

MEDEDELINGEN DER KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE
AKADEMIE VAN WETENSCHAPPEN, AFD. LETTERKUNDE
NIEUWE REEKS, DEEL 49 – No. 1

DIVINE PRESENCE
IN ORDINARY LIFE

Gerardus van der Leeuw's twofold method
in his thinking on art and religion

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ISBN 0-444-85652-8

IN VERKORTE VORM UITGESPROKEN
IN DE VERGADERING VAN 14 JANUARI 1985

Introduction

Some scholars are well known during their life time, but are too soon forgotten after their death¹. This also happened to the great Dutch scholar in the study of religion, Gerardus van der Leeuw, who was a universal genius in this field. He was not only a prominent scholar in the field of science of religion, but also in that of philosophy of religion, dogmatics, the study of liturgy and the history of church hymns, the study of art and aesthetics, etc.

In this publication we will describe the main structure of his thought, thus also giving a survey of his principal thoughts in the fields mentioned above. We will, however, concentrate on what his statements are on art and religion. Van der Leeuw lived in the existentialist and phenomenological tradition and therefore he laid less emphasis on precise wording than is usual today. Still his way of thinking shows an exact structure which we find in all the fields of his activity. As it is quite frequently the case Van der Leeuw thinks more logically – evidently by a kind of logical intuition – than he himself thought. We will also consider some apparently inconsistencies in his work and we will improve him in such way that these inconsistencies will disappear². As we will see this can be done relatively easily. But before we do this we will give a short biography and a short survey of the development of his thought.

Biography

Gerardus van der Leeuw was born on March 19, 1890 in 's-Gravenhage (The Hague)³. He died on November 18, 1950 in Utrecht. He studied theology in Leyden (1908–1913), where he was a student of the great scholar in the history of religions, W. Brede Kristensen. Then he studied for two semesters in Berlin and one semester in Göttingen (Germany). In Berlin he studied in particular Egyptology with A. Erman and K. Sethe. In 1916 he received his theological doctor's degree with a dissertation in the field of Egyptology: *Godsvoorstellingen in de oud-Egyptische pyramide teksten* (The ideas of God in the old Egyptian pyramid texts). This dissertation was an important step forward in the field of Egyptology, because it was a study in Egyptian religion based on a careful investigation of written texts, which were then for the first time available, whereas until that time the

1. cp. the relative small number of secondary literature to the work of Van der Leeuw: ten Ham, 1973; Hermelink, 1960; Hubbeling, 1983, 1985; Sierksma, 1951; Waardenburg, 1978.

2. For a defence of such a method, cp. Hubbeling, 1975; 1981: 66ff.

3. For these biographical data, cp. Waardenburg, 1978.

study was based mainly on the images of the pyramids. The difference between these two approaches was the difference between the German and the French school and Van der Leeuw belonged undoubtedly to the German school. In this dissertation Van der Leeuw showed that in Egyptian religion an impersonal power (a kind of 'mana') was present from the earliest stages⁴. In the same year he married and became a minister in the Netherlands Reformed Church in 's-Heerenberg in the neighbourhood of Arnhem. At the same time he was a minister of the church in a little Dutch community in Emmerich in Germany. In 1918 he became professor of science of religion and Egyptology. Although he was offered several other chairs, he never accepted any of these offers. He only temporarily had another job, *viz.* when he became minister of education in the first government after the second world war. In his work in the government Van der Leeuw did pioneer work. He actively promoted arts from the side of the Administration, which was then a novel in government politics. This did not mean that according to Van der Leeuw the government should interfere in cultural matters and decide what kind of art is best. But in contradistinction to the liberal policy of the pre-war governments Van der Leeuw was of the opinion that the Administration should subsidize the various cultural manifestations. His policy was continued by the following Administrations, although in a more economical way⁵.

Van der Leeuw was a versatile and many-sided man both in the field of science and in the field of art and religion. He sang in a semi-professional choir, he played the organ, he wrote poetry (there are several hymns from his hand in the hymn book of the Netherlands Reformed Church, especially translations of old Latin Hymns), etc. He was a member of several societies that were affiliated with the Church and with Church life, *int. al.* the *Liturgische Kring* (the Liturgical Circle = a society for promoting liturgy) of which he was the founder and the chairman for many years. He was a member and for many years chairman also of the *Dutch Bach Society* and of the *Groningen Society for promoting musical life*. He was a member of many learned societies, *int. al.* the *Royal Dutch Academy for Science and Humanities*, the *Royal Flemish Academy for Science, Literature and Art*, and the *Accademia dei Lincei* in Rome. He was one of the founders of and became chairman of the *International Association for the History of Religions*. In 1946 he received a honorary doctor's degree from the Masaryk university in Brno (Czechoslovakia). What has been mentioned above is only a small part of his many activities. He also published many books and articles. The list of publications amounts to a total of 650 titles⁶! He was a great

4. Cp. 1916: 7ff.

5. Van der Leeuw gave a theoretical foundation of his work as a minister of education in: 1945; 1947b; 1947c.

6. For a bibliography of Van der Leeuw's works *vide* W. Vos, 1950.

scholar in many fields as we have already indicated: science and philosophy of religion, aesthetics, etc. He died relatively young at the age of 60 (in 1950).

Van der Leeuw gave many quotations and much material from various sources in order to support his theories. In a survey publication like the present one this richness is, unavoidably, lost. He wrote in a beautiful style mixed with many anecdotes and arresting stories. And he had a great sense of humour and self-criticism⁷. We will give an example of the former side of his character. When a strict orthodox colleague once held a long personal speech against Van der Leeuw's approach in the study of religion and against his discipline (comparative religion or phenomenology) in such a way that one could infer that his discipline had been devised by the devil personally, Van der Leeuw answered: 'But my dear colleague, you do not really believe that God is afraid of my phenomenology?'. There were no great ruptures in the development of Van der Leeuw's thought⁸. In his youth he belonged to the so called *ethical theology*, a kind of mediation theology (*Vermittlungstheologie*). The adherents of this kind of theology tried to combine a more or less orthodox belief with modern scientific methods. From the beginning Van der Leeuw emphasized the importance of the incarnation. This was the central concept in his system from beginning to end. He also emphasized that man cannot reach truth by rational thinking alone. A reference to some irrational source is always needed. This has also been a characteristic of Van der Leeuw's thought during his whole life. We will come back to this later on in this publication. In a second stage of Van der Leeuw's thinking the phenomenological method with its central concept of intuitive understanding (*Verstehen*) was introduced. We will come back to this later on in the publication. In a third and final stage the theology of the sacraments took a central place in his thought. In the course of his development the individual religious experience has been broadened to a universal human religious experience, with special emphasis on the interpretation of human life and the world as a symbol of God's activities, which become especially visible in the sacraments of the church: baptism, Holy Supper and the service of the Word. For a correct understanding of Van der Leeuw the fact must be taken into account that in his youth Van der Leeuw belonged to the Duinoord Church, a congregation within the 'Nederlands Hervormde Kerk' (Neth-

7. Many examples in Sierksma, 1951.

8. Waardenburg, 1978, distinguished with ten Ham, 1973 three periods: (i) Van der Leeuw as an 'ethical theologian' (until 1928); (ii) Van der Leeuw emphasizing the phenomenological method with its theory of understanding (*Verstehen*) (1928-1937); (iii) Van der Leeuw devotes himself to the study of liturgy, to promoting the liturgical movement and to the theology of the sacraments. In my opinion one could also add in the last period that Van der Leeuw became more and more an adherent of Jung's theory of archetypes.

erlands Reformed Church), which emphasized the relevance of liturgy. Van der Leeuw has also written a book on the pastor of this congregation, Dr. J.H. Gerretsen⁹. We will come back to all this later on in this publication. At this point we will give an example of Van der Leeuw's self-criticism, which may at the same time illustrate his development. In one of his lectures he said that he had once summarized his thoughts in the following way: 'The living Lord is the best proof that the Lord has lived'¹⁰. This was – according to the older Van der Leeuw – a 'metabasis eis allo genos'. The 'living Lord' is a truth from religious experience, but the conclusion inferred is on the level of historical truths, *viz* that Jesus Christ has really existed and lived and that he was not only an inspiring idea as some critical New Testament scholars say. Well, such a conclusion is not permissible. I think the older Van der Leeuw is right. Nowadays we would call such a mistake a mixture of language games (Wittgenstein) or a category mistake (Ryle).

My own attitude towards Van der Leeuw has changed. I must admit that I have learned to see his greatness only in the course of time. As a student I was an empiricist through and through and I was highly critical towards Van der Leeuw's 'phenomenology'. I thought that too much idealism and dogmatism were smuggled into his approach, and that phenomenology should be replaced by plainly empirical comparative religion. I remember that in a 'seminar' Van der Leeuw asked what method should be used in his field. I answered that we should use plainly inductive methods. If we want to know e.g. what a priest is, we should compare various priests in the various religions in order to discover the common characteristics so that we could find the 'essence' of priesthood or at least the various types of priesthood. Van der Leeuw, however, indicated that with the help of purely inductive methods we could not discover anything. First of all we must have a notion of priesthood in order to discover the priests in the various religions. As a student I did not believe Van der Leeuw, but whatever one may think of Van der Leeuw's phenomenological method – and I still think that many critical remarks are necessary here – in the above mentioned respect he was right. Without already accepted concepts one cannot use empirical inductive methods.

Another important aspect in Van der Leeuw's thinking was his growing interest in Jung's doctrine of archetypes. He emphasized this in his lectures even more than in his written work¹¹.

9. cp. 1942.

10. 1919: 94.

11. 1949: 153 (= 1959: 152); cp. Waardenburg, 1978: 22.

Methods

We will now consider more extensively the methods used by Van der Leeuw. For all things he claimed to be an adherent of the phenomenological method. This method, however, had many variants. The great founder was Husserl, but Van der Leeuw was part of an earlier tradition *viz.* that of Schleiermacher and Dilthey¹², which eventually merged with the phenomenological method of Husserl. Van der Leeuw himself gave the following characteristic of his phenomenological method: First of all we give the phenomena, i.e. what has become visible, a name. Then we insert these phenomena into our own life: we try to re-experience the religious thoughts and feelings we find in other people and other religions. Thus we come to an understanding (*Verstehen*) of its structure. Here we preserve the so-called *epoche*, i.e. we only ask for the sense and structure of the religious phenomena, we do not ask for their truth. We try to grasp its meaning and we do not ask: 'Is it true?' or 'What is its value for my personal religious life or for society?'. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to re-experience strange religious phenomena, but nothing is to such a degree alien to our psychic life, that in some hidden corner of our personality we cannot come to an understanding of its sense and meaning¹³. Now it is very important that Van der Leeuw replaces Husserl's vision of the essence (*Wesensschau*) by Weber's construction of types¹⁴. With the help of these ideal types we can understand the phenomena. Such an ideal type ought not to be found in reality in exactly the same way. In it the various aspects of a phenomenon come together and thus they constitute an intelligible unity. 'Rostand Sr. sketches a portrait of the Duke of Reichstadt, *L'Aiglon*, that is not confirmed by history, but this portrait is in itself intelligible. We understand this weak child of his father *and* his mother, this Napoleon at the court of Vienna. Rostand Jr. writes a drama on Napoleon IV, the unfortunate prince Louis, who fell in an ambush during the Zulu war. His description too does not seem to be in confirmity with history, more anti-English. But apart from that: it does not convince us; the relations are not "intelligible" enough¹⁵. If I may render Van der Leeuw's intentions in my own words, we may say that we must select some aspects of a whole of phenomena and that we must try to read some 'code' in this 'ideal part'. With the help of this 'code' we can perhaps understand this whole of phenomena that would have remained unintelligible otherwise. The test as to whether or not we have discovered the right 'code' is of course whether or not we can understand the phenomena or phenomenon with the help of this 'code.'

12. 1948a: 63ff, 72ff.

13. 1948c: 7 (= 1961: 10); 1924: 12.

14. 1948a: 62; 1938: 673f (= 1977: 771f).

15. 1948a: 62.

This phenomenological method, however, does not make the usual philological, archaeological and historical investigations superfluous. The result must stand the critical test of these investigations¹⁶.

This whole seemingly complicated procedure has no other purpose than a pure respect for facts. Phenomenology only wants to give testimony of what has been shown to it¹⁷. The kind of phenomenology represented by Van der Leeuw differs in various respects from that of Husserl. Van der Leeuw himself has indicated this clearly: 'Husserl could not understand Dilthey, because he interpreted his discovery in a rationalistic way'¹⁸. Van der Leeuw criticized rationalistic thinking, although he acknowledged its limited rights. But he always emphasized that logical and rationalistic thinking had its limits and that it should be completed by the understanding (*verstehende*) method (phenomenology) as well as by metaphysical and dogmatic methods. In historical sciences the empirical rationalistic method also has its rightful place, especially for establishing the facts. But here too it should be complemented by phenomenology. Thus phenomenology is something midway between these empirical sciences and disciplines like metaphysics and dogmatics. These latter disciplines seek for a complete meaning of the world and life. Phenomenology is more modest. It uses the *epoche* as we have seen¹⁹.

