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PROGRESS IN THE GREECE OF THUCYDIDES

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INTRODUCTION

It is an overwhelming experience, and one which makes for a feeling of uneasiness, to read the different modern studies concerning the age-old question of whether 'progress' constituted a problem for intellectuals in Greek and Roman antiquity. Many misunderstandings have arisen because of the lack of clear definitions on the subject, a point which has been established by many scholars, e.g. L. Edelstein in the introduction to his stimulating book *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity* (1967).

Edelstein made his own views quite clear on the first page, and then in the course of the book put forward arguments intended to prove that his viewpoint is the correct one.

An idea of progress really did exist in antiquity, "a tendency", as he said in accordance with Lovejoy's definition, "inherent in nature or in man to pass through a regular sequence of stages of development in past, present and future, the latter stages being – with, perhaps, occasional retardations of minor regressions – superior to the earlier"¹.

In the process of the evaluation of the evidence, which is the purpose of this paper, 'nature' and the question whether progress is inherent in it, will not be touched upon. 'Forward movement' in nature is a difficult question for anyone, and it is better left to other scholars, such as biologists. I would mention in passing, however, that I should not be surprised to learn of the possibility of disagreement among these scholars – mainly because of the lack of clear and agreed definitions of 'progress'. A second point I would make is that those who include nature in their definitions of progress betray the origin of their points of view, for it indicates that their inspiration is derived from the natural sciences. I hope this statement will be taken not as a criticism of the concept but rather as an unmasking of one of the modern stimuli which have prompted study of this problem in the history of ideas, especially where classical antiquity is concerned.

From the many publications since the data of his book, it can be deduced, that Edelstein did not solve the question of whether 'progress' was a problem in antiquity. E. R. Dodds in his recently published (1973) book, *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, appears to be much more cautious than his predecessors, and is obviously

¹ Op. cit., XI. In A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore 1935) I, 6.

aware of the need for a clearer definition of 'progress'. Dodds' book has been rightly criticized by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, whose review ends with the following valuable remarks:

"He (Dodds) finds that 'only during a limited period in the fifth century was the idea of progress widely accepted by the educated public at large'. The evidence of this belief, commonly cited from the poets, shows that some people thought civilization had arisen from humble beginnings; it is far from certain that it implies a belief that things were likely to get steadily better in the future. Dodds points also to Protagoras' opinion that virtue could be taught, and to Democritus' belief that human nature could be reshaped by education. These thinkers certainly held that improvement was possible for some people. But did they think it was possible for whole communities, or that it was in the long run automatic and inevitable in the way Victorian sages like Herbert Spencer, or at least Samuel Smiles, imagined? Surely the world outlook of a people that had started from such humble beginnings and whose religion was so moderate in its claims for men, could be trusted to preserve them from any such delusions"².

For the moment we shall concentrate on the first part of the quotation, and on the important and essential question which arises in all the controversies on progress. "Did they think that progress for whole communities was possible?" The implication here is that the word progress hardly includes the physical and mental improvement of the individual, but is concerned only with society as such, let us say the Greek polis and its citizens, or the Roman Empire with its victors and its vanquished. In modern studies since the Enlightenment this has always been implied by *The Idea of Progress*. This 'social' definition of progress is also mine. Using Lloyd-Jones' fundamental question as a *basis* it is worthwhile to reconsider the whole problem once again and to attempt to find an answer to it.

GENERAL REMARKS

Before going back to the ancient sources, it is necessary to make some general remarks which will be useful in our treatment of the source material. During our treatment of the available material it is imperative that we do not deviate from general questions; otherwise it will be impossible to sift the relevant findings from the irrelevant. As we progress it will become clear that much of the material which has already been dragged into our problem many times is indeed irrelevant. Our problem is the question of

² The Oxford Magazine. Vol. 91, no. 2 (n.s.) 18 May 1973, 11-12. Quotation from p. 12.

what was the social impact of the idea of progress, progress being defined as a *phenomenon in society*.

