xaveer de Win shows in this passage, too, its usual accuracy.

22. *Lysis* 215 e, 216 a. A. W. Begemann (cp. n. 24) rightly gauged the import of the passage 215 c 4–216 c 1, but he failed to notice that the theorist who is quoted is called  $\kappaομψός$  at 216 a 1.

By pointing to the ironical connotation which the word has in Plato's usage (cp. n. 2) he could have strengthened his argument.

R. Stein, *Megaloprepeia bei Platon* (1965), pp. 46 f., is alive to the ironical tinge of *μεγαλοπρεπέστερον* at 215 e 1 where it is said about the same theorist that he ἐπεξήγει τῷ λόγῳ *μεγαλοπρεπέστερον*, but he confuses the evidence about *κομψός*, writing: "Dabei macht es wenig Unterschied aus, ob man sich wie Hippias für weise hält oder, wie es hier geschieht, für einen feinen, scharfsinnigen Mann (*κομψός*)". In Stein's context "hier" bears on the passage in *Lysis* (216 a 1); there, however, the qualification is given by Socrates. As to *Hipp. Mai.* 288 d 4 (referred to by Stein in his note 127), there Socrates calls the fictitious interlocutor who has been introduced at 286 c 5 *οὐ κομψός, ἀλλὰ συρρετός, οὐδὲν ἀλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές*, mockingly adapting his terms to common standards.

23. *Lysis* 218 a b. The relation between this passage and the corresponding passages in *Sypos.* 204 a and *Phaedr.* 278 d has often been discussed. A. W. Begemann, *Plato's Lysis* (cp. n. 24), p. 471, takes a peculiar position. He argues that the question whether a man can be called wise is answered positively, though with reservations, in *Sypos.*, with scepticism in *Lysis*, and negatively in *Phaedrus*. In this way, he says, a completely satisfactory line in Plato's change of opinion ("een ten volle bevredigende lijn van oordeelswijziging") becomes apparent. He thinks that this line is parallel to the chronological order of the dialogues (the order *Sypos.-Phaedr.-Lysis* would also be possible, according to Begemann).

Without entering into the question of relative chronology of the dialogues (I think that the dating of *Lysis* is the most vulnerable part in Begemann's book), one may consider the proposed interpretation of 218 a b. This is mainly based on the words *εἴτε θεοί εἴτε ἀνθρώποι εἰσιν οὗτοι* (a 3–4): "the decision of a man who finally wants to leave the question open" ("de beslissing van iemand die tenslotte de kwestie onbeslist wenst te laten"; the author's italics). This, in my opinion, is confusing scepticism with conscience of the limitations of man's knowledge. Actually the passage contains a summons to philosophizing, and is quite in tune with what is said in *Apolog.* 38 a: *ὅ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ*. Better than by Begemann, the import of the passage has been gauged by J. Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (1939), p. 275: "L'avantage de ces lignes, c'est de nous fournir positivement une explication dont le *Banquet* ne nous donne que le négatif; au lieu de nous expliquer l'incuriosité des ignorants

par l'ignorance où ils se trouvent, elle (the pronoun must refer to "ces lignes") nous montre dans la conscience de sa propre ignorance la condition de l'activité philosophique (*ἔτι γνούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἀ μὴ οἰσασιν*). Par là nous savons précisément en quoi consiste cet intermédiaire entre le savoir et l'ignorance; c'est l'ignorance qui se sait . . .".

24. *Lysis* 219 b. By an accumulation of unfavourable coincidences A. W. Begemann's *Plato's Lysis*<sup>1</sup> never won the attention which this important book deserves. The present note has partly been composed in order to draw attention to it.

On pp. 482–485 of his book Begemann argues convincingly against Hermann's suppletion in 219 b 3 *τὸ φίλον* *〈τοῦ φίλον〉* which is accepted by Croiset and Vicaire, and against Burnet's *τοῦ φίλον* *〈τοῦ φίλον〉*, and shows that they are not only not needed, but that they even disturb the clarity of the argument. It is impossible to summarize Begemann's closely-knit argument; but as it mainly bears on logical relations, his technical Dutch is easy to follow.

25. *Lysis* 219 c d. Aristarchus' method was "*Ομηρον ἐξ Ομήρου σαφηνίζειν*. In strictness of method, applied in another department of Greek literature, he is equalled and almost surpassed by A. W. Begemann in *Plato's Lysis* (cp. n. 24). B. wishes to explain the dialogue without using data from other works by the same author (cp. especially p. 407). Much can be said in favour of this method; it is certainly commendable in the initial phase of an inquiry. But it can be applied in too rigorous a way; and this, in my opinion, is what Begemann does when treating of the *πρῶτον φίλον* in 219 d 1.

Begemann, who explains the dialogue as an exercise in relational logic, is certainly consistent when rejecting all attempts to find a metaphysical (ontological, ethical) import in the *πρῶτον φίλον* (without knowing his work, G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, 1973, pp. 35 ff., argues about it in exactly the same way as Begemann does). Undoubtedly in the argument of the *Lysis* the *πρῶτον φίλον*

<sup>1</sup> A doctoral thesis of the Free University, Amsterdam, 1960; printed and put on sale by Buijten and Schipperheijn, Amsterdam. K. J. Popma wrote some scholarly pages on it in *Lucerna* II, 1960, pp. 560–567; this periodical, however, which is published in Dutch has only a very restricted circulation. When I learnt that no copies for review had been distributed at all, I published a belated review-announcement in *Mnemosyne* (1966, pp. 420 f.).

functions as the terminus of a logical chain, and Begemann is entirely right in rejecting an identification of this logical development with the *ἐπαναβαθμός* which in *Symposium* leads up to the vision of the *καλόν*.

But it is possible to hear overtones in the passage in which the *πρῶτον φίλον* is introduced; overtones which, I think, were meant to be heard and which serve as reminders of ontological and axiological possibilities. There is in the first place the use of the term *εἰδωλα* (d. 3). Several commentators have argued that its occurrence in this passage points to the presence of the “theory of ideas” in it. Now Begemann can easily refute such interpretations (similarly Vlastos); but he should have acknowledged the fact that an allusion can be heard, and, for once, his argument (*o.l.*, pp. 340 ff.) is not entirely convincing when he belittles the importance of the occurrence of the word. Further one may hear overtones in *πρῶτον φίλον*: granted that in the argument *φίλον* is no more than a relational term, in *πρῶτον φίλον* something more may be suggested (in the combination—not in *πρῶτον* alone: the author of the *Seventh Platonic Letter* who knew his Plato very well made a slip when he made him speak about *τι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων*, 344 d 4–5). Finally there is the striking trait *ἀπειπεῖν λόντας* (c 5–6): a sudden vivid touch amidst the abstractions of the argument. Translators should take care not to lose it. Neither Croiset’s “Mais ne sommes-nous pas entraînés dans une progression sans fin . . .?”, nor Robin’s “Mais, dans cette progression, ne sommes-nous pas forcés à lâcher pied?” do justice to the turn. De Win has “Maar kunnen we zo blijven doorgaan? Moeten we daar niet noodgedwongen van afzien?”, which has at least an echo of *λόντας* but still is lacking in vividness.

In *Phaedo* 99 d 4–5, *ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ δύντα σκοπῶν*, translators meet with a comparable difficulty. Bluck’s “failed” is not quite exact; Rufener’s “es aufgegeben hatte” too bleak; Robin’s “découragé” (both in the Budé and in the Pléiade translations) not fully satisfactory. By introducing the word “of”, that highly perceptive interpreter and translator Hackforth failed in his rendering of the passage: he has “had wearied of my investigations”. This may have led astray De Win who gives “er genoeg van gekregen had” (more or less equivalent to “was fed up with”—one of the few mistakes in his very reliable translation). The (often stilted) version by the poet P. C. Boutens is right: “moede geworden was van” (“had become tired by”).