In his lectures and seminars another aspect became evident. This aspect is also shown by Van der Leeuw when he applies his method. Above we gave only Van der Leeuw's own theoretical expositions. Van der Leeuw emphasized many times that a religious phenomenon shows its meaning better in its original form, when it is experienced for the first time than during later reflexions. In his seminars he taught us this again and again. He taught that we should look for the original religious experience when we read a religious text, for this original experience has often been covered by later rationalistic deliberations. This is also important for the interpretation of a piece of art. What an artist gives as his interpretation of his product, might not represent his original experience! It may be clear that in all this he stands in the line of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and not in the line of Husserl!

In his *epistemology* Van der Leeuw emphasizes that knowledge is seeing, doing and speaking²⁰: 'If I have never seen a mountain, never seen a picture of it too and have never read a description of mountains, then I ask: *what is that*, when I visit Switzerland or another country with mountains

16. 1938: 674ff (= 1977: 772ff).

17. Especially Hermelink has emphasized this giving testimony as a characteristic of phenomenology, 1960.

18. 1977: 774, note 1. (not in 1938).

19. 1948a: 63ff, 72ff.

20. 1948a: 18ff.

for the first time. I receive an answer, which is confirmed everytime when I see new mountains. Now I 'know' something. But what a mountain really is, I only know, when I have been in the mountains myself and have climbed some. Then I can speak about mountains. 'Knowing' is thus *seeing, doing and speaking*²¹. In his lectures Van der Leeuw used to refer to the fact that if I really understand and know something I should be able to explain it to someone else. As an example he used to mention the theory of relativity. 'I very often heard this theory explained. Last week I thought 'Now I understand it', but when I came home and tried to explain it to my wife, I could not do it. And that means that I did not understand and know the theory of relativity'²². The conformity with Wittgenstein is evident here, although the two cannot have known each other. For Wittgenstein too is of the opinion that one knows something only, if one is able to apply it, to use it correctly, etc.²³ According to Van der Leeuw one only knows what dancing is, if one dances oneself, the same with music, etc. This is also connected with his phenomenological method, where the empathy is a central concept. One has to live through the various phenomena of the other religions in order to understand them. One only understands a sacrifice in another religion if one brings this sacrifice oneself (in one's mind). Moreover, Wittgenstein criticized Frazer with similar arguments as Van der Leeuw did. Frazer saw a kind of primitive world view and explanation of nature in the myths of the primitive people. He did not have any understanding of the specific traits of the primitive mind²⁴. Wittgenstein could have copied this directly from Van der Leeuw!

Van der Leeuw's *theological* method was characterized by the following aspects: He started with a historical part in which the material was collected. The historical critical exegesis of the relevant texts of the Bible also belongs to this part. Then the phenomenological part follows, in which, in the way described above, the various structures and meanings of the religious phenomena are made intelligible. In a final part the whole material is arranged from a certain perspective, *viz.* the incarnation of the Word, Jesus Christ. The incarnation is the centre of Van der Leeuw's thought²⁵. Sometimes the order of the historical and the phenomenological part is changed and the phenomenological part precedes the historical one²⁶. Moreover, sometimes a new historical part follows the phenomenological part. We have seen above that the phenomenological method

21. 1948a: 18.

22. Van der Leeuw in one of his lectures.

23. L. Wittgenstein, 1951.

24. L. Wittgenstein, 1979.

25. e.g., 1949 (= 1959).

26. 1963: 305ff (= 1957: 307ff; = 1955: 335ff; = 1948d: 276ff; not in 1932).

needs the corrections from the side of historical criticism. Van der Leeuw, himself, did this very conscientiously. Thus he practically always added various passages in new editions of his books in which he made corrections or gave additional information on the basis of the most recent literature. Frequently he changed the whole order or approach. To give an example: His approach in discussing the Greek religion in an earlier work, *Goden en Menschen in Hellas* (1927), is different from that in a later work, viz. the chapter on Greek religion in a collection of essays (edited by Van der Leeuw): *De Godsdiensten der Wereld* (1940). In the earlier work he presented the Greek religion in the way he treated religion in his great work on phenomenology of religion. He started with the dynamic, impersonal powers and via chapters on animism he came to the great Olympic gods. In the later work he is strongly influenced by the book of W.F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands*. In this book the Olympic gods are the starting-point and Van der Leeuw now follows this example.

Thus the historical sciences try to comprehend reality, but phenomenology has not to deal with reality, but with conceptual structures, whereas theology again tries to comprehend reality from its point of view²⁷. All sciences converge to one eschaton. Theology tries to understand this eschaton from the viewpoint of revelation, from the side of incarnation.

In science of religion Van der Leeuw was a great scholar in Egyptian and Greek religion. He also gave lectures in Roman religion. But the primitive religions were the foundation of his view of religion²⁸. And they were not only the basis of Van der Leeuw's ideas in science of religion but in theology too. The word 'primitive' must not be taken in its pejorative sense. It means that the primitive people, i.e. the people without script, stand nearer to the origin of mankind than the people of the western civilization. And as we have seen above: according to Van der Leeuw original experience should be preferred above later rational reflexion. Especially religious intuition is in its origin more valuable than in its later rational interpretations. What primitive culture has as a characteristic and what has been lost in our culture is the unity of life. Our civilization has been divided in several departments, but for primitive man everything is connected with everything. Dancing, praying and working occur in one and the same act. When we pray we do not dance and we do not work and when we work we do not pray, etc. Religion is connected with all the other manifestations of culture according to primitive man. Here there is still a unity of art and religion which has disappeared in our civilization and our time. Van der Leeuw sees it as his task to try to restore this unity in our culture as much as possible. Of course, he was well aware of the fact, that a complete restauration of primitive mentality is impossible, but at

27. 1948a: 141.

28. 1928; 1937; 1940; 1940-1941, vol. I: 7ff.

least we can diminish the many divisions between the various cultural areas. According to Van der Leeuw and many of his contemporaries primitive man's logic was different from modern man's. However, this does not mean that there is, according to Van der Leeuw, a fundamental difference between the way of thinking of primitive people and the people of modern civilization. But indeed he defends that there are two fundamentally different ways of thinking. One of them, the logical abstract way, can be found more often in modern cultures and therefore it is called the modern way of thinking, but this does not mean that primitive people do not also use this way of thinking. The other way of thinking is more massive and concrete and can be found in primitive cultures more than with us. But we too may sometimes reason in that way and Van der Leeuw defends the notion that this primitive way of thinking is also legitimate. Van der Leeuw gives the following characteristics of this primitive thinking:

- (i) Primitive man thinks 'massive'. By this notion Van der Leeuw refers to the fact that for primitive man 'everything is connected with everything'.
- (ii) Primitive man thinks on the basis of totality, i.e. the parts can only be understood if we see them as parts of a whole and if we understand this whole first of all.
- (iii) Primitive man can only understand something if he participates in it. He sees himself as a part of a greater whole.
- (iv) Primitive man thinks in a magical and mythical way. E.g. he ascribes a higher meaning to dreams for our knowledge and actions. Dreams may contain more truth than simple observation of reality.
- (v) Primitive man continually lives with the help of rites.

When we consider these characteristics more carefully, it may be clear that (i) and (ii) are without doubt connected with each other and that (iii) may be inferred from (i) and (ii).

Now, at least some critical remarks must be placed here. According to modern insight primitive man does not use a logic different from ours. He uses the same logic, but the empirical data that are available to him are different from ours. Besides, Van der Leeuw did not have the right concept of logic and he underestimated its importance. Logic is a purely formal science; it is the study of right reasoning. It teaches us how we can infer correct conclusions from certain given premises and it is as such indispensable. It can never be eliminated. In the first place Van der Leeuw made the mistake that logic may lead us to a kind of 'panlogism', i.e. that we can interpret everything logically and rationally. But this is never the

case. What can be inferred is that 'A follows from B' (or that 'B implies A') and then one may deduce B from C, C from D, etc., but finally one has to start from some indeducible and unprovable premises. Every empirical science has to start from some of such premises. Panlogism is never defended by any modern logical empiricist. Only in Hegel and some Hegelians such a position can be found, but the logic used here is so strong (i.e. less strict to such a degree) that it includes a dubious dialectics with the help of which anything may be proved²⁹.

In the second place Van der Leeuw does not distinguish enough between logic and experience. When primitive man is of the opinion that a man can be present on two places at the same time, he does not transgress modern logic, but our experience! On another level: if the Gospel proclaims that Christ has risen from the dead, then this is not a transgression of logical, but of empirical laws. Of course, I do not deny that besides logical, rational thinking there is another way of thought. One may think e.g. of Spinoza's third way, the intuitive way. In this way Spinoza continues scholastic thought. I am not sure, however, whether or not this intuitive thinking is the same as primitive thinking. But I also accept e.g. the third (iii) characteristic of primitive thinking, mentioned above. We acquire more easily knowledge by participating in a certain structure than when we stay completely outside what is to be known. But on the other hand I am of the opinion (in agreement with Spinoza) that the difference between the two ways of thought (the rational and the intuitive one) is not as great as Van der Leeuw thinks. With Spinoza I am of the opinion that in principle everything that is known by intuition in the long run ought also be proved by reason, provided that adequate premises are accepted.

Fundamental structure of Van der Leeuw's thought

We can find a certain fundamental structure in the whole of Van der Leeuw's thought. We will show this in a moment. This structure as such is not indicated by Van der Leeuw himself. But it can easily be deduced from Van der Leeuw's scholarly work. Moreover, Van der Leeuw himself refers to the fact that there are, according to him, two ways in theology: the phenomenological way from the boundary to the centre. The centre of Van der Leeuw's thinking is the incarnation. But now, there is also a second way, the way from the centre to the boundaries. This latter way is no longer a scholarly way; it is the way of faith, it is a dogmatic way. We should not mix the two ways. The first way is that of the university, the second way that of the church. But if we want to grasp the full meaning of our sciences and life we must go this latter way too³⁰.

29. cp. Hubbeling, 1981: 54ff.

30. 1948a: 163ff.

The structure that is in my view the foundation of the whole of Van der Leeuw's thought is that we obviously have to distinguish carefully between the centre and the margin of our sciences and our life. The centre is Christ's incarnation³¹. God's Word became flesh. But according to Van der Leeuw we have to interpret this incarnation synthetically and not exclusively. In Christ we meet all that is valuable in the other religions and non-Christian philosophies. But Van der Leeuw does not start with the centre. He begins in a phenomenological way with what is most universal and this can be different in the various sciences: a belief in a universal power, belief in life in its indifferenced form, etc. This most universal being (principle) is the start of Van der Leeuw's system. In the further development of the system this universal principle becomes more and more qualified, i.e. it receives more and more specific qualities until it receives the highest possible qualities, i.e. it becomes the incarnation, where God himself and not only one of his divine emanations enters the world. But if we have reached this centre we have to go the reverse way in order to understand the whole system from the view point of incarnation. The margin (boundary) is the most universal, i.e. the least qualified. The centre has the highest qualities and upholds the whole system with its power. And the system receives its final sense and meaning from this centre. We can find this fundamental structure in the various fields of Van der Leeuw we have to interpret this incarnation synthetically and not ex-ry of church music, theology, philosophy of religion, etc. However, we must not interpret this road from the most universal being (principle) (least specified) to the most qualified and specified (*ens concretissimum*) by way of an evolution in time. It is, as Van der Leeuw says *expressis verbis*, a structural development³².

As for its contents the philosophical foundation is constituted by a kind of philosophy of life in Dilthey's way. For Van der Leeuw life is obviously the phenomenological basis and it manifests itself in the various religious, artistic and other phenomena. We will see this presently.

Examples of the fundamental structure of Van der Leeuw's thought

In *phenomenology of religion* Van der Leeuw starts with *dynamism*³³. This is the belief in an all pervading power. Everywhere where there is a special manifestation of power, where something special happens or where life shows itself powerfully, there is *mana*. This term 'mana' has been taken from the Polynesian languages. It is used by Van der Leeuw as a technical

31. 1933; 1963: 339f (= 1957: 344f; = 1955: 375f; = 1948d: 470ff; = 1932: 216f); 1948a: 164.