In connection with the problem under discussion there are ancient authors who have stated that a development really did exist which might be interpreted as 'progress', but that 'decline' also took place³. A case in point here would be the views of some authors on barbaric and primitive tribes. The Golden Age is accepted as the beginning of the history of mankind, but it should not be forgotten that misery, poverty, coarseness, and lack of philanthropy also were mentioned in regard to these early times by Agatharchides in the third century B.C. Even earlier, Hesiod talks about continuous decline, in spite of the Heroic Age during which benefactors of mankind improved their heroic world, or at least temporarily prevented the disasters of the Iron Race⁴. Hesiod also depicted a development towards more humanitarian behaviour in the succeeding generations of the Gods: Zeus is "better" than Ouranos. In Hippocratic literature, the author of *On Ancient Medicine* gives expression to both views⁵, criticising modern opinion which he opposes and which, according to Edelstein, shows him to be an enemy of progress. However, the conscientious doctor and author of this famous treatise was confident that the admirable achievements of the past would be surpassed in the future; one-sided interpretation of this text is, after all, quite out of proportion to what the man actually said, nor should he be labelled an enemy of progress because of one isolated passage. Generally speaking it would be as wrong to label any writer as conservative because he criticizes new discoveries and publications, as it would be to label him progressive because he acclaims or supports new discoveries.

My second general remark has regard to our attitude towards the people of the past. In general it is an ambivalent attitude. We both admire and criticize them and usually feel superior to them, and yet, as our own society and civilization expands and grows more complicated, we envy their 'simplicity'. "Wie haben wir es herrlich weit gebracht" has its counterpart in nostalgia for the remote past when it was not necessary for the 'Good Savage' to vindicate himself by his works. Those who adopt this viewpoint

³ Albrecht Dihle, in a review of Edelstein's book (*Gnomon* 41 (1969), 435) uses the words: "einen eigentümlichen Zwiespalt".

⁴ Whether Dihle is right (*op. cit.*, 436), in arguing that the myth of the five Races or World periods cannot basically be reconciled with the story of Prometheus, is doubtful. See my remarks in 'Romanitas and Christianitas' (in honorem I. H. Waszink), 1973, 25.

⁵ Rightly Dihle, *op. cit.*, 436, quoting *de vet. med.* 2.3. See also p. 48 ff. below.

are not concerned about whether or not there is historical truth in it; and indeed, if we explore this further, it becomes clear that any such truth concerning the past is not really as important to the present as is the certainty of the existence of posterity's ambivalent attitude.

Let us return, however, to ancient Greece. These 'contradictions' are very apparent in the fourth century B.C.⁶, but can in fact be detected in all societies, sometimes as more conspicuous, and sometimes less so. All one can say is that they clearly existed and that they still do exist as a *primum movens* of social behaviour. What should occupy our minds now is the remarkably biased conclusion that a feeling of superiority over earlier generations would (or even should) imply an 'Idea of Progress'. My feeling is that such an opinion is a completely empty one which cannot be maintained. The complaint about moral decay in one's own time⁷ — which was a complaint often made in the fourth century B.C. — and the view that the history of the glorious past (lessons of the Persian Wars) was an essential part of learning how to improve corrupt contemporary Athens were alike paramount. In the opinion of many Greeks (especially in Athens), only the past could give adequate inspiration for a better future. On the other hand it was Plato, who, though appreciating the remote past, criticised the great statesmen of the fifth century (and most unfairly at that). It is thus not surprising that through the ages Plato (though he does not stand alone) has been claimed as an inspired predecessor⁸ of both progressive and conservative thought. Care should therefore be taken before stating that any specific writer is, or was, a champion of progress. It might be discovered that ambivalence prevails in many ancient writings and that each passage, *pro* or *contra*, was partly influenced by the impulse of particular moments of hope or of despair. To the best of my knowledge no examination has been made, within the field of ancient philosophy, into the ambivalence which surrounds these passages. It was an ambivalence taken for granted, which appears to have been part of the way of life and the fact that it was a natural part of Greek life seems to me to be the best proof of the fact that the idea of progress,

⁶ They have been summarized in a clear way by Dihle, op. cit., 437.

⁷ Examples in Edelstein, op. cit., 131, 140, 156.