26. *Lysis* 220 c d. M. Landmann, *Ursprungsbild und Schöpfertat* (1966), p. 61, thinks that there is a contradiction between this

passage and *Theaetetus* 176 a, οὕτι ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν. He mistakes the character of the argument in the *Lysis* passage. If anywhere in his interpretation of this dialogue, A. W. Begemann, *Plato's Lysis* (cp. n. 24), pp. 70 ff., 242 ff., is justified in regarding its argument as an exercise in relational logic; cp. also J. Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (1939), p. 165, on the "appel à une expérience évidemment fictive". In *Lysis* 220 c d the argument is strictly logical, without any metaphysical import; *Theaet.* 176 a contains a metaphysical statement.

27. *Lysis* 223 b. A. W. Begemann, *Plato's Lysis* (1960), pp. 386, 389, makes a cautious use of G. Rudberg's approach (cp. above, n. 4). He shows that in the *Lysis* the erotical element is handled in a strikingly detached manner, and he argues that Socrates converses with Athenian youth in an at the same time paternal and playful way. All this is right; but Begemann should not have found an argument in the final passage where Socrates calls himself a γέρων ἀνήρ: "old" can be a relative concept, and "older" men often display some "inverse coquetry" when speaking about their age with younger people (cp. *Mnemosyne* 1955, p. 274, against a remark made by D. J. Allan on *Crat.* 429 d 7).

Even if Socrates should really have to be seen as an old man in the *Lysis*, he would be so as a literary character, created by the author of the dialogue. Begemann is not entirely clear on this point, but his note 44 on p. 386 makes the reader suppose that he would not draw an argument for his dating of the dialogue from the way in which Socrates is represented in it.

28. *Protagoras* 316 d. In K. Döring and W. Kullmann, (edd.), *Studia Platonica* (1974), p. 47, W. J. Verdenius argues that in 316 d 2 φθόνος (*φθόνοι*) does not mean "envy", but "criticism, censure, reproach" ("Tadel"). He quotes with assent Nestle's statement that "wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung wurde als nutzlos oder schädlich betrachtet". This, however, is not the point in question. The preceding passage (*ξέρον* c 5–*συνονοίαν* d 1) shows that it is not the subject-matter of the sophists' teaching or the fact that they teach which evokes φθόνοι, but the personal success of their ability to attract young people. The sophist is, at least in Plato's view, the "agonistic" man *par excellence*. Therefore the idea that people will be envious of his success comes quite natural to him (for φθόνος, cp. also n. 40 below).

29. *Gorgias* 484 b. In his lucid note on this passage Dodds convincingly refutes the arguments proffered by Wilamowitz (*Platon II*, 21920, pp. 96 f.) for ascribing the famous misquotation in the fragment from Pindar to Plato himself. He then proceeds to say that he feels “no doubt that Plato quoted Pindar correctly”, and he explains the supposed corruption in the mss. as a “spoonerism”, comparable to the one to be found in B at [Plato], *Alcib.* II 138 a 1. C. Pavese, *Harv. St. Class. Phil.* 72, 1967, p. 55, n. 22, fully agrees with Dodds.

Now A. E. Taylor (*Plato, the Man and his Work*,<sup>3</sup> 1926, p. 117, n. 2) thought that Plato deliberately made a misquotation; the suggestion returns with W. Theiler (*Mus. Helvet.* 22, 1965, p. 69). Theiler speaks only about a “bedenkenlose halb-ironische Miszinterpretation”, without venturing an explanation. Taylor thought that “the verses had been actually quoted in this form by the champions of φύσις against νόμος in the fifth century”. Now this assertion, a corollary of Burnet’s and Taylor’s well-known historicist theories, is certainly fanciful. But Dodds’ refutation of it is not entirely cogent. He argues that “the misquotation would have no dramatic value (and would pass unnoticed by most readers) unless Socrates proceeded to correct it”. In my opinion, Taylor rightly held that the words τὸ γὰρ ἀσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι serve as a hint that the quotation is not correct. Dodds, however, thinks that the words “are surely no more than Plato’s device for avoiding a long quotation which in a dialogue would lack verisimilitude” (on this point, too, Pavese agrees with Dodds). But no reader of the *Gorgias* would probably have expected to find Pindar’s poem quoted to its full extent; nor does one find, as far as I know, in a dialogue or in any other kind of literary work in Greek a speaker or character or writer excusing himself for only quoting part of a work. Moreover, Dodds’ explanation does not account for the preceding words, οὐτω πως, which bear on exactitude, not on length.

Perhaps one may suppose, with Taylor, a deliberate misquotation, but attempt at a different explanation. In many societies one finds aristocrats disclaiming exact knowledge or purposely performing in a not quite exact way: possession of exact knowledge or perfect skill would put them on a par with professionals and so would make them banausic (cp. the amusing case of *Pro S. Roscio Amerino* 46 where Cicero, parading senatorial *gravitas*, pretends not exactly to know the name of some character in a comedy; in the next paragraph he forgets his pose and says that everybody knows the character in question).

Greeks, too, knew the attitude; but careful distinctions are needed. The sentiment behind it is not to be found in Callicles’

words at 484 c 5 ff.; there one hears some kind of pedagogical concern. Nor can it be said to have inspired the passages which Newman refers to in his note on Aristotle, *Polit.* 1337 b 15. In Isocrates' many quips against too deep a plunge into philosophy, mainly sprung from jealousy, it cannot be felt. But one finds it in [Demosth.], *Erot.* 44, and in Plutarch, *Vita Per.* 1 (in a note to the latter passage in the Budé edition Flacelière and Chambry wrongly refer to Xenophon, *Oecon.* IV 2, as a parallel; in that passage the class sentiment is different).

Perhaps *Tim.* 21 c should be compared. Somebody calls Solon *κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν τῶν ποιητῶν πάντων ἐλευθεριώτατον*. I think that Taylor in his note on the passage is right in taking this to mean that Solon composed "like a free gentleman, to please himself", in contradistinction to professional poets who were obliged to gratify the tastes of their patrons. Proclus reports on the discussions which the word provoked in Antiquity, cp. his commentary on the *Timaeus* 29 b (I 93, 7 ff. Diehl) and Festugière's translation with notes of this work I (1966), p. 129, n. 3. Taylor can refer to Origenes (the Platonist) for his explanation—it is anyhow preferable to a vagueness like Rivaud's translation (in the Budé edition), "le plus noble" (similarly De Win and, one is sorry to have to state it, even Jan Prins in his rightly famous translation of the dialogue).

To the remark just quoted the very aristocratic Critias is made to reply that Solon might have surpassed both Hesiod and Homer if a) he had taken his poetry seriously, not treated it as a pastime, b) the troubles which he found on his return to Athens had not forced him to lay it aside. Perhaps Critias may be understood to compliment Solon on his not having taken his poetry too seriously (cp. P. Vicaire, *Platon critique littéraire*, 1960, pp. 118 f.).

Against the explanation of *Gorg.* 484 b 10, suggested here, one can argue that in 484 e 4 ff. and 485 e 3 ff. Callicles is able to quote Euripides by heart and has details from the tragedy to which he refers at hand. I myself am not fully convinced that my suggestion is tenable; but I have not seen any better explanation proposed.

30. *Gorgias* 494 e. In the introduction to his edition Dodds argues convincingly (against Wilamowitz) that in the *Gorgias* Callicles appears as an aristocrat. One of his arguments (p. 13, n. 2), however, is not valid: he thinks that Callicles' nobility is shown by the fact that Socrates addresses him by *ὦ γερρᾶς* (494 e 9).