32. 1938: 27f, 88, 151, 153f, 169 (= 1977: 9, 84, 161, 185).

33. 1948c: 11ff (= 1961: 15ff); 1938: 23ff (= 1977: 3ff).

term. In this presentation of his ideas Van der Leeuw shows himself to be standing in the Diltheyan tradition. The *stream of life* is according to primitive insight and also according to Van der Leeuw the foundation of all being. This stream of life is in its origin unqualified, but it gradually receives its special forms: it becomes the universal law of nature (*Tao; logos* in Heraclitus) in man's theoretical thinking³⁴. But this is still a very general concept. *Power* becomes more and more qualified: sacred objects (fetishes and amulets)³⁵, sacred stones and trees³⁶, sacred water and fire³⁷, sacred mountains³⁸, the sacred world above³⁹, sacred animals⁴⁰, etc. Now a new element enters the religious world: the idea that everything is animated. We have reached the stage of animism. We find thus the holy dead, holy people, above all the king, the priest, the prophet and finally the saviour⁴¹. Finally the many gods arrive, but let it be understood: God has a late arrival in the history of religions⁴². Now we see angels, demons, the 'momentary gods' and the 'special gods', the many gods of polytheism, the high gods and we end with the creator God as Father. With all this we have sketched the object of religion. Phenomenology continues: the subject of religion, object and subject in their reciprocal operation, the world, the various forms of religion, etc. but we need not go into giving a complete summary of Van der Leeuw's phenomenology. What however is important for all things, is that we must not interpret the development of religion given above as an evolution in time. Van der Leeuw gives, as he says so himself, a structural presentation. With the help of it we can interpret historical reality better, but it does not give an isomorphic picture of historical reality. And we have seen Van der Leeuw's general scheme: he moves from the most general concept (*mana*) to the more concrete (the creator god). In this part of his phenomenology we have not yet reached the heart of the system, the incarnation.

The same scheme we also find in *art*. Van der Leeuw starts with life that is rhythmically caught in dance⁴³. Dance is the art of movement. The next stage is drama, the art of movement and counter-movement⁴⁴. Thus drama is more complex than dance, i.e. it has more qualities and characteristics. The centre of art is the poetic word. Like Kant, Kierkegaard,

34. 1948c: 15ff (= 1961: 21ff); 1938: 29ff (= 1977: 10ff).

35. 1948c: 21ff (= 1961: 29ff); 1938: 37ff (= 1977: 19ff).

36. 1948c: 25ff (= 1961: 34ff); 1938: 52ff (= 1977: 37ff).

37. 1948c: 29ff (= 1961: 40ff); 1938: 59ff (= 1977: 46ff).

38. 1948c: 29 (= 1961: 29); 1938: 54f (= 1977: 41f).

39. 1948c: 31ff (= 1961: 42ff); 1938: 65ff (= 1977: 54ff).

40. 1948c: 34ff (= 1961: 46ff); 1938: 75ff (= 1977: 66ff).

41. 1948c: 38ff (= 1961: 52ff); 1938: 83ff (= 1977: 77ff).

42. 1948c: 57ff (= 1961: 77ff); 1938: 134ff (= 1977: 141ff).

43. 1963: 11ff (= 1957: 23ff); 1948d: 9ff (= 1955: 11ff).

44. 1963: 77ff (= 1957: 87ff); 1948d: 103ff (= 1955: 85ff).

Heidegger and others Van der Leeuw sees the highest form of art in poetry⁴⁵. Plastic arts⁴⁶, architecture⁴⁷ and music⁴⁸ are again more on the periphery. The whole of art is again upheld by the incarnated word, Jesus Christ. 'All the beauty of heaven and earth is comprehended in Thee alone'. And with this sentence Van der Leeuw finishes his book on art and religion. Sometimes Van der Leeuw has been seduced to saying that dance is the oldest form of art⁴⁹. Still we must not interpret the scheme given above as a form of evolution in time. Van der Leeuw only gives a structural approach. But another aspect of the relation between art and religion did have a development in time. Originally the two formed a unity, but became separated in the course of history⁵⁰. Van der Leeuw, however, hopes for a re-union and he sees some indications for this.

In *theology (dogmatics)* Van der Leeuw defends a highly original theology of the sacraments⁵¹. In this theory of the sacraments Van der Leeuw starts with a discussion of the relevant biblical texts⁵². Then he continues with a phenomenological part⁵³ in which he discusses the *sacramentalia* in the various religions. In the primitive religions man knows that he cannot take life for granted. In this way a sacramental world view arises. If man does not act according to certain rites life will escape him. He is not allowed to treat the things of the world as he likes. But he can make the various possibilities of life's power mobile. Thus a great number of *sacramentalia* originates⁵⁴. All activities in life can become a *sacramentale*: eating, drinking, singing, etc. We will treat all this more extensively later on in this publication. The church's sacraments originate as a further specification of these *sacramentalia*. But the sacraments too are upheld by Christ's incarnation. Human activity in the service of the sacraments is executing an office (in Dutch: *ambtelijk handelen*). But this executing an ecclesiastical office has also originated structurally from a more universal human acting in an office. Wherever we have to do with the *sacramentalia*, we have to do with human beings who are executing an office. Even poets, artists and

45. 1963: 115ff (= 1957: 125ff); 1948d: 155ff (= 1955: 127ff).

46. 1963: 153ff (= 1957: 161ff); 1948d: 205ff (= 1955: 169ff).

47. 1963: 193ff (= 1957: 201ff); 1948d: 343ff (= 1955: 217ff).

48. 1963: 213ff (= 1957: 217ff); 1948d: 365ff (= 1955: 235ff).

49. 1963: 13 (1957: 25; = 1955: 13).

50. 1963: 36ff, 86ff, 127ff, 199ff, 217ff (= 1957: 47ff, 95ff, 136ff, 204ff, 220ff; = 1948d: 45ff, 116ff, 171ff, 347ff, 369ff; = 1955: 39ff, 95ff, 140ff, 221ff, 239ff); 1932: 39ff.

51. 1949 (= 1959).

52. 1949: 26ff (= 1959: 27ff).

53. 1949: 133ff (1959: 109ff).

54. 1938: 361ff (= 1977: 406ff); 1948c: 111 (= 1961: 148). It is interesting to note that in 1924 there is no mentioning of sacramentalia and less emphasizing of the sacraments. Where in 1948c there is an exposition on the sacraments, 1924 gives an exposition on drama!

others are executing an office. For they too give life a more qualified and higher form. Here too we find Van der Leeuw's scheme: in the stream of life man shapes various models, forms of life and it is only by these that life becomes possible for him. Man plays a certain role in life or, which comes to the same, he executes an office.

Also *liturgy*⁵⁵ takes place in the midst of life. It does not end at the church's door. As one of Van der Leeuw's students, the late prof. Van Ruler, rightly summarized Van der Leeuw's views: 'The cigar after the sermon also belongs to the church's liturgy'. Certainly, the Christian's life with his God is concentrated in the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper, but the other forms of life are also shaped in the Lord and in this way receive a certain dedication and thus they belong to liturgy.

Spiritual hymns and *the hymns of the church* also originate from worldly songs, especially the melodies⁵⁶. They too are a 'concentration' of a general activity, but the whole, the worldly and the spiritual songs and hymns, are upheld by the power of the Lord's incarnation. Thus we find Van der Leeuw's scheme everywhere: in a stream of a more universal activity a concentration occurs, a further qualification, which has its centre and upholding power in Christ's incarnation.

Philosophy of religion

Let us, first of all, look at Van der Leeuw's view on religion⁵⁷. According to Van der Leeuw the number of definitions of religion is tremendous. Each definition is characteristic, if not for what religion is, then for the Age in which it originates and for the scholars who developed it. Generally speaking religion refers to a relation between man and something else. There is, however, a great disagreement about the further specification of what this 'something else' is. The difficulty is this that the *object* of religion cannot be comprehended in one word. We must try to find the common denominator in the various religions. And now we find that religion is the relation to something superior, which can be interpreted as personal or impersonal, spiritual or material, moral or purely dynamical. It is, however, always superior to man. In other words: in religion man has a relation to something that is completely different from him, that is experienced as 'holy'. It is a relation to the 'wholly other' dwelling in another world, even if man's view only knows of one world and not of a world hereafter. Perhaps still better: in religion man interprets his experience as revelation. Not only the object of religion is difficult to determine, the relation itself can hardly be defined unanimously. Schleiermacher offers his theory of

55. *vide* 1946b.

56. *vide* 1948b.

57. cp. 1927–1931, s.v. 'Religion' and 1940–1941, vol. I: 1ff.

absolute dependence (*schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*) but on the one hand this definition is too narrow, because religion includes love, submission, devotion, etc. too and on the other hand it is too broad, because in magic man is not dependent on a higher power, for he tries to take possession of this higher power and to use it for his own purposes. Therefore the concept of dependence is not the dominant characteristic of religion, but an ambivalent feeling with respect to the holy. Rudolph Otto has called the holy a *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. The holy inspires man with anxiety, but also with love. All this refers to the contents of the holy, its 'matter'. Spranger's studies reveal us the form of the holy. According to him it is characteristic for religious activities that in religion we never deal only with one value or a limited point of view, but always with final values and a definite, total point of view. A human activity can be evaluated from various points of view: morally, aesthetically, scientifically, etc. Religious man thinks of a final, total value. Religion claims totality, its values and judgements do not have other values and judgements next to it. The values that are acknowledged by it, are not limited by a certain point of view. They are values for God⁵⁸. The religious values incorporate the other values in it according to Van der Leeuw. For the religious point of view thinking on the basis of a total uncompartimentalized view is characteristic and therefore primitive man is more religious than we.

According to Van der Leeuw philosophy of religion plays an important role as a connecting link between phenomenology and theology⁵⁹. But before we go into this field I want to point out that Van der Leeuw even as a scientist of religion is fundamentally a philosopher of religion. For he studied the various religions not only from a purely scientific interest, but he was of the opinion that he could learn from them. We can learn spiritual things from other religions. Especially primitive religions have a great appeal to us. History of religions and especially phenomenology provide material to philosophy of religion. Philosophy evaluates this, but in contradistinction to phenomenology the problem of the truth and value of the various religious concepts and statements is put. The difference between phenomenology and philosophy of religion is that in the latter the *epoche* has been given up. This is also done in dogmatics (theology), but here the difference is that the latter bases its judgements on revelation, whereas philosophy keeps its immanent character. Theology starts from the eschaton, *viz* revelation; it goes from the top to the bottom, from God to man. Philosophy, however, goes from the bottom to the top, from man to God. It is rightly called wisdom of the world. The problem of the relation between God and man belongs to it, but not e.g. the question of Christ's res-

58. 1963: 5 (= 1957: 17f = 1948d: 3 = 1955: 3).

59. 1948a: 205ff.

urrection. Thus philosophy and theology stand opposite to each other, but they cannot exist without each other. Theology always needs new concepts that are borrowed from philosophy. Theology may start from its eschaton, but before that it must know of an eschaton and this can be learned from philosophy. Philosophy has to lead the various sciences to their eschaton and then, because it knows the limits of science and rational thinking, it makes place for theology (faith). In philosophy of religion the Christian faith can at most be the first or the highest religion, but in theology it is *the* (only true) religion. But we cannot acquire this insight, if we have not tried to go to the utmost limits with the help of philosophy of religion.

But philosophy of religion is not allowed to become a form of apologetics⁶⁰. Van der Leeuw rejects the traditional arguments for God's existence and natural theology. In my view, however, Van der Leeuw does give a kind of 'argument for God's existence' (without calling it that). For he gives a foundation for the possibility of absolute sense (meaning). In connection with this he brings forward an argument for God's existence thus developing an *argumentum e sensu absoluto*: 'We remember the various meanings (senses) that every activity can have: I hear you talk. I can receive your words in a purely acoustic sense as a more or less intensive set of sounds. I can also evaluate them musically and appreciate their cadence, their euphony. If you speak Chinese I cannot make any sense of it. But if you speak a language that is known to me I can understand it and know what you are talking about. That is: I understand your actual intention, if you ask me e.g. to shake hands. But other connotations are in the background, for I have understood you *really*, if I have understood that with this shaking of hands you want to thank me or to ask me for help, or that by shaking hands very powerfully you only want to hurt me, etc. All these meanings (senses) flow into a final and definite sense that includes all possible meanings. We do no longer comprehend this "final sense", but we believe in it as the foundation of all our understanding. I can only provisionally form an opinion of a certain activity. We mean this when we say that a criminal has been rightly condemned by the judge, but that there is still another judgement possible that is given by someone who is not bound by a book of law and finally there is God's judgement'. Here we end in God.