⁸ The conclusion of Dihle is obviously correct. "Man müsste also vielleicht deutlicher machen, als es bei Edelstein geschehen ist, dass das Gefühl es weiter gebracht zu haben als die Alten, wohl in allen Gesellschaften — und so auch bei den Griechen — stets neben dem bewundernden Aufblick zu Leistungen der Vergangenheit, auf denen jede Generation ihr eigenes Werk aufzubauen hat, lebendig sein kann. Lediglich der Akzent mag sich periodisch verlagern".

as we have known it in Western Europe since the Enlightenment, simply did not then exist. Greeks who argued endlessly on every topic did not make of this burning modern problem a subject for their discussions. That no mention was made of the idea of progress is a weak argument, I realise, and so the burden of explaining this remarkable fact must rest with those who believe in the existence of the idea of progress as of a continuous improvement through the ages. To repeat once again the words of Lloyd-Jones: 'the belief that things were likely to get steadily better in the future, and that improvement was possible for whole communities', that belief, in my opinion, did not exist.

A third observation concerns the difference of opinion about what progress actually is. This point is often forgotten. Thoughts along these lines have recently and briefly been put forward by Dihle in the review mentioned above and amplified in an exemplary way by Dodds in his summary of Dihle's study⁹. The difference is that between a belief in scientific or technological progress and a belief in moral progress (and I add, any progress as such).

Dodds mentions Plato, Posidonius, Lucretius and Seneca, as many scholars before him have done. I am not concerned for the moment with the belief in scientific or technological progress but with Dodds' first and more important statement:

"It is untrue that the idea of progress was wholly foreign to Antiquity, but our evidence suggests that only during a limited period in the fifth century was it widely accepted by the educated public at large".

Dodds says "our evidence suggests", and this implies that he might be wrong, and that a different conclusion might be reached if more evidence were available. I maintain that his evidence, even for the fifth century, is insufficient. Before proceeding, however, let me make one last general remark¹⁰. The greatest heresy of those who believe in the existence in antiquity of the ideas of modern Enlightenment originates, strangely enough, from Christianity. Physis or nature is a concept found in paganism as well as in Christianity. In all Greek concepts nature is static. Living according to nature is a well defined way of life. The knowledge of the physis of all things in the world is a Greek ideal, and their philosophers said on occasion that this knowledge grew from one generation to

⁹ Dodds, *op. cit.*, 24-25. Dihle, *op. cit.*, 437.

¹⁰ What follows here has been inspired by, sometimes literally taken over from, the last part of Dihle's excellent review, but differs from his views, in some details.

another and that their knowledge was in a permanent state of development which took place within a process which may be defined as progress. It was alien to Greek thinking—even blasphemous—to try to dominate nature through the results of an increased and improved knowledge¹¹. This, however, is exactly the task which modern technology has set itself, a task based on the nineteenth century idea of progress. Its aim is to change the earth, to rule over it, to dominate, and to set the rules. Certainly it should not be forgotten that the first condition for achieving this technological ideal is to be found in the secularization of the human mind. From a different point of view¹², however, it could be claimed that such secularization of the human mind was already evident in Greek achievement and that therefore modern technology is merely a revival of Greek scientific attitudes. Such a claim is not good enough. The ultimate justification of technology, as Dihle so rightly says, lies in the secularized biblical command that man must subdue the earth (Gen. 1.28). It is a command which runs contrary to all that the Greeks associated with *physis*. This then is the great contrast between ancient and modern ideas of progress, and the gap is unbridgeable.

THE EVIDENCE

In recent research a crucial question has arisen from evidence to be derived from the fifth century B.C. It is generally accepted that Hesiod (ca 700 B.C.) was a pessimist. Dodds also acknowledges this, though reluctantly. Unfortunately we have no sure means of knowing “how far Hesiod’s contemporaries accepted his despairing prognosis”¹³.

The effect of this remark is that once again a clear piece of evidence is called into question, although Dodds knows as well as any scholar that alternative, or opposite, views were hardly to be expected in Hesiod’s time.

Dodds naturally pays much attention to the first explicit statement to be found at the end of the Archaic Age—the lines of Xenophanes: “Not from the beginning did the Gods reveal everything to mankind. But in course of time by research man

¹¹ Once again I endorse A. Dihle (op. cit. 438): “Dass ... der Mensch zur Gestaltung und Veränderung der Welt berufen sei, hat wohl kein Grieche gelehrt”. This was one of the controversies between ancient philosophers such as Porphyry and his Christian adversaries. See CPh 69 (1974), 198–208.

¹² On this point I cannot endorse Dihle’s views.

¹³ Op. cit., p. 4.

discovers improvements" ¹⁴. For the last part of this quotation I prefer the translation of T. M. Robinson: "and find out better with the passage of time" ¹⁵ and I agree with his conclusion: "There is no compelling evidence in the rest of the fragment that what is found will be to man's long-term material and/or moral advantage".