If this were right, one would have to ask a) to what height of nobility Callicles may have risen when Socrates uses  $\delta\gamma\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$  in addressing him (521 b 1); b) why greatness is thrust upon Malvolio-Polus by Socrates' form of address  $\delta\gamma\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon$  (473 d 3; the latter question would be especially intriguing as  $\delta\gamma\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon$  with a proper name certainly would express more respect than  $\delta\gamma\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon$  without one).

*ὦ γενναῖε* is clearly a colloquial turn. A check of the forms of address used by Socrates is sufficient to prove this. Besides the formal *ὦ Καλλίκλεις* Socrates uses *ὦ βέλτιστε*, *ὦ δαιμόνιε*, *ὦ θαυμάσιε*, *ὦ ἄριστε* etc.; it is not very probable that in this series *ὦ γενναῖε* should not be a colloquial form of address but should have to be ranged with *ὦ Καλλίκλεις*. Now all the turns like *ὦ βέλτιστε*, *ὦ δαιμόνιε*, pertain to a trait of the addressed person's character or behaviour. Again it is not probable that *ὦ γενναῖε* should be an exception and say something about descent.

The distribution of the various forms of address in the dialogue shows some interesting points.

Throughout their conversation Gorgias and Socrates remain courteous: they address one another with ὦ Σώκρατες, resp. ὦ Γοργία.

For all his coltishness, Polus behaves respectfully towards Socrates: without any exception he uses ὦ Σώκρατες. Socrates himself is far less polite. Certainly, at the first time when he addresses Polus, he uses ὦ Πῶλε (448 e 2), and he uses it twenty-four more times (statistics are sometimes useful). But when the conversation with Polus starts, his first address is ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε (461 c 5): his reaction to Polus' outburst in b 3–d 4. And more is to follow: ὦ βέλτιστε (461 e 1), ὦ λῦστε Π. (467 b 11), ὦ ἔταιρε (469 b 1, 473 a 1), ὦ μακάριε (469 c 8, 471 e 2), ὦ θαυμάστε (470 a 9, 471 e 2), ὦ φίλε (471 a 3, 479 d 7), ὦ γενναῖτε Π. (473 d 3), ὦ ἄριστε (479 a 5).

The conversation between Socrates and Callicles is, in this respect too, the most interesting. Callicles nearly always uses ὁ Σώκρατες. Even when he becomes somewhat rude. *Ποίων ἴματίων*; (490 d 10) was probably just admissible in civilized Athenian conversation; *οὗτοι ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν* (489 b 7) was not. But it is followed by ὁ Σώκρατες. *Φλυαρεῖς ἔχων* (490 e 4) and *ἡδὺς εἰ* (491 e 2) are coarse, but the courteous form of address is used directly afterwards (490 e 9, 491 e 4). Once Callicles permits himself a patronizing ὁ φίλε Σώκρατες (486 a 4). Twice he uses ὡγαθέ (506 c 4, 507 a 4)—that is when he is most deeply irritated by the turn the discussion has taken and rather would end it; but at 510 a 1 he returns to ὁ Σώκρατες.

Socrates uses ὁ *Καλλίκλεις* forty times. But in this conversation, too, he is far more ebullient than his partner. *Καλλίκλεις* (489 a 5, without ὁ) is a “direct approach”: Socrates wants to drive home his point. Then follow ὁ *σοφώτατε* *K.* (489 c 8), ὁ *δαιμόνιε* (489 d 1, 517 b 2), ὡγαθέ (490 d 7), ὁ *βέλτιστε* *K.* (491 b 5), ὁ *έταιρε* (491 d 4), ὁ *βέλτιστε* (494 c 4, 511 c 4, 515 d 9), ὁ *γενναιῖε* (494 e 9), ὁ *ἄριστε* (505 b, after a remarkable pause!), ὁ *φίλε* *K.* (507 a 3), ὡγαθέ *K.* (511 b 1), ὁ *βέλτιστε* *ἀνδρῶν* (515 a 1), ὁ *γενναιότατε* (521 b 1).

Then, however, the peroration starts. No more Socratic pranks; the colloquial forms of address cease to be used. ὁ *Καλλίκλεις* is heard (524 a 8, d 4, 525 e 5, 526 a 4, c 3, d 3), almost as an incantation. So the dialogue runs to its rightly famous closing sentence with its wonderful rhythm, *ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὁ Καλλίκλεις* (527 e 7).

31. *Hippias Maior* 292 b. Miss Dorothy Tarrant was not too much amused by the pleasantries of the dialogue. It must be stated, however, that she failed to understand the very best of them. Her comment on 292 b 7–8, *καὶ ἔμοι τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ γε αὐτὸς ταῦτα οἴει*, is that Hippias “shows rather surprising meekness in thus agreeing with Socrates’ judgment without further question”. In fact, Hippias is very angry because Socrates has said that his anonymous acquaintance would rightly beat him for risking the answer suggested by Hippias; he would deserve to be beaten, says Hippias, for holding that the beating would be deserved.

*τοίνυν* is conclusive (cp. E. des Places, *Et. sur quelques particules de liaison chez Platon*, 1928, pp. 289 ff.); it bears in the first place on *δικαίως* in b 6. This link should not be neglected as in A. Croiset’s translation (in the Budé edition), “Je commence à le croire aussi”. Rightly Robin, “dans ces conditions”, De Win, “dan”.

32. *Menexenus* 245 e. One of Wilamowitz’s most brilliant emendations was made in his passage. He proposed (*Platon* II, 1920, p. 135, n. 2) to read in 245 e 5–6 ἀπηλλάγημεν *τοῦ πολέμου οὕτως ἀγαπητῶς*: ‘*ἀγαπητῶς δ'*⟩ἀπηλλάττοντο καὶ οἱ πολέμοι. This is better than Madvig’s *οὕτως, ὡστ'*⟩ἀγαπητῶς ἀπηλλάττοντο which is accepted by Burnet, and far better than the transmitted ἀπηλλάγημεν *τοῦ πολέμου, οὕτως ἀγαπητῶς ἀπηλλάττοντο* which is kept by Méradier (in the Budé edition; when editing the dialogue in 1931, he should at least have mentioned Wilamowitz’s suggestion). In the

transmitted text the asyndeton is difficult to explain (Wilamowitz asked himself whether it would not be sufficient to read ἀπηλλάγμεν τοῦ πολέμου οὕτως ἀγαπητῶς· ἀπηλλάττοντο<δέ> καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι, in my opinion a less convincing and certainly a less elegant emendation of the passage).

Wilamowitz himself apparently did not realize how brilliant his idea was: in another passage of the work in which he published it (I, 2 1920, p. 267) he found in the dialogue “Zufriedenheit mit dem Zustande, den der Königsfriede garantierte”. This mistakes the import of the passage which, especially in its emended form, is fully loaded with the irony that is rife in the *Menexenus*: by the doubling of ἀγαπᾶν the author drily adds that the enemies could be content, too (and it should be kept in mind how often ἀγαπᾶν suggests that one has to be content with a second best). The next sentence brings out the irony very clearly when first is spoken about the brave soldiers who died in Corinth and then added that brave also were those who liberated (!) the Persian king. Far from being content with the situation created by the peace of Antalcidas, Plato would, for once, have agreed with Isocrates (cp. *Paneg.* 175–177).

A better gauge than Wilamowitz's of the import of the passage is to be found, *ex. gr.*, in M. Pohlenz, *Aus Plato's Werdezeit* (1913), p. 292; P. Friedländer, *Platon* II (21957), p. 210; E. R. Dodds, *Plato, Gorgias* (1959), p. 24, n. 2. A good assessment of the dialogue as a whole is given by R. B. Levinson, *In Defence of Plato* (1953), pp. 609 ff.; G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (1973), pp. 188 ff. (= J. Mau and E. G. Schmidt, edd., *Isonomia*, 1964, pp. 21 ff.).