I myself have tried to give a similar argument for God's existence in 1963, but such an argument is only valid in a system where some rule of the dialectics of infinity is permitted⁶². For in some way it is presupposed

60. 1948a: 209.

61. 1948a: 200.

62. cp. Hubbeling, 1963. For an exposition of dialectics and a critique of such a way of reasoning as I permitted myself in 1963, *vide* Hubbeling, 1981: 54ff.

here that all finite beings, finite values, finite meanings, etc. are founded in an infinite being, infinite value, infinite (all inclusive) meaning. Such a rule may be valid in some systems (cp. Zorn's lemma), but as a general valid rule it cannot be accepted. Earlier in the history of philosophy all arguments for God's existence used this rule (or some even more doubtful rule taken from Hegelian dialectics). The renaissance of the arguments for God's existence today are due to the fact that they are shown to be valid in much stricter systems⁶³. Like many philosophers of religion in his day Van der Leeuw did not value the arguments for God's existence very highly.

Although Van der Leeuw rejects the possibility of giving proofs for God's existence, he never starts purely dogmatically from the top to the bottom, from God to man. There are always two ways in theology⁶⁴, as we have seen: one way going from the bottom to the top, going from man, with his religious experience, to the eschaton, God; the second way, going from God's revelation to man, from the top to the bottom. In dogmatic theology Van der Leeuw uses the following method: first of all the dogmatician has to try to determine the meaning of the words of the bible *e mente auctoris* (in agreement with the original intention of its authors). The dogmatician should also hear the voices of the tradition of the church. For Van der Leeuw this is both the tradition of the dogmatician's church and the ecumenical tradition. The data of science and philosophy of religion must also be considered. Finally we may hope that the Holy Spirit will guide us on the way to the truth. Besides this purely formal method in dogmatics Van der Leeuw also gives a method which refers to the contents of dogmatics. This method prescribes that we should base our theology on the doctrine of incarnation⁶⁵. All other Christian doctrines must be derived from this central dogma. If Van der Leeuw speaks of Scripture he primarily thinks of the New Testament. The Old Testament belongs to the other religions⁶⁶. In Dutch Calvinism this is an extremely extraordinary position, because in the Netherlands theologians usually emphasize the relevance of the Old Testament. As Van Ruler, who is in other aspects strongly influenced by Van der Leeuw, said: 'The Old Testament is the real Scripture and the New Testament is its explaining compendium'. Van der Leeuw was a synthetic thinker. Therefore his theology of incarnation also includes the message of the Old Testament, while at the same time including the truths of other religions. Among these other religions

63. Hubbeling, 1981: 77ff.

64. 1948a: 163ff.

65. 1948a: 164. Van der Leeuw also gave an exposition of this dogmatic method more extensively in a lecture.

66. 1948a: 146.

especially the primitive religions are important because western man can learn from the primitive religion and mentality.

SYMBOL AND SACRAMENT

Symbol and sacrament take a central place in Van der Leeuw's theology. They are the concrete manifestations of Christ's incarnation. Van der Leeuw wrote a book on the theology of the sacraments (*Sacramentstheologie*). According to Van der Leeuw symbol and sacrament are closely connected⁶⁷. This is manifest in the following quotation which explains Van der Leeuw's view on symbol and sacrament very clearly. 'The sacred, then, must possess a form: it must be "localizable", spatially, temporally, visibly or audibly. Or, still more simply: the sacred must "take place". This "taking place", however, is never and on no occasion simply the event that is given: rather, in the given, possibilities must first of all reveal themselves. Eating, therefore, is not a "taking place" of the sacred, but the sacrament is. But every event may be a "taking place" of the sacred, and in such cases we speak of a "symbol". A symbol, that is to say, is by no means something quite inessential, as our loose modern mode of expression seems to imply, but rather the encounter, συμβαλλειν, between possibility and givenness, between event and "taking place", between secular and sacred. The symbol, then, is a participation of the sacred in its veritable, actual form: between the sacred and its form, there exists an essential community'⁶⁸. This quotation shows that Van der Leeuw places symbol and sacrament together. The symbol is not something inessential, something that is 'only' a symbol, i.e. something that is not real. On the contrary a symbol is something that expresses the holy (God, the divine) and refers to it. Further: a symbol is not something static and substantial. It 'takes place', it is a holy activity. Now, sacrament and symbol are not completely the same thing. According to Van der Leeuw every sacrament is at the same time a symbol, but the reverse is not true. A sacrament always includes an activity and is never static. But there certainly are some static symbols: the cross in Christianity, the wheel in Hinduism and Buddhism, etc. These are symbols in the narrower sense of the word and not sacraments. 'The sacred becomes "fixed", or "placed", in the concrete human situation; and this includes persons and objects, words, actions *etc.*, all of which receive their ministerial status from the sacred and thus become symbols; while among these, "symbols" in the narrower sense such as the cross, incense, the *sacra* of the mysteries *etc.*, play a subordinate though momentous part'⁶⁹.

67. cp. Waardenburg, 1975: 212.

68. 1938: 447f (= 1977: 510).

69. 1938: 448f (= 1977: 511).

However, Van der Leeuw's doctrine of the symbol is developed in his later works. It is interesting to compare the first edition of the so called 'little phenomenology' (*Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis*, Haarlem, 1923) with its second edition (*Inleiding tot de phaenomenologie van den godsdienst*, Haarlem, 1948). In the first edition the concept 'symbol' is only used in its modern sense and Van der Leeuw emphasizes that primitive thinking is different. "Symbol" is a modern concept which does not belong to primitive thinking⁷⁰. Van der Leeuw's admiration for primitive anti-rational thinking has increased in the course of time⁷¹ and he has tried to incorporate this way of thinking into his system. Worship, liturgy, sacrament and symbol then belong together: 'In his worship man speaks and acts, but also God. That can only happen, if divine and human acting receive a material form, if it becomes visible, audible, touchable. And this is only possible by means of a third component that is taken from this world, but is sacralized in worship. We call this third thing: *symbol*, not in its mitigated, modern sense of the word, but in the sense which can be found in antiquity: in the symbol two realities coincide, in it God and man meet'⁷².

Van der Leeuw's symbolic and sacramental thinking is based on a certain world view and anthropology. Here there is no devaluation of matter or body. Matter and body are possibilities also, i.e. they have the potency to transcend the given reality. In connection with this Van der Leeuw teaches the resurrection of the body and not the immortality of the soul⁷³. He also anticipates Merleau Ponty's well-known theory of the materialistic aspects of thinking and the doctrine of the body which is a subject (*le corps sujet*)⁷⁴: 'But the following must clearly be said, that no culture and in general no human existence can dispense with either consciousness or unreflected life. Thinking is never and nowhere a purely intellectual activity. Man thinks with his body; thinking is an activity of the complete human being, of his digestion just as well as of his soul and intellect. . . . The possibilities of human existence is called body or spirit. It would be completely wrong to consider the two as each other's opposites; they belong together'⁷⁵.

Furthermore, the fact that according to Van der Leeuw God or the Holy can be known only by means of symbols and sacramental activities, can only be explained by the fact that a direct knowledge and experience of God is impossible. Here too a development in Van der Leeuw's thought can be noticed. As we have seen above Van der Leeuw originally believed

70. 1924: 199.

71. cp. 1937 (= 1940).

72. 1948c: 142 (= 1961: 189).

73. cp. 1947a.

74. Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 203ff.

75. 1941b: 49f.

that the difficult problem of the relation of faith and history, i.e. the problem as to how eternal truths can have a historical basis, can be solved by referring to the direct experience of the living Lord. That means that he believed that a direct knowledge of God was possible. But later he rejected this possibility and moved towards an indirect knowledge of God, i.e. a knowledge by means of symbols and sacraments. In this connection it is also important to refer again to Van der Leeuw's epistemology. Knowing is never acquired by the attitude of a disinterested observer; knowing is an act, a deed. I know a mountain by climbing it, etc. (vide p. 7).

Are sacraments and symbols invented or found by man? Is man passive or active in acknowledging or constituting something as a symbol? Now, man is always active, but on the other hand 'the symbol is not arbitrary, but necessary'⁷⁶. In this connection Van der Leeuw refers to Jung's doctrine of archetypes, at least he does so in his later works. Man bears old original symbols in his subconsciousness. They acquire a form in worship and rites 'Rites build a home for religious experience in daily life. They do this with the help of symbols, which lie collectively and very deep in the human mind. Some original symbols appear again and again, they form a bridge between the two worlds in which man participates, a bridge which lies in man's essential existence. Symbols are boundaries by which the two realities are bound together. Man does not invent them, they are given to him'⁷⁷.

Symbols are more or less imposed on man. However, if he does nothing, if he does not want to hear the symbolic language of the things around him, symbols will no longer come into existence. At present we live in a time that is poor in symbols. But even modern man cannot live without symbols and therefore he creates some by himself. 'The urgency to approach reality in a symbolic way is too strong and therefore modern man creates new ones, where the reality of the given sacraments is no longer evident. In this way we get artificial sacraments, which seems very strange. But still this happens so that the ineradicable urgency to have sacraments becomes manifest. ... In our day a French student, who is not satisfied with a life in which one does not really decide or create anything, undertakes a completely senseless, but dangerous expedition to Smara, a town in ruins, in the Spanish colony Rio del Oro. He is convinced that something will happen, which will give his life a new direction. But nothing happens except that he grows ill on his way back, that he became a Catholic and died. But he had decided for himself that Smara would change everything'⁷⁸.

76. 1938: 448 (= 1977: 511).

77. 1949: 134 (1959: 109f).

78. 1949: 135 (= 1959: 110); cp. also 1946b: 44.

This French student, named Vieuchange, knew at least what symbolic life means⁷⁹. Man receives symbols, but if he does not find them and if he does not receive some stimulus, he creates the symbols himself. 'Without doubt this is the psychological foundation of a sacrament. One decides that by doing something one causes something else to happen. We know this from the time of our youth, the time of children's magic: if I do this or that I will get a high note for my exercise in French, etc. Marett thinks of the same thing in his book that is so fundamental for the phenomenology of the sacraments, when he says "the sacraments meet the world half-way" ...'⁸⁰.

Van der Leeuw sees also a going together of activity and passivity in other religious areas. Therefore in his view the distinction between magic and religion in a narrower sense is not so great: 'We will not, as is done so often, sharply distinguish between magic and religious acts. We do not believe that such a distinction is possible'⁸¹. One can only say that in magic man tries to dominate the world and the all pervading power (*mana*) by symbolic means, whereas in worship man and the Holy communicate with each other⁸². When man acts symbolically or sacramentally he uses daily forms and activities. But he does so in order to establish something in another realm. This other realm can be his inner life or the world. One can treat the world as a dominant ruler or one can consider oneself as a part of a greater whole or one can see the events as guided by someone else: 'A definition that is free from the well-established theological concepts will be: a sacrament, seen as a human phenomenon, caused by human intentions, is an elementary action, which man performs being aware of the fact that he establishes something in another area. From this we can find the following possibilities of the structure of the sacraments:

- A. The *magic structure*; a cosmic-factual moving rite (moving is taken here in its transitive sense), a ceremony with creative power;
- B. The *mystic-pantheistic structure*: a cosmic-factual moving rite (moving is taken here in its intransitive sense);
- C. The *psychological structure*: an inward moving and moved rite;
- C. and A. The *mystic-ecstatic structure*;
- D. The *structure of faith*: a cosmic-factual rite that is brought about (instigated by God, whenever He wants it). It is eschatologically connected with creation and redemption.⁸³

79. 1946: 44.

80. 1949: 135 (= 1959: 110).

81. 1948c: 143 (= 1961: 190).

82. 1948c: 142f (= 1961: 190).

83. 1949: 136 (= 1959: 110f).

We know God by means of symbols and sacramental performances and not by way of a rational argumentation. As long as Van der Leeuw writes as a phenomenologist (scientist of religion) he cannot make a choice between the various sacramental structures. As a theologian and even as a philosopher of religion he chooses structure D. However, he cannot bring forward rational arguments for this choice. Still this choice is not arbitrary. Therefore he is able to give what today we call 'good reasons' for his choice: in the first place man is never a completed being. He is always on his way⁸⁴. In the second place the various partial meanings refer to an absolute meaning (*vide* above p. 18f). I cannot find this absolute sense in myself or in the world. A third being appears: God, my creator. "My existence is connected with my surroundings and I am in danger of becoming detached from myself. But now another Being emerges from these surroundings and he is neither myself nor the world. Therefore this Being can only be God. The world is only present as my world. I am only present as a part of the world. I exist in my trying to free myself from the world, but in this I am not successful. If a third being from 'outside' meets me then he has a relation with my existence that cannot be correlative as is my relation to the world. It is a relation of complete dependence"⁸⁵. And thus structure D. is reached! In the theology of the sacraments all this is worked out further: 'Sacraments and *sacramentalia*, they all have their place in the distribution of 'Our Lord's sacrifice'"⁸⁶. And this sacrifice is in its turn included in Christ's incarnation. This does not mean, however, that the other symbolic-sacramental structures are of no value. They are all included in Christ's synthetic power. There is a mystical aspect also in the festival of the Lord's Supper. This stimulates the inner life of the believer and it certainly has some cosmic aspects, etc.