His subsequent conclusion is also perfectly right: "Indeed, Xenophanes' well-known scepticism concerning man's ability to know the truth about the gods and ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων (B 34 D-K) might even suggest the contrary; even if man did make significant material progress, he could never be absolutely sure that it *was* such (B 34, 35 D-K). Edelstein quotes (in a highly inaccurate translation) the first line of 34, but does not seem to appreciate the force of the total assertion" ¹⁶. How right this verdict is may be checked by anybody who reads the Greek text properly

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὕτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων.

Indeed Robinson can appeal to the rest of the passage, of which the last words are conclusive: δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται: "Schein haftet an allem" (Diels).

If anything is to be derived from this fragment from Xenophanes it is that he observed the efforts of man. If this deduction is correct then his lines might bear testimony to his awareness of *technical* progress, although to say as much may already be going too far. To try and find more in these words than mere scientific progress is modern wishful thinking. The passage does not say anything about progress according to our definition of it—that is as a continuous, inevitable, and never-ending progression towards improvement in a community. On the contrary Dodds himself shows the other side of the coin by saying that Xenophanes expected that in the future the sea would cover the earth and destroy all human life, just as it had done in the remote past ¹⁷.

There is good argument for not giving too much importance to the human achievement which might be seen as alluded to by

¹⁴ Fragm. 18 (Diels-Kranz). The translation is Dodds'. Overstatements pervade Edelstein's book; the attention paid to Xenophanes is out of proportion (op. cit., 16). "This was an unquestionable belief in progress and unqualified faith in man". For a different viewpoint P. Shorey, CPh 6 (1911) 88 and W. J. Verdenius, Mnem. IV, 8 (1955), 222.

¹⁵ T. M. Robinson, Phoenix 22 (1968) 345. ἄμεινον is adverb. Compare Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 1957, 179; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy I, Cambridge 1962, 376.

¹⁶ Phoenix, passage indicated in previous note. Edelstein's translation of the line in question (fr. 34.1): "There never was nor will be a man able to decide everything on the evidence of the senses".

¹⁷ A 33 (Diels-Kranz). See Dodds, op. cit., 4 note 1.

Xenophanes. I believe W. Jaeger was right in remarking: "Only as theologian can he really be understood"¹⁸; and I am therefore inclined to endorse the view of W. J. Verdenius¹⁹ who opposes the usual explanation of an "anthropocentric theory of civilization" on the grounds of *θεῶν προμηθείην ἔχειν*²⁰. Verdenius continues: "So this argument cannot turn on the contrast *θεοὶ ὑπέδειξαν-θνητοὶ ἐφευρίσκουσιν*, but only on the contrast *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα-χρόνῳ ἄμεινον*. To his mind, divine showing and human finding were not in opposition to each other but were complementary aspects of one and the same process". The fragment is too enigmatic to give definite support either to this interpretation or to the arguments of J. H. Loenen, who defends the traditional interpretation²¹. Although my inclination is to stay outside this controversy I must say that the distinction accorded to Xenophanes' fragment as evidence of the idea of progress, is rashly accorded. I do not expect to find absolute consistency in Xenophanes' thoughts, and we shall see that, in this field, there are many errors in modern interpretation of ancient authors. Greek thinkers were often neither as logical nor as dogmatic as their modern interpreters would have them be. It is better to accept their so-called inconsistencies than to try to reconcile them²².

A generation later we find a second testimonium which is always quoted in connection with progress, the speech of Prometheus in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and the whole passage is worthy of quotation:

"In the beginning their eyes looked vainly; listening, they did not hear, but like shapes seen in a dream they lived their long life to no purpose; nor had they sunny houses made of bricks, nor wood-work, but buried in the ground they lived like little ants in the recesses of sunless caves. And there was for them no fixed sign either of winter or of flowering

¹⁸ The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford 1947, 49; this is quite in keeping with the last major survey of Xenophanes by K. von Fritz in R.E., Zweite Reihe, vol. 28.

¹⁹ W. J. Verdenius, Mnem. IV, 8 (1955) 221.

²⁰ Fragm. B 1, 24: "der Götter allzeit fürsorglich zu gedenken, das ist edel" (translation Diels).

²¹ J. H. Loenen, Mnem. IV, 9 (1956) 135-6.