33. *Republic* 328 c. In his paper on this passage (*Rhein. Museum* 111, 1968, pp. 93 f.) A. S. Henry is rightly not content with Adam's and Tucker's attempts to explain οὐδέ in οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ήμιν καταβαίνων as elliptical or colloquial (the latter explanation would, indeed, explain nothing at all). Rightly, too, he rejects the “corrections” proposed or accepted (οὐ δέ, οὐ δή, οὐ τι). The “emendation” which he himself proposes, however, is hardly an improvement. Referring to μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον (328 a 7–8) he would read <οὐ δεῖπνεις> οὐδὲ θαμίζεις. Now one may ask whether δεῖπνεῖν is thought to mean “dine to-night”—then how could Cephalus know Socrates' plans for the rest of the day? Perhaps it could be meant as an invitation—then οὐδὲ θαμίζεις would be senseless. Or has it to mean “use to dine”? Then οὐδὲ θαμίζεις is superfluous.

The “Fluch der bösen That” makes itself felt in this case, too, for Henry is forced by his “emendation” to delete καταβαίνων.

He offers *parablepsis* as an explanation (—δε from δειπνεῖς); *καταβαίνων* must be regarded as a gloss (?).

Actually, the difficulty is entirely imaginary. In 328 c 6 οὐδέ means “not at all”, cp. 329 a 8 οὐδὲ ζῶντες, *Euthyd.* 302 c 1 οὐδὲ ‘Αθηναῖος (with my note, *Mnemosyne* 1972, p. 53), *Phaedrus* 261 a 4 οὐδὲ ἵκανος, 264 a 5 οὐδ’ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς (with my notes on these two passages and on 242 d 2 μηδ’ ἐξ ἐνός), *Theocr.* VI 134 οὐδ’ εἰδος ἔχω κακόν, and J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (21954), pp. 197, 583.

34. *Republic* 414 b c. One look into old Stephanus would have been sufficient to preserve us from the “noble lie”—he describes clearly enough the idiomatic use of γενναῖος. Yet “noble lie” or similar turns occur still in recent translations (and, of course, in innumerable books, pamphlets and papers) Shorey, who certainly knew Greek idiom, has it. Chambry has “beau mensonge”. Robin presents his readers with “noble fausseté”. In Apelt one even finds “durchaus wohlgemeinte Lüge”.

One should compare 372 b μάζας γενναῖας, 409 c γενναιότατος . . . δ τοιοῦτος δίκαιοτής, *Theaet.* 209 c πάντα γενναίως ἐσικεν ἐσκοτωμένω (where πάντα γενν. is best linked with ἐσκοτ., not with ἐσικεν), *Polit.* 274 e ἀμάρτημα . . . τῇ μὲν βραχύτερον, τῇ δὲ μάλα γενναῖον καὶ πολλῷ μεῖζον καὶ πλέον ἢ τότε (with Campbell’s note). Cp. also above n. 30.

Without insisting on the fact that “leugen” and “lie” are inadequate renderings (on this point Robin wins with “fausseté”), one may state that De Win’s translation “fikse leugen” is accurate and award the prize to Jowett’s revisers for “royal lie”.

35. *Republic* 501 b. In his paper, *Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action* (first published in *Rev. Et. Gr.* 68, 1945, pp. 118 ff.; reprinted in *Questions platoniciennes*, 1970, pp. 79 ff.; my quotations are from the book edition, p. 83, n. 29), V. Goldschmidt offers a contribution to the explanation of this admittedly difficult passage. He argues that ἐκεῖνο in b 3 cannot be “la copie humaine qu’ils en font” (to wit, of τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, “comme on l’entend d’ordinaire”), because this “supposerait, pour le sens, un emploi zeugmatique de ἀποβλέπειν et d’ailleurs une banalité: il va de soi que l’ouvrier regarde son ouvrage”. He takes ἐκεῖνο to mean “chacune des vertus précédentes, non plus envisagées en soi, mais sous la forme particulière qui convient à chaque homme: par exemple le cordonnier et le guerrier seront justes tous les deux; mais chez chacun d’eux l’οἰκειοπραγία

revêt une forme particulière. Autrement dit, *ἐκεῖνο* signifie encore une Forme, mais qui, à l'égard de telle vertu en soi, est comme l'espèce par rapport au genre; cf. III 402 c 2: *τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνθρείας π.τ.λ.*" (the author is, in my opinion, mistaken in finding the same idea expressed in *Crat.* 389 b).

Goldschmidt may find himself supported by the scholiast who glosses *ἐκεῖνο* by *τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει*. But I think that both the scholiast and Goldschmidt fail to take due account of *ἐκατέρωσε* in b 1 which supposes a greater divergence than is implied in their interpretation. The same objection could be made, though to a lesser degree, to H. Margueritte's suggestion, reported by Goldschmidt, that *ἐκεῖνο* bears on *τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας* (a 9–10): the blueprint (*ὑπογραφή*) can best be regarded as being half-way between *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον* and its (attempted) realisation in society.

One should not with Wilamowitz (*Platon II*, 21920, p. 382) understand *τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* (if this reading is adopted) as "das irdische Material, das Menschenmaterial"; then Adam's remark (in his *appendix V*) would be valid: "The legislator who starts with a *tabula rasa* needs not trouble about *τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δίκαιον*".

The words *ἐκεῖνο . . . ἐμποιοῦν* can best be taken to bear on the (work on the) copy which the philosopher will try to effectuate. This is not brought out in a too concise translation like the revised Jowett's, "the human copy"; Shorey's "at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind" is not quite clear ("that" can be taken in the scholiast's sense); De Win's translation, "de copie daarvan, die ze in de mensheid zouden willen verwezenlijken", is accurate.

No disagreement is possible upon the point that *ἀποβλέπειν* can be used for the attention which the workman or artist (in the present case it would be the philosophical reformer) has to pay to his work; the element of obligation, expressed by *ἀπό*, is accounted for. In his note on *Gorgias* 503 e 1 Dodds translates *ἀποβλέπων πρός τι* by "keeping his eye on something", adding that this "something" "seems to be a mental image of the effects he wants to produce" (my italics; if "model" is taken in the sense in which nowadays it is mostly used in scientific language, we would meet Margueritte's *σχῆμα*). Now in *Gorg.* 503 e *ἀποβλέπων πρός τι* is followed and illustrated by the words *ἄσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρός τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἔκαστος*. In his note on this passage Dodds argues that *ἔργον* "can hardly (despite *Rep.* 501 b) be his own product", and prefers to understand it as "the craftsman's task, the *τέλος* he hopes to achieve, a picture of which exists as a *παράδειγμα* in his mind" (similarly A. Hellwig,

*Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles*, 1973, p. 103; for ἔργον in this sense Dodds refers to *Gorg.* 517 c and *Rep.* 335 d). Without entering upon Dodds' explanation of *Gorgias* 503 e, I gladly pick out his parenthesis "despite *Rep.* 501 b".

Would it really be a "banalité" to state that the workman, the philosophical reformer, would have to pay attention to his work? I do not think so. Plato knew how exacting the execution of a work as he had it in his mind would be; and his respect for craftsmanship was very great.

36. *Republic* 508 e. Among the passages in which Plato speaks about the idea of the good *Rep.* 508 e is a crucial one; at the same time it is one of the most difficult. Even the constitution of the text is not quite certain. Adam's appendix IX to his commentary on bk. VI reports on the remedies which the nineteenth century thought fit to apply to supposed flaws; one of the strongest and most arbitrary was probably Ph. W. van Heusde's transposition (cp. *Initia Philosophiae Platonicae*, 2<sup>o</sup> 1842, p. 338). Adam himself only introduced a minor change, reading γιγνωσκομένην. Subsequent editors have rightly regarded the change as unnecessary: γιγνωσκομένης can very well be understood as bearing on αἰτίαν.