THE DOCTRINE OF ART

a. The history of the book 'Wegen en Grenzen'

Van der Leeuw wrote on art in various books, but especially in his work *Wegen en Grenzen. Over verhouding van Religie en Kunst* (Amsterdam, 1932) (*Ways and boundaries. On the relation of Religion and Art*). There was a second edition in 1948 in Amsterdam. Van der Leeuw had added many new parts to it and he also fundamentally changed its framework. We will come back to this in a moment. After his death a third edition appeared which had again a different framework. An English translation was made based on this third edition. Furthermore, Van der Leeuw wrote some smaller works on religion and art. These are also dealt with in this publication.

84. 1941b: 50ff.

85. 1941b: 91.

86. 1949: 334 (= 1959: 256).

Before we can consider Van der Leeuw's aesthetical insights with respect to religion we must first of all give a survey of the framework and the main contents of the book *Wegen en Grenzen* and its remarkable history. In this book Van der Leeuw tries to show that the relation between religion and art had the following development. Originally religion and art formed a closed unity. In primitive cultures people did not separate dancing and praying, etc. But in the course of our technical development religion and art grew more and more apart. First there was a transition stage in which religion and art still had many relations. The original unity peeped very often through the various phenomena. But finally there came a stage in which religion and art were totally separated and were even actively opposed to each other. But today we live in a stage in which there are growing contacts between religion and art. Van der Leeuw calls these contacts between art and religion 'moments'. By sketching these moments he also tries to show when a certain piece of art can be called religious. Therefore they function also as a kind of criteria for deciding whether or not we may call some product of art religious. Finally he discusses the relation of the sacred and the beauty on a more abstract level and he expresses his hope that religion and art will understand that they need each other. Moreover he is of the opinion that there are indications that this will happen in the future. The main division of the book in the first edition is the treatment of the periods mentioned above: (1) 'The unity of beauty and holiness in a magical sense'; (2) 'External connection between holiness and beauty in half-magical and half-modern sense'; (3) 'Holiness and beauty as hostile powers'. The following two chapters have been added to these three: (4) 'The essential unity of beauty and holiness moments'; (5) 'Ways and boundaries'. The title of the last chapter (and the whole book) refers to Van der Leeuw's view that there may be boundaries between religion and art (or between the sacred and the profane), but that there are always ways (i.e. connections) between them. In the first edition Van der Leeuw speaks in each chapter of the various forms of art: literature, dance, music, theatre (drama), painting (and sculpture) and architecture (in this sequence). They all appear in every period.

In the second edition Van der Leeuw has completely changed the structure and framework of his book. Now he treats the various forms of art separately, and the periods mentioned above are treated every time when a special form of art is discussed. The sequence of the forms of art has been changed also. It is now: dance, drama, literature, painting (and sculpture), architecture, music, i.e. (1) 'the beautiful movement'; (2) 'movement and contra-movement. Drama'; (3) 'the beautiful word'; (4) 'the image of God and the image of man'; (5) 'the house of God and the house of man'; (6) 'music and religion'. Again a final chapter 'ways and boundaries' is added. Van der Leeuw added many details so that the book is now twice the original size. In Van der Leeuw's new framework unfortun-

ately some repetitions were unavoidable. The third edition appeared after the death of the author. E. Smelink did the editorial work. He did not change many things in the text, but he changed the structure of the work, although Smelink aimed at presenting a book by Van der Leeuw, not a work of his own. And indeed, the words are always Van der Leeuw's words, but he does not speak in his own way, because the sequence of paragraphs has been changed many times. The third edition has the slight advantage that some repetitions, which were on the other hand many times useful and not without sense, have disappeared, but at a very high price! For through the many changes of place many paragraphs and sections have received a completely different connection with the other paragraphs and sections. Thus they receive another 'modality', another emphasis and very often another meaning, because the meaning of a certain paragraph highly depends on its surroundings. Smelink has kept the main structure of the second edition, but many paragraphs and sections are replaced and an example that Van der Leeuw puts in the first period very easily acquires another meaning when it is now seen in the second period. Unfortunately the English translation is based on this doubtful third edition instead of the better second edition: *Sacred and Profane Beauty. The Holy in Art* (London, 1963). Or more correctly: it has been made from the German translation which in its turn has been made from this third edition. As we want to concentrate on the 'moments' of coincidence of religion and art (see above) and these moments are dealt with best in the first edition, we will even follow the sequence of this latter edition.

b. Moments of beauty in holiness

We will now consider Van der Leeuw's theory of art more carefully. As said above Van der Leeuw sees a development from an original unity via disintegration and external relation towards hostility and separation. Van der Leeuw defends a fundamental unity. There are always moments, where in a manifestation of art the (philosophical) other, sometimes the Holy Other of religion, is present. We want to consider some of these moments and we adhere to the sequence of the first edition, where the relevance of these moments is more manifest than in the later editions. Another disadvantage of the English and German translation is that the beautiful illustrations have been omitted. At this point a remark should be made about the term 'moments', which has been rendered inadequately by 'influence' in the English translation. It is taken by Van der Leeuw in its Latin sense of *momentum*. This sense has not been completely lost in English, as we have phrases as 'a matter of moment'. The connotation 'constituent' should not be lost sight of either. The moments Van der Leeuw put forward constitute beauty and at the same time holiness.

The first moment which forces its attention upon us is the *massive*, the

monumental. Architecture provides the most eloquent examples. It works by nature with large masses. But it can work in two directions: either overcoming mass as well as it can, removing its weight, thwarting its lines, or by letting mass itself speak. As soon as it does the latter, it possesses a means of expressing a particular side of the holy. Van der Leeuw thinks of the gigantic 'Deadalus' buildings of ancient Greece, which gave Pausanias an impression of the divine. He also thinks of the megaliths and the gigantic constructions of prehistory, their simplified mass, powerful gesture, which appears to us as divine movement. Above all, Van der Leeuw thinks of the architecture of ancient Egypt, of the oppressive weight of the monstrous pillars of Karnak, placed all too near to each other, a divine oppression which compels us to flee; he thinks of the superhuman gesture of the pyramids and obelisks. A learned Egyptologist once called the building of the pyramids – so much effort and expense for the grave of a king – 'an infinite waste of material'. A man with deeper understanding feels the titanic resistance to death of the divine life given to the king; the pyramids lie there like a mighty memorial to the battle between god and god. Let us look once at the famous rock temple at Deir el-Bahri. Simple rows of pillars form the entrance to the dark interior of the temple in the rock. But they end and are as if they were crowned by the enormous rock wall, which seems to absolutely destroy them. It is as though the architect wanted to express his human vision in divinely threatening masses of rock, make his own work worthless, as though he wanted to say that the divine is invariably greater and of higher rank than what humans build. Here we also find the aspect of negation, to which we shall return presently.

Still we cannot claim this moment for architecture alone. Egyptian sculpture too, occasionally expresses the holy through its massiveness. The Sphinx, which in Egypt is by no means the feminine riddle it is in Greece, but rather a symbol of the masculine and divine might of the king, lies in the sand of Giza like a gigantic fragment of divine might. The enormous royal statues which watch over the lonely rock temple of Abu Simbel make us aware, solely through the majestic calm of their gigantic stature, that we are entering another world.

Not only architecture and sculpture, but music too, can express the holy through the massive and momental. There is music, even if it is only rarely found, which piles up stone blocks and awakens the experience of the divine solely through its massiveness. We think at once of the symphonic works of Anton Bruckner. Mahler's *Eight Symphony* is likewise such a breaking through of power. The method of building sounds – in itself no guarantee of aesthetic effect, and not even above suspicion – is here used to interpret the experience of the wholly other. It is as though the entire world were dissolved in sound; we collapse under the weight, and feel ourselves fascinated and repelled simultaneously. In many of Bach's organ works, the master, even if the architectonic line of his work is as fine and clear as every-

where in his music, seems to be playing with blocks of stone, like a pre-historic giant (*Toccata and Fugue in D minor, Fantasia and Fugue in G minor*).

It is no wonder that the massive and monumental possesses numinous power. Even primitive man heard the voice of God in thunder. A good criterion of the religious value of massive music is whether or not it is possible to perceive God's thunder behind it⁸⁷.

A nuance of the massive and monumental is *profusion* (*het vele*). Van der Leeuw does not mean multiplicity, motley, but the monotonous profusion which we find primarily in Indian art. The endless rows of identical stupas in the Borobudur attempt, through repetition, to express the holy. We find in literature an analogy to this extension of structure in the piling up of epithets in the *Mahabharata*, which seeks likewise to awake experience of the infinite through the endlessness of profusion; then there is also in literature a typically Buddhistic infinity, image of the series of infinitely many Buddhas which in the endless change of birth still incarnate the same formless divinity⁸⁸.

Further we have the moment of the *sublime*. This is related to that of the monumental; this we shall find above all in architecture, in the solemn calm of its noble line. In addition, however, the sublime is conveyed by an inwardness which reaches into the depths of our soul. We find it in all the arts, but literature has perhaps the best example of it. Thus Van der Leeuw quotes the famous passage in Isaiah 6: 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory'. Besides Isaiah 6, we could cite a whole series of other passages from the Bible which are filled with the same greatness. We think also of Vondel and Goethe, who, no matter how different, are similar in this regard. Further, the famous song of the choir in Vondel's tragedy *Lucifer* is a paraphrase of Isaiah 6. In the 'Prologue in Heaven', of Goethe's *Faust*, adoration is addressed more to nature than to God, but at least to a nature which is boundless in its majesty and delicacy:

Da flammt ein blitzendes Verheeren,
Dem Pfade vor des Donnerschlags;
Doch Deine Boten, Herr, verehren,
Das sanfte Wandeln Deines Tags.
Der Anblick gibt den Engeln Stärke,
Da keiner Dich ergründen mag,
Und alle Deine hohen Werke,
Sind herrlich wie am ersten Tag.

87. 1963: 206 (= 1957: 210f; = 1948d: 356; = 1955: 228; = 1932: 133f).

88. 1963: 207 (= 1957: 211; = 1948d: 358; = 1955: 229f; = 1932: 135).

There flames a shining devastation,
 Before Thy thunderbolt's display;
 Yet angels praise with glad ovation,
 The gentle progress of Thy day.
 Thy sight make strong the heavenly city,
 Since none may seek to probe Thy ways,
 And all Thy works, both high and mighty,
 Are glorious as creation's days.⁸⁹

Music contains sublimity by slowness of tempo. But this is not the only means, nor does it offer a guarantee for true sublimity, as many 'religious' composers seem to think. Majestic reserve, chaste restraint are frequently expressed by slow tempo. And even this remains nothing unless everything point to an emotion which admits no more violent expression. Here Palestrina is probably the greatest example. We may also mention examples from Wagner's *Parsifal* and Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*⁹⁰.

This sublime and overwhelming can be either fascinating or awe-inspiring (a *fascinans* or *tremendum*). It can enchant, captive, illuminate, remove a burden from the heart. It can also oppress, bring fear, cause horror and terror. Wherever the accent may lie, according to Van der Leeuw's working principle, no work of art can be an expression of the holy unless it contains both elements. It may be that terror dominates, but fascination must not be absent. It may also be that we are so enchanted that we revel in bliss; but if every tremor is lacking, it is a false bliss, even if we are confronted with real beauty⁹¹. One should notice these last words. According to Van der Leeuw a product of art may be beautiful without expressing the holy in a genuine way. We will return to this in a moment. Further, Van der Leeuw emphasizes that a work of art does not become religious by a religious theme alone!

Fascination, the attraction exerted by the holy, can be expressed through *light*, through colour, through sunlight in contrast to darkness, of which we shall speak presently. We think of the white grace of the temples of the Greeks, which are strongly filled with the sense of the numinous, earthly likeness of the *olympia domata*. In painting we have e.g. Klinger's wonderful *Pieta*, which is in Dresden: in the foreground everything is dark, the black shape of the disconsolate mother bends over the corpse of the Lord, John stares in infinity, holding the Lord's hand. Death prevails here. But all this is not only made bearable, but is also glorified, put into a divine light by the background: a colourful meadow in spring full of

89. 1963: 139 (= 1957: 146f; = 1948d: 186; = 1955: 153f; = 1932: 135f).