K. Vretska (*Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, pp. 48 f.) declared himself not satisfied by Adam's text and translation of the sentence, "and being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but . . .". He regarded "no doubt" and "by knowledge" as arbitrary additions (apparently failing to notice that the first is a rendering of μέν and that the second is implied in γιγνωσκομένην). Of the second, however, he approved for a different reason: he thought that it could serve as a rendering of διὰ νοῦ which he regarded as the right reading: διανοοῦ, generally accepted by modern editors, is, in his opinion, superfluous and even disturbing because he thinks that the entire sentence depends from φάντι in ε 3; he supposes a "concessive" construction ως . . . μὲν . . . οὕτω δέ which would be made unclear by the reading διανοοῦ. According to Vretska, the structure of the sentence is complicated by the fact that from οὕτω δέ on there is a complete thought: ἐπιστήμη and ἀλήθεια are fair, but the idea of the good is fairer; then Plato added a second concessive construction: though the idea is grasped by understanding, which in itself is a fine thing, yet . . . Vretska argues that the concessive phrases have been telescoped, the result being in his rendering: "Wenn du sie, die Ursache des Wissens und der Wahrheit, obgleich sie zwar durch den Verstand erst erkannt

wird, dennoch, obwohl diese beiden schön sind, für noch schöner hältst, hast du recht". This strained and arbitrary interpretation must be rejected; Vretska himself, in his heart of hearts, can hardly have been satisfied by it, as he says that perhaps after *ναλῶν* a second *μέν* should be added. In fact there is only a syntactical shift, hardly important enough to be called an anacolouthon (Luise Reinhard rightly omitted to discuss the passage in *Die Anakoluthen bei Platon*, 1920).

In *L'Antiquité Classique* 39, 1970, pp. 450 ff., E. de Strycker published an important contribution to Platonic studies, to wit the address on "L'idée du Bien dans la République de Platon", given to the section for philological and philosophical interpretation of the international classical conference in Bonn, 1969. The author stresses the fact that the idea of the good can be an object of knowledge, while at the same time it is transcendent. In the compass of his address De Strycker has not elaborated this point (of prime importance for philosophy, not only Plato's, and theology); but he has made sufficiently clear the position which he takes. I think that he will agree with this passage in A. E. Taylor's *Plato, the Man and His Work* (1929, pp. 287 f.): "That Socrates finds himself unable to speak of this form of good except negatively is inevitable from the nature of the case. The same thing may be seen in any philosophy which does not simply deny or ignore the 'Absolute' or supreme source of reality. Because this source is *ex hypothesi* a source of all reality, you are bound to insist that it transcends, and thus is wholly other than, every particular real thing: every predicate you affirm of it belongs properly to some of its effects in contradistinction from others and can therefore only be asserted of the supreme source 'analogically' and with the warning that the analogy is imperfect and would mislead if pressed unduly. At the same time, because it is the source of all *reality*, every predicate which expresses a 'positive perfection' must, in its degree, characterize the source of all 'perfections' and must be ascribed to it 'analogically'. All we gain by knowledge of the 'detail' of the universe must add to and enrich our conception of the source of reality, and yet we can never comprehend or completely rationalize that source. It remains, when all is said, an unexhausted and surprising 'mystery'. Hence the necessity Christian theology has always felt itself under of incorporating the profound agnosticism of the 'negative way', or 'way of remotion', in itself and the grotesque aberrations into which it has always fallen in the hands of second-rate theologians who have attempted to know God as one may know the 'general conic'. Hence also the tension between the affirmative and the negative

moments in a metaphysic like that of Mr Bradley. Hence equally the inevitable failure of ‘positive science’ to complete its task of explaining everything . . . The last word on the question whether the philosophy of the *Republic* and the last dialogues generally is ‘rationalism’ or not is briefly this. If we could fully comprehend ‘the good’ we should directly see that it is through and through intelligible, and the *only* object which is wholly and perfectly intelligible; as we never can comprehend it completely, there is, in fact, always something mysterious, not yet understood, about it”<sup>1</sup>. Or with these lines from another classic of Platonic scholarship, Auguste Diès’ *Autour de Platon* (1927, p. 489): “Pour mettre une objectivité au terme de chaque démarche essentielle de l’esprit, il devait accepter une pluralité de Formes intelligibles, et, pour couronner cette pluralité sans la détruire, il ne pouvait poser à sa cime qu’un principe qui fût à la fois une Forme déterminée comme les autres Formes et quelque chose pourtant de supérieur à ces Formes, la loi même de leur intelligibilité comme de toute intelligibilité”.

For the meaning of *aitía* in *Rep.* 508 e, De Strycker compares *Phaedo* 97 c ff.<sup>2</sup>; as to the general import of the passage, he agrees with the interpretation which now is the most current (cp. also his statements in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, edd., *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, 1960, p. 92).

Not so Miss C. J. de Vogel. In “Encore une fois le Bien dans la République de Platon”, published in *Zetesis* (the volume of essays presented to Professor E. de Strycker, 1973), pp. 40 ff., she sets out to correct De Strycker’s views as stated in the paper mentioned above. She attaches much importance to *ἄλλο* in 508 e 5. Her translation of the passage is: “Figure-toi que l’Idée du Bien est cause de la connaissance stricte et de la vérité qui est objet de la connaissance—mais, bien que par là même (*οὕτω*) toutes deux soient belles, la connaissance et la vérité, tu peux croire de bon droit que l’Idée du bien en est distincte (*ἄλλο*) et les surpassé en beauté”. The following comment is added: “Le *ώς* avec *γιγνωσκομένης* est simplement ‘comme’. Si l’on veut, on peut le rendre par ‘en tant que’. Il est même très usité dans ce sens. Le *οὕτω*, ‘ainsi’, reprend ce qui précède et fait ressortir que ‘par là

<sup>1</sup> I hope I may be allowed this very long quotation. It is made in order to remind the reader of Taylor’s excellent contributions to Platonic scholarship. The “Burnet-Taylor-theory” is now (rightly) abandoned; this should not lead to neglect of the many good things which are to be found in their works; especially, I think, in Taylor’s.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Taylor, *l.l.*; F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (1939), p. 132; B. H. Bal, *Plato’s ascese in de Phaedo* (doctoral thesis of Nijmegen Univ., 1950), p. 121, n. 1.

même', i.e. comme science et son objet qui tous les deux ont leur cause dans le Bien, toutes deux sont belles. Malgré cela (*δέ*), le Bien en est distinct: il est d'un ordre supérieur à elles".

Now I doubt very much whether the Greek would allow such an interpretation: *οὐτω*, resuming a clause which starts with *μέν*, and then being followed by *δέ*, is rather quaint, whereas the natural way would be to link it with *καλῶν*. As to *ώς*, having to mean "en tant que", one may recall Adam's lapidary statement: "Nor is there any point, so far as I can discover, in saying that the Idea of the Good is the cause of truth *so far as it is known*. The Idea of the Good is the cause of all Truth, known and unknown" (Adam's italics).

The quotation from Adam shows that Miss de Vogel's translation and interpretation are not brand-new, as she herself is the first to point out (she is too modest: her interpretation of *οὐτω* is a novelty; this, however, is the least acceptable part of her translation and comments). As commentators and translators with whom she feels herself to be in agreement she refers to Jowett, Apelt, Maass and Chambry; she could have mentioned more. She lists also the commentary on *Rep.* by Jowett and Campbell. Now it is interesting to notice that these commentators first print Jowett's translation which on the whole does square with Miss de Vogel's, but then they add this comment which does not: "*μέν* strictly belongs to *αἰτίαν* and is opposed to the following *δέ*: the idea of good 'is indeed (*μέν*) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (*δέ*) it is other and fairer than they' ". This comment has influenced the revisers of Jowett (1953) who offer this rendering: "... and this Idea, which is the cause of science and truth, you are to conceive as being apprehended by knowledge, and yet, fair as both truth and knowledge are, you will be right to esteem it as different from these and even fairer". Further one may observe that the evidence shows that a translation of 508 e which more or less squares with the one proposed by Miss de Vogel does not necessarily imply full agreement with her views on the idea of the good.

These she states as follows: "Il (to wit, le Bien) est rationnel comme *postulat* de la raison, et comme cause ultime de la réalité, il est 'réel' plus qu'aucune autre chose. On parle bien dans l'esprit de Platon quand on dit qu'il est 'surréel'" (the italics are the author's). Now I think that introducing the notion of a postulate into Platonic philosophy is a very risky affair. As to "surréel", a reference to 508 e 5 is not sufficient: *ἄλλο* there needs not denote a difference of essence; *κάλλιον* in the next line does certainly not. Undoubtedly there is the momentous phrase in 509 b, *οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, immediately followed by the equally important

ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. The text is admittedly as difficult as it is crucial. The cautious way in which Taylor, Diès and De Strycker try to handle its evidence is, in my opinion, preferable to Miss de Vogel's borrowing a term which has been coined in late Antiquity, ὑπερουσιώδης οὐσία, in order to characterize Plato's idea of the good ("Ce n'était pas là le langage de Platon. Mais le terme exprime assez bien ce que Platon lui-même pensait de l'*ἀγαθόν*"). Moreover, she herself states that "pour Platon, sans aucun doute, le principe ultime était une réalité au plus haut degré"; here one should, I think, recall *Rep.* 477 a 3, *τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν*.

A review of the passages in *Rep.* VI and VII in which the (idea of the) good, once it has been mentioned, appears as a reality and as an object of knowledge yields interesting results. Considering the reserve which Plato keeps when speaking about the subject, one is struck by their high number—without bringing anything new I will enumerate them. The good is an idea (508 e 3, 517 c 1, 534 c 1). It can be seen, *μόγις* indeed, but it is *ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ* (517 c 1), and *συλλογίζεσθαι* about it is possible. It can be known (534 c 4). It is a *μάθημα*, even the *μέγιστον μάθημα* (504 d 2–3, 3 4–5, 508 a 2, 534 e 4). It is on a line with the beautiful, and as such an object of *νοεῖν* (507 b 5–10, cp. 532 b 1). This can be done by *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις* or *ἐπιστήμη* (511 b 4, c 5, 532 d 8, 533 a 8). The *λόγος* can grasp it (511 b 4, 534 c 3) and distinguish it from other objects (534 b 9).

The highly competent Platonic scholar Cornelia de Vogel knows, of course, all these passages by heart. Several of them are mentioned in her paper; some are extensively discussed. One can agree with her that a phrase like *διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ* (534 b 9) is not necessarily meant as a formal definition. One must even acknowledge that her interpretation is possible and consistent—it is mainly the one given by the neoplatonists, very able commentators and interpreters: so much should be said even when one entirely disagrees with them. On the other hand, it must be stated that the author sometimes passes lightly over counter-instances, especially over the designation of the good as a *μάθημα*. Even if one is willing to go a long way with Miss de Vogel, one will find in this way some unsurmountable obstacles in the form of passages which unmistakably speak about the good as a "real" being and an object of knowledge. Two of them will be discussed.

1) In 518 c 9 the good is called *τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον*. Not an unsurmountable obstacle in the eyes of Miss de Vogel: she holds that the genitive is not partitive, but marking a comparison ("... ce qui est le plus brillant *par rapport à l'être*, ou *comparé à lui*"),

the author's italics). She quotes with approval Cornford's (to my taste just a bit too florid) translation "... contemplate reality and that supreme splendour which we have called the Good". Now Cornford's (not even quite exact) translation, which parades a not too pleasant kind of *variatio* may be left alone; but not Miss de Vogel's argument. She says that Cornford "a évité de faire que Platon se contredise lui-même en disant que le plus brillant fait 'partie de l'être'"; where is the contradiction, if one does not admit the author's premisses?

Two points must be made: a) *superlativus pro comparativo* is not an established usage. Miss de Vogel refers to the works on Greek syntax by Kühner-Gerth and Schwyzer-Debrunner. In fact, Schwyzer-Debrunner, *Griech. Gramm.* II (1950), p. 100, is rather sceptical about the usage; in Kühner-Gerth, *Griech. Gramm.* II (*Satzlehre*) 1, (31898), p. 24, the reviser of the third edition, Gerth, corrects Kühner's admission of the usage. H. Thesleff, *Studies on the Greek Superlative* (1955), p. 8, n. 2, practically ignores it. As far as I have seen, one could only regard the *sup. pro comp.* as a grammatical possibility in cases where the superlative is predicate; in *Rep.* 518 c 9 it is quite clearly not.

b) In the phrase ἔως ἀν εἰς τὸ ὄν τοῦ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη one can take καὶ as specifying ("and especially the brightest part"; this I would prefer) or as explanatory ("en wel van het schitterendste deel"; so De Win in his often felicitous translation) or as additive. Now even is καὶ is additive, τὸ ὄν is on a line with τὸ φανότατον, depending from ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη εἰς. This is a very strong expression. How can Miss de Vogel's sharp distinction between τὸ ὄν and τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον be made to square with this syntactical fact?

526 e 3–4, not mentioned by Miss de Vogel, is comparable; it may serve as a corollary. The (idea of the) good is here called τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος. There can be no question of a *superlativus pro comparativo* in this passage.

2) In 532 c 5–6 the procedure is discussed of the arts and sciences which have the power to lead up the best part of the soul πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀριστού ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν. In this passage there is no genitive to quarrel about. Miss de Vogel insists that ἐν τοῖς οὖσι should be translated by "dans le monde intelligible". Rightly, as the parallelism with ἐν τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ (c 7–d 1) is clearly meant to be observed (though renderings like, e.g., De Win's "in het zijnde", Robin's "dans la réalité", Shorey's "among realities" could be defended: one can always plead to have taken "reality" in its pregnant, Platonic, sense). But if the parallelism is observed, it must work both ways: τὸ ἀριστον ἐν

*τοῖς οὖσι* is also on a line with *τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν ψυχῇ*, and the *ἀριστον* is part of the *ὄντα*, just as *τὸ φανότατον* is part of what can be seen *ἐν τῷ . . . δραπῷ τόπῳ*. Miss de Vogel reminds her readers of the fact that for Plato the sun was not a part of the terrestrial world, “mais était d’un ordre ontologiquement supérieur”. That may be; but it was part of the universe, even if “ontologiquement” (?) superior to the earth.

37. *Republic* 515 c. *Σκόπει δή, ἢν δ’ ἔγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ λασιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οὐα τις ἀν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιᾶδε ἔνυμβαινοι αὐτοῖς.* Many editors and commentators have found fault with *φύσει*. Earlier explanations and attempts at emendation are reported by Adam. Wilamowitz (*Platon II*, 21920, p. 384) suggested *φύσει τοιᾶδε*, but rightly rejected it himself as “ziemlich periphrastisch”. A new attempt at emendation was made by K. Vretska in *Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, pp. 49 f.; he thought that *φύσει* is a corruption of *φήσει*, the original reading being *φήσει<ς>*. He has to reshape the sentence, and he takes *οὐα τις ἀν εἴη* to mean “wie er etwa auch sein mag”—this would be rather dubious Greek.