90. 1963: 231 (= 1957: 234; = 1948d: 391; = 1955: 254; = 1932: 136f).

91. 1963: 232 (= 1957: 234f; = 1948d: 391; = 1955: 254f; = 1932: 137).

flowers. There life prevails and all this is more than a felicitous contrast. It is the light that gives divine meaning to the human object⁹².

Music, too, knows the divine light. Romanticism played with sounds which were visible and colourful. It thereby posed a psychological problem which remains acute.

Horch, es klagt die Flöte wieder,
Und die kühlen Brunnen rauschen,
Golden wehn die Töne nieder –
Stille, stille, lass uns lauschen.

Holdes Bitten, mild Verlangen,
Wie es süß zum Herzen spricht!
Durch die Nacht, die mich umfängen,
Blickt zu mir der Töne Licht.

Hark, the mournful flute is sounding,
Cool fountains softly sifting,
Golden sounds come downward drifting –
Quiet, hear the song abounding.

Blessed asking, gentle yearning,
To the heart it sweetly calls;
Through the night about me turning,
The light of sound my sight enralls.

(Clemens Brentano, *Abendständchen*)

Here we are involved with more than a psychological game or even a psychological problem. The light of golden tones comes into the darkness; all seems gentle enchantment; only night brings a brief tremor of fear.

In the music of Mozart's operas, above all in the ensembles, is contained something of this divine levity, this unearthly gaiety which is like the whispered laughter of stars, sublime in spite of its exuberance. Here, of course, we are far removed from all 'religious' objects and every standard religious style. But Don Giovanni's Champagne aria, the great ensemble with the minuet from the same opera, Cherubino's '*Voi che sapete*', and the finale in the fourth act from *Figaro*, the trio of three boys and the overture to the *Magic Flute*, are religious music in the noblest sense. Here we find

92. 1963: 190 (= 1957: 195; = 1948d: 257; = 1955: 210; = 1932: 137f). The editions of 1955, 1957 and 1963 do not have the example of Klinger's *Pieta*, because Smelink omitted it, obviously because this painting was no longer in accordance of the taste of his day. How arbitrary such a procedure is, is shown by the fact that today (1985) there is a renewed interest in Klinger and the *Jugendstil* in general.

what is absolute, what is perfect, through which the young love of Cherubino, the drunkenness of Don Giovanni, in themselves become absolute, something which does not exist on earth. Here we have reached an immense separation from everything that is earthly. But here too the 'tremendum' does not lack. Ever and again this divine gaiety is interrupted briefly, very briefly, by a sound of a different sort (the chords of the adagio in the overture to *The Magic Flute*), which briefly causes us to shudder, but only briefly, just enough to let us feel not only enchantment, but also fear⁹³.

Besides this light we have something related. In Dutch we have *licht* as the opposite of dark as the English light and this is treated above. But in Dutch *licht* is also the opposite of heavy. We must think here of what can move more freely in the air (*zweven*). The English translation speaks of 'suspension', but this is not adequate. It is better to speak of *hovering* or *floating* (in the air), which is meant in a figurative sense. This hovering or floating seems to reach for heaven, or better it is an expression of heavenly immateriality. Music, freeing itself from the world, rises up to heaven in silent or occasionally loud ecstasy. When we are considering the expression of heavenly immateriality, we think first of Gothic architecture. But music, too, contributes its part: for example the aria from Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*, 'Aus Liebe will mein Heiland sterben', in which two oboes without the usual foundation of basso continuo accompany the flute and soprano voice. Here heavenly love emerges freely. Just as in dance, ecstasy is one of the means of expressing the other, reaching a new reality. Dionysus was not only the originator of the dance, but also of music. From the walls of the Villa Ierem in Pompeii, the ecstatic face of a singing silenus looks upon us, incarnation of ecstatic music.

The most beautiful example from the present day is the Negro spiritual. In these songs of an oppressed and faithful people something of the ecstasy is perceptible which inspired the Hebrew Psalms and the early Christian pneumatic hymns⁹⁴.

Another 'moment' is the *heavenly* (het *hemelse*). We find it e.g. in various works of Richard Wagner. It is formed differently compared with what has been said above with respect to the hovering or floating. The pilgrim motif *Tannhäuser*, the Grail motif in *Lohengrin* and in *Parsifal*, the Valhalla motif in *The Ring*, all bring up the image of another world in solemn, unearthly chords, filled with longing. In contrast, Bach, who knows the moment of the heavenly well, but emphasizes the distance much more greatly, frees the expression from all human longing. The symphony in the *Christian Oratorio*, for example, has the sparkling melody of the violins with

93. 1963: 232 (= 1957: 235f; = 1948d: 392; = 1955: 255f; = 1932: 138f).

94. 1963: 233f (= 1957: 236; = 1948d: 393; = 1955: 256f; = 1932: 140). cp. also 1943: 80f.

the effect of a glittering, starry sky, in contrast to the pastoral shawms of the shepherds⁹⁵.

Another moment is the *tremendum*. The awe-inspiring, divine *orgè*, that about the holy which excites fear, is expressed above all by sculpture and painting. Otto has pointed out the deliberately ugly, even monstrous, character of many Indian deities. Less barbaric, but still repulsive enough, is the effect of the threatening of Byzantine art. And even more, modern art knows the 'fear of the Lord'. Van der Leeuw has in mind that *Christ With the Crown of Thorns*, by Dürer or one of his pupils, which brings us unvoluntarily to a 'Lord, depart from me, for I am a sinful man'. Van der Leeuw thinks of Michelangelo's damned, the face reflecting absolute terror of the holy⁹⁶.

An nuance of the *tremendum*, the awe-inspiring is the *ghostly*, the ghostly, which Grünewald was able to express in the terrible glory of his colours and the demonic richness of his insanely impossible movements. Before his picture of the resurrected Christ we are first gripped by fear of the spectre, just as the soldiers we see in the foreground, their limbs distorted with fear. The phenomenon still does not lack the majesty of divine terror.

In the 'Crucifixion of the Isenheim Altar', though, the awe-inspiring is free from the ghostly: gruesome reality suffices to terrify us and causes us to tremble. Horror seizes us. But the mighty finger of John the Baptist points away from the human to the divine⁹⁷.

The experience of the 'wholly other' in art is very often occasioned by *ancient, archaic forms*. The language of the King James version (or of the Dutch '*Statenbijbel*') has a devotional effect because of its archaisms, and no other translation, however excellent, can replace it for religious and cultic use. Frequently the language of many sermons is the language of yesterday, while the preacher's gown was in earlier times the usual costume of the learned. Quite apart from their content, the Gregorian chant, the chorale, and organ music can independently conjure up a religious mood. The ancient psalm tones, which are no longer 'in our ears', precisely for that reason are able to give us the consciousness of distance. The oldest Javanese dances, the *bedäyâ semang* in Yogya and the *bedäyâ ketawang* in Solo, were revered as a holy inheritance. Their melodies, too, are considered holy, and may not be played except on official occasion (and this is also the case with the *gamelan instruments*). For this reason we must probably admit that age is one of the most important means with which the holy is expressed in art⁹⁸.

95. 1963: 234 (= 1957: 237; = 1948d: 394; = 1955: 257f; = 1932: 140).

96. 1963: 190 (= 1957: 195f; = 1948d: 257; = 1955: 210; = 1932: 140f).

97. 1963: 190 (= 1957: 196; = 1948d: 258; = 1955: 210f; = 1932: 141).

98. 1963: 57ff (= 1957: 68ff; = 1948d: 72ff; = 1955: 62ff; = 1932: 141ff).

Also *transition* is an important 'moment'. In music it occurs as a surprising modulation and in architecture and painting in the form of contrast (e.g. in the Egyptian Sun Temple and Klinger's *Pieta*). In music Beethoven's Ninth is a good example; Van der Leeuw refers to the transition in the finale at the words '*Und der Cherub steht vor Gott*'. '*Vor Gott*' is repeated twice, but the second time the key changes, and only then does the word 'God' seem to receive its full significance; it is as though the doors of heaven were opened, as though we were truly standing before God, and the music of the angels could reach our ears. Filled by a completely different consciousness of God, but just as strongly numinous is the transition in 'Siegfried's Rhine Journey' from Wagner's *Götterdämmerung*. The sudden, almost brutal, modulation into another key corresponds to the change of the motif: the nature-earth motif, which expresses life as it slowly grows and unfolds, is transformed without preparation to the *Götterdämmerung* motif, whose falling line proclaims the end of all growth. Here one experiences the divine proximity of the fate of the world, the impersonal power which ranks above gods and men.

A very fine example of the expression of the holy through a change of key is offered by the soprano recitative from the first chorus of the *St. Matthew Passion*, '*Er hat uns allen wohlgetan*' (phrase (*Satz*) 57). At the final words, '*Sonst hat mein Jesus nichts getan*', the key changes to C major, so that the spotlessness of the divine radiates in glorious light. Transition can also be occasioned by a sudden, complete change in the character of the music, the tempo, the rhythm, or the expression; for example, in the final aria in Bach's beautiful cantata 'Wachet, betet, seid bereit' (No. 7). A powerful, majestically moving bass recitative has just pictured the terrors of the day of the Last Judgement. Slowly, hope breaks through and is finally transformed into joy. Then the aria begins, with an incredibly beautiful vocal melody: '*Seligster Erquickungstag*'. But it is suddenly interrupted by a violent presto in the accompaniment, one of the 'knocking' themes so loved by Bach: '*Schall, schalle, letzter Schlag, Welt und Himmel geht zu Trümmern*'. The world is being annihilated. The voice, too, begins to rage rhythmically, fearfully sounding for help; the orchestra races on without pause. Finally, the voice sighs, breathless, '*zu Trümmern*'. The transition at this moment has a numinous effect. Without a break the vocal melody begins once more from the beginning with a indescribably lovely effect: '*Jesus führet mich zur Stille*'. The presto becomes an *adagio religioso*, the knocking motif a broad, singing harmony, and the fearful agitation is dispelled in the great, endless calm of heavenly bliss.

Finally, transition through the introduction of a new instrument can also become an expression of the holy. The most beautiful examples known to Van der Leeuw are the two places in Saint-Saëns' Third Symphony where the organ enters: in the first movement, where an *adagio religioso* follows the agitated beginning, which is later taken up by the violins

and transformed into a living prayer; then in the second movement, where the majestic fortissimo chord of the organ follows the Wagnerian ending of the winds, which seems to transport us to another world⁹⁹.

We come still closer to the holy through the moment of *darkness and semidarkness*. We are dealing here with a technique analogous to the *via negationis* in the development of the concept of God: by denying everything human and earthly, one comes closest to the nature of God. In the temples of many peoples, the deity has dwelt in the dark for ages. This does not mark it as a 'Spirit of Darkness'; rather the contrary – through the impenetrable darkness the fact is indicated that the deity 'dwells in an unapproachable light'. All earthly contours, all perceptible forms take flight and dissolve where the holy appears. Herein we recognize once more the 'paradox of expression' which mysticism, above all, knows well. He speaks most clearly about God who keeps silent. He draws the image of God most sharply who keeps it veiled in darkness. This darkness, of course, can never be total; if it wants to express something, then it must be perceptible, and if it is to be perceptible, then light too, must be there. Therefore we do better to speak of semidarkness. We know it from the Romanesque churches, with their narrow windows admitting little light. The art of chiaroscuro makes a strongly numinous impression. Rembrandt understands not only how to veil the descent from the cross or a birth in eloquent darkness, he also knows how to unite the element of darkness with that of transition, and give a numinous effect to the most brilliant light in contrast to the dark background (*Simeon in the Temple, The Hundred - Gulden Note*)¹⁰⁰.

In music, too, there is chiaroscuro. Van der Leeuw refers to the beginning of Beethoven's Violin Concerto, the four soft beats of the tympani and the chord which follows them, a mystic semidarkness from which the light of the melody at once arises¹⁰¹.

In the Far East, *emptiness* corresponds to darkness. Chinese painters purposely leave empty spaces in their work. In this manner the Tao best flows through the work, for the divine can only be brought to expression negatively. Where nothing is, is the divine. For the value of a bucket does not reside in its sides, but in the space enclosed, in the emptiness¹⁰². The moment of emptiness is also found in architecture, especially in the Islam. In the empty mosque the eye is irresistibly drawn to the empty niche which shows the direction of Mecca for prayer. The denial of all content receives positive significance. Therefore, emptiness comes after darkness as

99. 1963: 234ff (= 1957: 237ff; = 1948d: 394; = 1955: 258ff; = 1932: 144ff).