Schneider’s explanation of *φύσει*, to wit “in the course of nature”, is supported by the outcome of D. Mannsperger’s careful investigation *Physis bei Platon* (1969), pp. 74 ff.; Shorey has “in the course of nature” (though his note suggests that he adhered to Ast’s “re vera”). It was also accepted by Jowett and Campbell; rightly, in my opinion.

Adam argued that the release of the prisoners is “a return to their true nature, and may for this reason be described as natural”. Robin’s rendering, “en vertu de leur nature”, is clearly influenced by this note; it is, however, certainly wrong: the prisoners do not liberate themselves, nor is their nature the moving force in their liberation (De Win, who probably also follows Adam, is more cautious; he translates by “overeenkomstig hun natuur”). Chambry’s “naturellement” is entirely mistaken: too much is said in books VI and VII of the *Republic* about the perilous state of philosophy to regard the liberation as a matter of course; the conversion which is needed is something like a miracle.

38. *Republic* 538 a. The birth of scepticism in a young man’s mind is compared to the experience of “a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and

should not be able to find his true father and mother" (Shorey's translation). Then, it says, *πῶς ἀν διατεθεῖη πρός τε τοὺς κόλακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ το τῷ χρόνῳ φόοντες οὐδεὶς τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὖτε οὐδεὶς*; Wilamowitz (*Platon* II, 21920, p. 385) was shocked by the second οὐδεὶς: this is "falsch, denn das Wissen liegt nicht in der Vergangenheit. εἰδεῖη ist gefordert und steht auch am Schlusse der nächsten genau ebenso gebauten Periode" (*scil.* at b 5). Many years before the same objection had been made by Henry Richards, and the same remedy proposed. Adam had answered Richards, and Wilamowitz might have consulted Adam's commentary. Adam defends the transmitted text by referring to *Rep.* 515 e and *Phaedo* 67 e–68 a. His argument is sound; it can be generalized and strengthened by relating it to the rich material collected in R. J. A. Lagas, *Syntactische perseveratie- en anticipatieverschijnselen bij oudere Grieksche dichters* (a doctoral thesis of Nijmegen University, 1941). Lagas' interest is centred on archaic poetry, but he lists also numerous cases of syntactical "perseveration" in classical prose-writers, Plato included. They are a sufficient argument for keeping the second οὐδεὶς in 538 a 6.

39. *Republic* 617 d e, 620 a–d. In literary criticism and scholarship of the last decades there is a strong tendency to regard coherency as the all-important quality of a literary work; the consequence is the attempt to relate every detail, even the slightest, to the design of the whole. Inevitably this sometimes leads to strained interpretations. This is also to be seen in the work of classical scholars. Some of these, mostly younger men, are clearly (and sometimes avowedly) influenced by the methods of contemporary literary criticism; other interpreters showed and show the tendency while no such influence could or can be supposed (one of the latter —be it said *maxima cum reverentia*—was Paul Friedländer, and this was a *défaut* of his admirable *qualités* as an interpreter of Plato; sometimes his attempts to find structural significance in every trait of a dialogue made him mistake the element of free invention in Plato's literary artistry).

W. Biesterfeld, *Der platonische Mythos des Er* (1970), pp. 51, 193, has been led astray by the introductory words (614 b 2–3) to the final myth in *Republic* οὐ μέντοι . . . Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον . . . ἀλλ' ἀλκίμον μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρός τοῦ Ἀρμενίου. Perhaps ἀλκίμον has only been added for the pun's sake, but, true, Er has died in battle; so Biesterfeld can say that he is "schliesslich (this is delightful!) Soldat, und damit zugleich Angehöriger des mittleren Standes der Politeia" (this conclusion is as unwarranted as it is irrelevant).

This makes him find “ausgesprochen militärische Formen und Ausdrucksweisen” in the myth. In 617 d 6–e 5 the “military tone” is conveyed by “das Vermeiden jeglicher Kopula und Verben im ersten Teil der Ansprache”. He seems to forget that it is the προφήτης, not Er, who is quoted; worse is his failure to notice the fact that Plato here, as in *Phaedrus* 245 c, uses the nominal phrase of early Ionian prose in order to make the impression of an oracular utterance (cp. J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 1952, p. 4). He suggests that in 620 a ff. Plato adapts the tale to the level of a soldier’s intelligence by describing only well-known characters in their acts of choosing a new life—but using mythological characters in this tale stood to reason. Apparently it is a concession to the supposedly low level of military intelligence, too, that the comments which in the tale are given on the acts of choosing are “entsprechend vordergründig, verschleiernd sogar”. For this Biesterfeld only refers to the choice of Orpheus who “certainly”, says he, did not choose the life of a swan because he had come to hate women but because he “als Sänger sich diesem Tier wahlverwandt fühlt”. Biesterfeld argues in this way because he regards συνήθεια as all-important and decisive in the choice. Rightly, as 620 a 2 shows; but now he wants to demonstrate its effects in all the acts of choosing, and he forgets that the συνήθεια may also work in a negative way, as is clear in the cases of Orpheus and Odysseus (and, to some degree, of Agamemnon). His interpretation is rectilinear. He argues that in Euripides’ *Philoctetes* (as partly reconstructed from Dio Chrysostomus 52 and 59) Odysseus appears as a man who loves quiet; so his choice in Rep. 620 c 3 ff. is a direct consequence and continuation of his former habits. Now his reading of Dio’s speeches and of the fragments of Euripides’ play must have been rather superficial: in the play Odysseus asks himself whether it would not be wiser to lead a quiet life, but avows that φιλοτιμία makes him enter upon the career of self-advancement with all its hardships. Still worse is, that Biesterfeld has failed to see that his interpretation makes two crucial words, φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκνῖαν, in Plato’s text (620 c 5) senseless.

40. *Laws* 635 b. For the meaning of φθόνος which he finds in *Protag.* 316 d, W. J. Verdenius (cp. above n. 28) also refers to *Laws* 635 b 1, τῷ μὴ φθόνῳ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλ' εὐνοίᾳ δεχομένῳ. Here, too, he thinks that “criticism, censure” (“Tadel”) would be the right rendering.

Now φθόνος can be a) jealousy of another man’s good;

b) unwillingness to share one's own good with another man. The distinction is not always kept in mind in the discussions.

In the present passage the rendering "criticism" can hardly be right. Criticism by the Athenian is announced and expected (634 d 2, 635 a 6, cp. b 2). Accepting criticism implies acknowledging superiority of the critic, on some point at least. Clinias says that criticism can have a salutary effect if it is accepted without envy of that superiority.

Perhaps a word may be added on Lysias XXIV 1, also referred to by Verdenius. Several dictionaries have an entry "oppos. ἔπανος", *scil.* to φθόνος, with a reference to this passage. This is misleading. Lysias' invalid argues that he is not to be envied for his pension but to be praised for his meritorious way of life. There is no real opposition; the Greek love of antithetical structure (particularly noticeable in Lysias) has produced an antithesis which exists only in appearance.

41. *Laws* 682 a. In a 1 ἐνθεαστικόν can no more be regarded with doubt since the Bodmer papyrus has given us Menander, *Dysc.* 44.

In a 4 it is possible to take γιγνομένων as a *participium imperfecti*; cp. my notes on *De Sublim.* IX 13, τῆς μὲν Ἰλιάδος γραφομένης (in *Mnemosyne* 1965, p. 237) and on *Phaedrus* 241 a 1 ἐπίπονον οὖσαν, 248 b 4 πολὺν ἔχονσαι πόνον, with the literature referred to there. If it is taken in this way, one cannot (entirely) agree with T. J. Saunders' judicious treatment of the passage (*Notes on the Laws of Plato*, 1972, pp. 13 f.).