100. 1963: 190ff (= 1957: 196f; = 1948d: 258; = 1955: 211ff; = 1932: 147f).

101. 1963: 236 (= 1957: 239; = 1948d: 396; = 1955: 260; = 1932: 148).

102. 1963: 191 (= 1957: 197; = 1948d: 259; = 1955: 211f; 1932 does not have this passus).

a means of expressing the holy. Among the most difficult problems of rejuvenated Catholic and Reformed architectures is the space to be filled with seats and pews – in contrast to a church which is empty, to which one brings one's own kneeling cushion. A church full of furniture is indefensible, not only aesthetically, since it destroys every architectonic line and makes illusory the effect of space, but also theologically, since the house of God is not an auditorium. Rationalism has given a fixed place in our churches to everything, with the exception of the one thing that should be fixed: the communion table¹⁰³. For a man like Van der Leeuw, who promotes a sacramental theology as we have seen, this is an unforgivable mistake!

What darkness and emptiness are to architecture and the pictorial arts, *silence* is to music and verbal art. 'The Lord is in his holy temple; let all the earth keep silence before him'. Of course this silence, if it is to express anything, cannot be pure silence. It must begin and end, or, to use the musical term, it must be a rest. Or it must be a semisilence, corresponding to semidarkness. It is not the silence of a man who has never spoken, but the falling silent in the presence of the holy – holding one's breath. For before the wholly other, one stands in silent reverence. Music can indicate this numinous silence, which is like echo of the 'silence of heaven' (Rev. 8:1), by a pause or rest. Van der Leeuw gives many examples of which we here give one: the recitative from the *St. Matthew Passion*, '*Mein Jesu schweigt zu falschen Lügen stille*'. Silence is here already suggested by the text, but the music is much more than a mere illustration of the text: the shrill staccato chords are an expression of unbearable tension before Jesus' death¹⁰⁴. In his books on *St. Matthew Passion* and *St. John Passion* Van der Leeuw defends the necessity of performing these *Passions* using often 'a nearly rest'. This is in accordance with the performance technique of 'the' modern interpret of Bach, Harnancourt! Musical silence is thus by no means only a 'rest' in which nothing happens, but the greatest possible tension. The pause is by no means something negative, but the negative expression of something most positive¹⁰⁵.

Silence and semisilence are primarily constituents of music. But we find them also in verbal art, even if it is more difficult for literature to deal with 'paradox of expression' than for music: the art of saying something by saying nothing or, at most, very little. It is concerned with what is written between the lines and discloses unsuspected depths. The little 'Evening Song' of Tersteegen not only speaks of quiet; for the most part it is quiet:

103. 1963: 207f (= 1957: 211f; = 1948d: 358; = 1955: 230; 1932 does not have this passus).

104. cp. 1943: 73.

105. 1963: 236f (= 1957: 239f; = 1948d: 397f; = 1955: 260ff; = 1932: 148ff).

Nun schläfet man,
 Und wer nicht schlafen kan,
 der bete mit mir an
 Den grossen Namen,
 Dem Tag und Nacht
 Wird von der Engelswacht
 Preis, Lob und Ehr' gebracht,
 o Jesu, Amen!

Weg Phantasie,
 Mein Herr und Gott ist hie,
 Ich bin sein Sternlein, hie
 Und dort zu funkeln.
 Jetzt kehr ich ein:
 Herr, rede Du allein,
 Beim tiefsten Stillesein,
 Zu mir im Dunkeln.

Now sleep is here
 If sleep does not appear,
 Then come with me, draw near,
 Praise Him who made us,
 Who day and night
 Receives upon the height
 All praise and glory bright.
 O Jesu, aid us!

Away with fear!
 My Lord and God is here,
 I am his starlet, here
 And there to glisten.
 Now I must cease,
 Lord, may Thy word increase
 And come in deepest peace,
 And let me listen.

We can find the same in Goethe, from quite another world, as he speaks with a voice which becomes ever quieter, almost completely silent:

Selig, wer sich vor der Welt
 Ohne Hass verschliesst,
 Einen Freund am Busen hält
 Und mit dem geniesst,
 Was, von Menschen nicht gewusst
 Oder nicht bedacht,

Durch das Labyrinth der Brust
Wandelt in der Nacht.

Happy the man without hate
Who remains unknown
With one friend to share his fate
Shares with him alone
What remains unknown to the rest
Or hidden from the light,
Through the labyrinth of the breast
Wandering in the night.¹⁰⁶

Also the moment of the *infinite* may evoke the holy. In the realm of music the moment of infinity is best approached through seemingly endless repetition¹⁰⁷, which suggests an element of eternity. Thus the redemption motif at the end of Wagner's great *Nibelungen* trilogy, which seems to transform the wealth of lines and colours into an eternal, no longer audible melody; the melodies of the 'Liebestod' in *Tristan und Isolde*, which strive for nirvana and silence; the endlessly, monotonously repeated 'ewig, ewig' at the end of Mahler's 'Lied von der Erde' – these are examples of an approach to infinity which is probably more common in Asiatic music than in our own. The 'uncanny emptiness of long, drawn-out notes' in Bach, for example, at the words 'ewig, Ewigkeit', has the same effect. There is a good example of the numinous effect of long notes at the word 'patris' in the *Cum Spiritu Sancto* of Bach's *Mass in B Minor*¹⁰⁸.

One can also approach the holy by means of the *Apollonian and Dionysiac movement*. The first is characterized by calmness and grace, by a rational equilibrium and harmony, the latter by ecstasy, exuberance and richness of contrasts. The opposition stems from Nietzsche's philosophy, but it has been worked out for the history of the Greek religion by Erwin Rohde. Originally it was a Greek opposition, but it is also valid for the human mind in general. It appears primarily in dance. But it can also be seen in other forms of art. But both Apollo and Dionysus order life to the extent that its depths become visible and its undertones audible. Even today the dance asserts its ancient rights. It is not only exstatic flight from life and stormy conquest of the higher realms of life that cause men to dance. Peaceful, serene ordering of life and the need to trace the complicated multiplicity of life back to a fixed foundation, summon man to dance. For dance is according to Van der Leeuw every ordered, rhythmic movement,

106. 1963: 141f (= 1957: 148f; = 1948d: 188f; = 1955: 154f; = 1932: 150f).

107. 1963: 238 (= 1957: 241; = 1948d: 399; = 1955: 262; = 1932: 152).

108. 1963: 238 (= 1957: 241; = 1948d: 399; = 1955: 262; = 1932: 152); cp. also 1941a:

even the minister's stalking to this pulpit. The girls in the Vosges, who perform a round dance in the middle of winter about a well decorated with a sort of Maypole, constitute a remarkable and peaceful contrast to the Greek women raving on the mountains in the winter nights. Not only the wild orgy, not only the intoxication of the mystic who forgets everything, demand dance. An active thankfulness, too, expresses itself in the movement of the dance: 'Then Miriam, the prophetess, the sister of Aron, took a timbrel dancing' (Exod. 15:20). In addition to ecstatic and erotic elements, it is, presumably in greater measure than these, awareness that there is peace for the soul to be attained which again and again compels young people to dance¹⁰⁹.

Dionysiac rhythm lives ecstatically in the raving dance of the dervishes and maenads. In mysticism it becomes the symbol of dissolution, of the complete loss of the self to the god. The dance of the Mevlevi dervishes takes place within a bounded circle. The leader takes up a position to the east. The whole dance illustrates the Sufic theory of emanation: the first semicircle representing the emanation from the godhead to the animal kingdom, ending in man; the second symbolizing the reverse ascent of man to god. This explanation had already been given by the founder of the Mevlevi order, the great poet Dshelal-ed-din-Rumi. Thus he could say: 'Whoever knows the power of the dance resides in the god, for he knows how love kills'. Thus dancing is not a secular pastime, but training for blessedness. Dance belongs to the technical apparatus of many types of mysticism. Not only the dervishes, the Old Testament, too, knows the dance of prophetic ecstasy (cp. 1 Sam. 10:5-6). Even more strongly than in the Old Testament, which as a rule is very cautious about ecstasy or the domination of holy powers, we find the transformation into another man, the loss of individual personality, the possession by a strange power, and finally unconsciousness under the influence of rhythm (Saul lay thus for a day and a night) in Hellenism. We find it in Eleusinian mysteries, in the cult of Dionysus, etc. The rhythm of the Dionysiac dance creates in the soul an emptiness in which the god can live, a freedom of the ego from itself which binds it to the god. The movement releases power, dissipates it, so to speak, and empties the soul so that it may be filled with the god. It is self-evident that in dance music plays an important role and e.g. the Phrygian flute makes the souls who devote themselves to the service of Dionysus 'enthusiastic', filled with the god.

Rhythm which has become independent leads to the rhythm of life itself. For this reason all the gods of the Central American peoples dance. Even the corn mother dances, the goddess of fertility from whom springs

109. 1963: 59ff (= 1957: 70ff; = 1948d: 76ff; = 1955: 64ff; = 1932: 152ff); cp. also 1930: 55ff.

all life. That is, the parental, basic movement of all life is the dance. But we do not need to go to the Indians. Eos, the goddess of dawn dances; she has her 'residences and dancing-places' (Odyssey XII, 4). Dance may mirror the cosmic movement¹¹⁰. Thus there is dancing in heaven, there it may appear in its purest and highest form¹¹¹.

The rhythm has still another meaning, *viz.* in drama. Life is concentrated in its simplest form, in its authentic content and kernel by restriction and by presentation in a dramatic movement. In every drama there is a decisive turn from life to death and *vice versa*. The secret of all dramatic art is '*tua res agitur*'. Therefore drama is the *broadening and deepening of life*. New tales of joy and sadness, mourning and rejoicing, appear out of the complex multiplicity of life. But amidst the great variety of events the same thing is felt. It concerns you or, rather, it concerns the power that resides in you, in God, in everyone. Aristotle's dictum that drama means a purification of the passions is the half-modern expression of the releasing, overwhelming, life-giving force of drama. Primitive man thought of it as magical. We try to understand it psychologically. We can learn from the actor about reality and depth of feeling. An actor can 'put himself inside' all men, murderers and saints, heroes and bunglers, Oedipus and Thersites, the Cid and Scapin, Falstaff and Henry IV, Faust and Mephistopheles. This ability is called a 'religious exercise' by Chesterton. The roles of the theatre represent more than they seem to be. In the great tragedies they are types whom one may find in all periods of history and whom one may meet in the street. Van der Leeuw emphasizes the importance of the type in drama. Therefore he underlines the relevance of the *Commedia dell'arte*, and, in accordance with Goethe, the relevance of the Punch and Judy show (*poppenkast*)¹¹².

Also *objectivity* can be an expression of the holy. This moment constitutes the aspect of the holy in which it is emphasized that we do not have to do with subjective, relative truths and values but with eternal ones. The most beautiful example of the expression of the holy through objectivity is the way Bach, in the Passions and cantatas, continually sublimates the subjective sufferings and joys of the faithful into a suprapersonal expression of faith. Every action, every word of Scripture, but also every emotion, every movement, and even every burst of anger is immediately connected by Bach, the great priest, with the '*Credo*' of the congregation. Upon the anguished, human '*Herr, bin ich's?*' follows at once the confiteor: '*Ich bin's, ich sollte büssen*'. We are immediately transported to another at-

110. 1963: 60ff (= 1957: 72ff; = 1948d: 79ff; = 1955: 67ff; = 1932: 155ff); cp. also 1930: 45ff (= 1931: 37ff).

111. 1963: 67ff (= 1957: 78ff; = 1948d: 90ff; = 1955: 74ff; = 1932: 156); cp. also 1930: 57ff (= 1931: 53ff).

112. 1963: 104ff (= 1957: 113ff; = 1948d: 142ff; = 1955: 114ff; = 1932: 157ff).

mosphere, as though we were ascending from the rough sea to the firm land. The congregation knows of that guilt which is greater and lies deeper than the individual sin of a discipline; of that great guilt which comprehends the entire world. Van der Leeuw emphasizes the liturgical character of Bach's Passions. *St. John's Passion* is even more objective than *St. Matthew Passion* where another facet of Bach comes more to the fore, viz. his pietism. And this sometimes causes sentimental outbursts of emotion. The chorals especially are the expression of a suprapersonal attitude of faith. Here the objectivity and human subjectivity merge together¹¹³.