For various answers to the question whether the power of poetical inspiration, stated in the present passage, must be taken at face value, cp. R. Weil, *L'archéologie de Platon* (1959), pp. 77 ff.; P. Vicaire, *Platon critique littéraire* (1960), pp. 93 ff.; E. N. Tigerstedt, *Plato's Idea of Poetical Inspiration* (1969), p. 59. In these discussions the occurrence of the word τινόν in a 4 has not been used as an argument. I think that it shows some irony on Plato's part. For τις conveying irony (and sometimes even contempt), cp. Adam on *Rep.* 363 d, 372 b, 381 e; Groeneboom on Aeschylus, *Prom.* V. 696; Jebb on Sophocles, *Philoct.* 519.

42. *Laws* 689 d. There is no contradiction between ὡς σοφούς τε προσοργέον in d 2 and the well-known passages in which possession of wisdom is denied to philosophers (cp. above n. 23). E. Dönt, *Platons Spätphilosophie und die Akademie* (1967), p. 19, thinks

that in the present passage philosophers are called wise (with G. Müller, though rightly rejecting the interpretations put by Müller upon the supposed shift in Plato's thought).

In fact the former statements remain valid. It is those who are free from "crass ignorance", the moral insanity, described in 689 a-c, who may be called wise. This does not imply a judgment upon their capability to attain the aims of philosophical striving. The case in 689 d is, of course, purely theoretical. Plato does not wish to commit government to people who can neither read nor swim; he formulates an overruling condition.

One may hear in this passage an echo of Socrates' ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία (*Apol.* 20 d). It should be remembered by those who like to declaim on Plato's aristocratic contempt of common people.

43. *Laws* 909 a. In *The Unwritten Philosophy* (1950), pp. 66 f., F. M. Cornford recalls Ivan's story of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky's novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. He tells it in a brilliant page, a fitting ending to an excellent essay. Its merits, however, are mainly literary. The intended comparison between the acts of the inquisitor and those of the members of the nocturnal council in *Laws* 909 a 4-6 fails: the inquisitor has his verdict ready, the members of the council come ἐπὶ νονθετήσει τε καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ, hoping that δοκῆ τις σωφρονεῖν of the prisoners.

If Cornford had cared as much for exactitude as he did for literary effect, he might have pointed not to a character of literary fiction, however impressive it may be, but to the historical inquisition. A comparison of the practices of the nocturnal council and the inquisition would be possible, and perhaps fruitful, if the points of difference are kept in mind (cp. R. B. Levinson, *In Defense of Plato*, 1953, pp. 356 f., n. 265; G. R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan State*, 1960, p. 489, n. 272, pp. 500 ff.).

But Cornford's imagined scene in which Socrates has to stand a second trial before a nocturnal council presided by Plato could never have been real: what charge could be brought against Socrates according to the rules of *Laws* X?

Far better than Cornford's too much applauded parallel is the assessment made by T. J. Saunders in his translation of *Laws* (Penguin Classics, 1970, p. 410): "We may approve in general of Plato's desire to rehabilitate criminals, but his proposal that officials should visit heretics or atheists for five years 'to admonish them and ensure their spiritual salvation' suggests . . . disturbing modern parallels". There are, of course, in Plato's work, and especially in the *Laws*, many "disturbing" traits; only the modern

reader should ask himself whether the cause of his disturbance lies entirely with Plato. And anyhow he should read his Plato with the fair and scholarly mind which makes Saunders add after "suggests" the parenthesis "but does no more than suggest".

44. *Laws* 944 a. Discussing the components of the final myth in *Republic* W. Biesterfeld, *Der platonische Mythos des Er* (1970), p. 30, argues that "auch das Phänomen, dasz ein Toter wieder zum Leben erwacht, ist den Griechen durchaus vertraut. Platon selbst führt (*Nomoi* 944 a) die beiläufige Rede: 'Wenn Patroklos wieder zum Leben erwachte, was Tausenden geschehen ist . . .'".

The general statement is only very restrictedly right. Eurydice might have returned to life; Er and Alcestis did return. Asclepius certainly raised many people from death; but he was stopped. "Durchaus vertraut" is rather too strong a term and suggests too much. The thought that death is final is a commonplace in Greek literature as well as in other literatures (cp. e.gr. Homer, *Il.* 9, 408; Aeschylus, *Agam.* 1018, *Eum.* 647; Sophocles, *El.* 136, *fr.* 67; Euripides, *Alc.* 1076), and the reaction described in *Acts XVII* 32 is typical.

As to the reference to *Laws* 944 a, Biesterfeld has probably misunderstood H. Müller's translation which runs "Wenn Patroklos . . . wieder . . . zum Leben erwachte . . .".

Of the passage in question two translations are possible, to wit a) "If P. had been still alive" (Jowett; similarly Stallbaum, Apelt, Robin, Chambry). An ellipse of "still" is easily conceivable, but the use of the aorist might be regarded as telling against this interpretation (which I yet think to be preferable); b) "If P. had revived" (England; similarly Bury, Taylor, Diès, De Win and Jowett's revisers, apparently impressed by England's criticism).

Biesterfeld's reference appears still more to be mistaken if one notices that the words *οἶον δὴ μυρίους συνέπεσε* can bear as much on *κομισθεῖς ἐπὶ σκηνὴν ἀνεν τῶν ὅπλων* as on *ἔμπνους ἐγένετο*, if not more. Syntax admits this interpretation, and it is favoured by the fact that the passage as a whole treats of abandonment of weapons. Most translators do not make fully clear which connection they prefer; Saunders does: "If Patroclus had pulled round after being carried to his tent without his weapons (as has happened in thousands of other cases)"; so does Apelt: "Gesetzt, Patroklos wäre noch atmend und lebend ohne seine Waffen in das Zelt gebracht worden, wie es bei Tausenden schwer verwundeter Krieger der Fall ist . . .".

45. *Laws* 967 b c. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951), p. 223 (=G. Vlastos, ed., *Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays* II, 1971, p. 228), writes: "Plato in fact wishes to revive the fifth-century heresy trials". Certainly in book X of the *Laws* trials for impiety are discussed and penalties fixed. But the difference between these trials and those which the fifth century had seen is far greater than their resemblance (cp. G. R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan State*, 1960, pp. 471 ff., 500 ff.); therefore "revive" is not quite exact.

Dodds continues: "He makes it plain that he would condemn Anaxagoras unless he mended his opinions" (similarly O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne*, 1945, p. 243). What charge would be brought against him? I do not think that Plato would have regarded him as an atheist.

Dodds explains his statement in a note (88) in which he summarizes the present passage as follows: "'certain persons' who formerly got themselves into trouble through falsely asserting that the heavenly bodies were 'a pack of stone and earth' had only themselves to blame for it" (almost certainly Anaxagoras is one of the "certain persons"). I think that the import of the passage is different from what Dodds finds in it. Anaxagoras is praised in b 4–6: even then there were some thinkers who risked to "assert that it was reason that imposed regularity and order on the heavens" (Saunders' translation). Only they went astray about the soul's priority to matter and regarded the heavenly bodies as inanimate. This made them incur "a great many accusations of atheism, and provoked a lot of hostility" (c 6, again Saunders' transl.). Especially poets abused them, comparing them to bitches baying at the moon, and levelling other silly taunts at them. Now these baying bitches recall (and are meant to recall) the quotations in *Republic* 607 b c. There Plato reports with contempt and disgust some of the sayings of poets about philosophers and philosophy. By recalling them in the present passage he wants to make clear that he takes sides with Anaxagoras and his followers: their errors did not justify the poets' "silly" abuses, and their merits remain. He can afford to acknowledge them because now the new astronomy of the Academy has provided a good starting-point for a better understanding (a 7–8, d 1–2).