The last moment that is treated by Van der Leeuw is the *human* (het *menselijke*). To express the holy by means of the human is certainly the most difficult and the most amazing problem which religious art has to master. For, in contradistinction to the human, it strives after the typical, the general. Dramatic art gives us a striking example. As the *tipi fissi* (fixed types) gradually take on more and more human character, art becomes profane. The Greek tragedians, Shakespeare, Holberg and Molière preserve still a remnant of the *sacer ludus*, the mime or the *commedia dell'arte*. Therefore they stand closer to religion than the completely free art of modern drama. The latter therefore seeks out a new means of reuniting the severed threads. It finds this in the symbol. The human life is bearer of a more comprehensive, suprapersonal reality, no longer as type but as symbol. Henrik Ibsen is the classic example. His characters are people, not types. But at the same time they are bearers of a suprapersonal, eternal content, symbols of another world: Solness, the master builder; John Gabriel Borkman; Johannes Rosmer and Rebecca West. Eternal values are expressed through their speeches, their actions. When Rosmer and Rebecca West go to the millpond at night, a part of humanity goes with them. Solness, who speaks to God from his tower, embodies the humanity of many centuries. Borkman, who hears the metal layers sing, awaiting the ambassadors who will offer him a kingdom; Borkman, against whom there blows, out of that kingdom he desired for so long and so passionately, the icy cold of death, is the 'official' (*ambtelijk*) bearer of a whole dream of humanity. The religious meaning of Ibsen's work does not reside in religious or philosophical generalities, certainly not in the so-called 'Christian' element of the oldest portions of his work. It is in the overwhelming power, in the disconcerting pathos of his plots, which make us realize that here something quite ordinary is happening, something which could also take place in our own lives; but here it is simultaneously the bearer of worldwide significance, eternal powers. And to us it seems as though, with the help of Ibsen's dramas, we might cast an eye upon the drama of God¹¹⁴.

113. 1963: 238ff (= 1957: 241ff; = 1948d: 399ff; = 1955: 262ff; = 1932: 160ff).

114. 1963: 108f (= 1957: 117f; = 1948d: 145ff; = 1955: 118f; = 1932: 165ff).

In verbal art it is lyric poetry which brings us closest to the human. It is not as though the poem were the experience of the poet himself. Only the poet who speaks on the mandate of society is really a poet. Since religion demands something 'official' (*ambtelijk*), we shall find religious poetry only where individual experience becomes the occasion for expressing suprapersonal feelings that are true for humanity¹¹⁵. According to Van der Leeuw both minister and poet act 'officially', i.e. they act supra-individually being committed by God or mankind.

The moment of the human is most evident in the pictorial arts. The human form in fixed movement, the human face in an unalterable expression, can here become expressions of the suprahuman and supranatural. The holy in man is shown in Christ, but it is extremely difficult to give the right form to him. For one has to express all in one form: the divine in the human, humanity without effeminacy, the divine without severity, and that is a task, which cannot be solved even by the most gifted artists. And thus we see that they are all one-sided. Leonardo da Vinci expresses in Christ an infinite, Johannine mildness; Rembrandt the humility of the despised Jew; Michelangelo – in *The Last Judgement* of the Sistine Chapel – paints the hero and judge, the terrifying gesture of whose hand condemns the sinner to Hell. But he does not leave it at that; that is not miraculous enough for him. The miracle lies primarily in the unity of hero and Saviour, of judge and God of mercy; and therefore next to the Son stands the Mother, a delicate merciful figure who pleads for grace. According to Van der Leeuw the best work is here the picture of Christ in Albrecht Dürer's *Sudarium of St. Veronica*, where hardness and love, majesty and mercy, the awe-inspiring and fascination are combined in a glorious manner¹¹⁶.

Above we have given Van der Leeuw's theory of the 'moments', the constituents of religious art. We have restored the sequence of the first edition where this theory of moments is clearer than in the later edition. These moments indicate that art transcends itself in various ways and that it points towards the other (i.e. the metaphysical world) and sometimes to the wholly other (i.e. the divine world). Anyway art has the possibility of transcending itself and thus though the divine is not always reached, the preparation of a meeting with the divine is present.

The relation between holiness and beauty

Finally we will consider Van der Leeuw's view on the relation between the holy and the beauty more carefully. At first sight Van der Leeuw gives a theory full of logical contradictions. However, we will try to solve these

115. 1963: 142 (= 1957: 149; = 1948d: 189; = 1955: 155f; = 1932: 166f).

116. 1963: 191f (= 1957: 197f; = 1948d: 259f; = 1955: 212f; = 1932: 168f).

contradictions. But first of all we must concede that this relation is always hard to describe. Every writer has his difficulties here.

In his whole oeuvre Van der Leeuw rejects the view that a religious theme is sufficient to make a piece of art automatically religious. Religious art may have a secular content and a religious content may be the content of a non-religious piece of art.

First we will study closely the main paragraph in which Van der Leeuw gives his view on the relation between holiness and beauty and in which he gives some logically contradictory statements: 'There is no particular art which can be designated religious. Still less is there a religion which one could call aesthetic. There is only a single art, and it is first of all, art. There is only a particular religion, and it is always and everywhere this religion. But again and again we discern an essential unity between art and religion; again and again holiness and beauty appear to us in the same guise. With the help of our various "moments" we have examined the appearance of this style of presenting. To return to our old image, we have again and again found points of access. It is now our task to see whether all these various points of access (and also boundaries) can be utilized, whether we shall succeed in finding a point from which we can survey the entire landscape. I can imagine that a reader who has borne with me patiently may now become somewhat restive and ask whether it would not be much simpler to come right out and state that all genuine art is religious, that the holy by its very nature comprehends the beautiful. Why was a whole book necessary to attain this simple conclusion? I reply that this objection is fully justified, that holiness always comprehends beauty, that their unity does not have to be discovered but can simply be observed. Yet there is nevertheless a need for a thorough discussion, which will have to be much more thorough and basic than our previous discussions have been if we are to pronounce this simple truth. Let us first consider the fact that this truth is not reversible. Beauty is holiness. But holiness is not absolutely, not exclusively, beauty; it is more. "Holy" is the ultimate word; "beautiful" the penultimate. He who says "holy" says everything; he who says "beautiful" says much. In addition there is the difficulty that although we can say that holiness is beauty, we only rarely experience this truth, and see it only in exceptional instances'¹¹⁷. Now we see: Van der Leeuw says first that holiness comprehends beauty, but some lines further he says that beauty is holiness, but the reverse is not true, or at least it is not always true. He ends, however, with the opposite statement that holiness is beauty, but that we see this only in exceptional instances! A paragraph full of contradictions! Logic was evidently not Van der Leeuw's strongest side. In his considerations he always emphasizes that logic and

117. 1963: 266 (= 1957: 269f; = 1948d: 262f; = 1955: 294; = 1932: 170f).

rational thinking are insufficient and that we do better to trust our intuitions. But if we consider Van der Leeuw's system more carefully we will discover that it is logically consistent. Van der Leeuw was no logician, but he certainly had some good logical intuition. His system has no more logical inconsistencies than e.g. a good logical system like that of Spinoza!

We will reconstruct Van der Leeuw's view on the relation between holiness and beauty from other parts of his work. Thus we will also take away the apparent contradiction. First we must distinguish between the activities of the artist and the piece of art. With respect to the activities of the artist the matter can easily be solved. Van der Leeuw has defined holiness in two ways. With respect to its content Van der Leeuw defines holiness as the wholly other (following Otto); with respect to its form he defines it as something that claims man totally¹¹⁸. Now the true artist devotes himself totally to his art and thus a true artist is at the same time in the service of religion. A piece of art is moreover at the same time a creation so that the artist acts in a certain structural similarity to the Creator, God. And one may add that without love no piece of art will be created. The artist must be inspired by his work and he must love it. Thus the artist serves God consciously or unconsciously. But not everyone who serves God is at the same time an artist! Thus it is evident that here (with respect to the activities of the artist) the following thesis is valid:

(i) *Beauty implies holiness, but the reverse is not true*

What I have said above may be verified by the following quotations: 'Religious art always arises when we recognize in the form of man the form of God, in the building of man, creation'¹¹⁹. In the Dutch editions this passage has been emphasized by being printed in italics. But the following is also valid: 'Holiness means distance. Between the holy God and his creation yawns a mighty chasm. The 'creation' of the artist is by no means a parallel to the creation of God. It is its dullest reflection and is completely overwhelmed by the light of the life of God. Whoever truly serves beauty, serves God. But whoever serves God does not yet therefore serve beauty'¹²⁰. These are our considerations as far as they refer to the activities of the artist. It may be clear that here the thesis is valid: beauty is holiness, but the reverse is not true.

If we now consider the product of art the matter is more complicated. Van der Leeuw makes a distinction between beauty in a narrower sense and beauty in a broader sense: 'The beautiful is a new world which, in addition to the beautiful in the narrow sense, also includes the good and

118. 1963: 4f (= 1957: 17f; = 1948d: 3f; = 1955: 2f; = 1932: 3f).

119. 1963: 286 (= 1957: 291; = 1948d: 275; = 1955: 316f; = 1932: 185).

120. 1963: 335 (= 1957: 339; = 1948d: 300; = 1955: 370; = 1932 does not have this *passus*).

the true'¹²¹. Here the distinction mentioned above is clearly made. Beauty in a narrow sense includes only what is beautiful, beauty in a broad sense includes also what is good and true. We will speak of beauty in a narrow sense as *beauty (N)* and we will speak of beauty in a broad sense as *beauty (B)*. The distinction of two concepts of holiness is even more important. On the one side holiness includes all that is good and beautiful of our world. Van der Leeuw indicates this again and again and he refers to the doctrine of the incarnation in order to give a foundation for his view. On the other side Van der Leeuw teaches that holiness is the wholly other and that it is incommensurable with earthly beauty, goodness, etc. We will speak here of holiness or *holy (I)* when we refer to holiness in its inclusive aspect, i.e. when it includes also what is beautiful, good, etc. of our world. We will speak of holiness or *holy (O)* when we refer to holiness in its aspect of being the wholly other. Now the following theses are evident:

(ii) *What is beautiful (N) is not always or necessarily holy*

But on the other side it is also true:

(iii) *What is holy (I) implies also both beauty (N) and beauty (B)*

These theses follow from the definitions given. But now the apparent contradictions have been taken away. Van der Leeuw's view refers to the theses (i), (ii) and (iii), but the further qualifications have not been indicated. Now it is also clear that with respect to the product of art we cannot say that what expresses holiness expresses at the same time what is beautiful. This is true for holy (I), but not for holy (O)! But the profundity of Van der Leeuw's thought becomes clear from the fact that even here a simple statement is not possible. For it is characteristic for all great art that it refers to something that transcends this piece of art. According to Van der Leeuw no product of art corresponds completely with the intentions and the inner view of the artist. The ideal of a great musician is a kind of music that has no longer any sound: 'Having arrived at the greatest height, music finds the air too rarefied and itself superfluous. No art points beyond itself more decidedly than does music. ... Music never reaches its goal, it only arrives at the gate. For it is tonal art and not music. ... Whoever desires music and not tonal art must keep silent. The means of tonal art, however infinitely rich they may be, desert him. ... He has heard the harmony of the spheres and cannot find it again. Bach finally arrived in his *Art of the Fugue* at the 'dogmatic' fugues; Beethoven at his *Last Quartets* and occasionally at the 'boundary of what can be represented by sound' (Paul Bekker)¹²². What has been said here with respect to music is in prin-

121. 1963: 278 (= 1957: 282; = 1948d: 458; = 1955: 307; = 1932: 210).

122. 1963: 226 (= 1957: 229; = 1948d: 383f; = 1955: 249; = 1932: 106f).

ciple also valid for the other forms of art. Thus art or beauty have a structural similarity even with holy (O): '...every true work of art is in a sense religious. Every true work of art bears within itself the germ of self-abolishment. The lines yearn to be erased, the colours to pale. Every true art is experienced as the incarnation of what is further distant from us, and different'¹²³.

Thus beauty and holiness are similar and dissimilar and at its height beauty transcends itself and achieves holiness.

Thus according to Van der Leeuw we as men of science of art and religion, we experience again and again the miracle of the blending of religion and art. As theologians, who can neither separate artificially the revelation in Christ and the apparently different one given us as revelation (in art), no desire to lose ourselves in the generality of an idea of God, we find the unity of art and religion where alone we know unity: in the doctrine of the Incarnation. As believers, we find the possibility of complete beauty in him in whom we find everything, in the divine figure, in the son of Mary, in the Son of God, who is most beautiful. And, with the old folk song, we say:

All the beauty
Of heaven and earth
Is contained in Thee alone.¹²⁴

123. 1963: 337 (= 1957: 342; = 1948d: 427f; = 1955: 372; = 1932: 205).

124. 1963: 340 (= 1957: 345; = 1948d: 471f; = 1955: 375f; = 1932: 217).

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