²² One has to remember the warning of Von Fritz on the so-called contradictions in Xenophanes. These inconsistencies "zeigen nur wieder aufs Neue, dass man die Äusserungen des X. nicht in der Weise pressen darf, wie dies von antiken und modernen Interpreten immer wieder geschehen ist" (op. cit., col. 1559, 54 ff.). The controversy goes on. Thraede RAC V 1962, s.v. Erfinder, and in RAC VIII (1972) s.v. Fortschritt; he follows the "progressive" interpretation of E. Heitsch, RhM 109 (1966), 220, and gives the following paraphrase of fr. 18, 2: "mit der Zeit und dank dem Suchen und Finden des Menschen geht es weiter und wird es besser" (RAC VIII, col. 144).

spring or of fruitful summer, but without understanding they did all things, until I taught them the risings of the stars and their settings, hard to interpret. And then number, the noblest of inventions, I devised for them and the composition of letters, memory of all things—productive mother of the arts. I first harnessed together wild animals, that they might bear either the yoke or the human body, that they might take the place of mortals in the greatest labors, and to the chariot I led horses which obey the rein, glory of the rich man's luxury, and no one except me invented those sea-tossed vehicles of the sailors winged with sails . . . If anyone fell ill, there was no help for it, neither solid food nor ointment, nor draughts, but they would have withered away for want of drugs before I showed them how to mix soothing remedies by which they might drive away all diseases. And the many ways of divination I first devised, and interpreted from dreams what must occur in waking life; omens hard to interpret I made known to them, and symbolic meetings, and I explained exactly the flight of crooked-taloned birds of prey, both those which are of good omen and those of bad, and the way of living which each has, and their hatred for one another and their love, and their manner of sitting together, and the smoothness of their viscera, and the color they must have, if they would be pleasing to the gods, the various propitious shapes of the bile and the lobe of the liver; and I burned the members enveloped in fat and the great loins to guide mortals in the dark craft, and I made clear the fiery tokens which before that time were dark. Such were my deeds. And useful things buried beneath the earth from sight of mortals, bronze, iron, silver, gold—who can claim to have found them before me? No one, I know, unless he wishes to babble vainly. Take all together in a word:—All arts (come) to mortals from Prometheus”²³.

I have never been able to understand why this passage has been used as unquestionable evidence of progress. A benefactor gives mankind his gifts, by which man's life becomes 'civilized'.

We must stop speculating about Prometheus as the great symbol of human progress. This allegory is more false than any which has been constructed in the name of human progress. I will repeat here²⁴ some lines of perspicacity and insight from the pen of K. Kuypers:

“The myth of Prometheus in Plato's *Protagoras* proves to contain a deeper meaning for our times than the Greek was perhaps able to put into it, in spite of his boldness. Modern biology confirms strikingly what this significant myth indicates as being characteristic for the

²³ Lovejoy, op. cit., I 202. I have dealt with the passage of Aeschylus' Prometheus in *Miscellanea Tragica* (in honorem J.C. Kamerbeek), Amsterdam 1976, 17–27,—quoted as *Miscellanea*.

²⁴ See my 'History and Allegory' in: *Romanitas et Christianitas*, Studia I. H. Wazink oblata (1973), 15–27, especially 25.

situation in which humanity was placed in its mythical origins, namely its organic lack of equipment in the struggle for existence. This lack was removed by the gift of fire and by the making of tools. In this way the weaker position became stronger. Animals do not know tools. Man, however, is able to liberate himself from the situation in which he finds himself, looking for any means to reach his aims”.

The author rightly does not hold the Greeks themselves responsible for this additional explanation of a continuous development of the process of advance from one aim to the next. As we have seen, however, there are many scholars who do maintain that such an idea of progress of the human species from animal life found its origin in Greek thought. I do not deny that there are some indications of development towards improvement—no more than that—but I do deny that the word progress can be applied, and I strongly maintain that the story of Prometheus should not be interpreted in this way. He who prefers to do so adds a ‘surplus of value’ to the texts or (to be less friendly) is manipulating a modern allegory.

PROMETHEUS AND AN OLD TESTAMENT VIEW

So far as I know, nobody has interpreted the book of Job as a document expressive of human achievement. That this text proclaims human achievement is shown in the passage which deals with man’s activities in the acquisition of wisdom (not with a lower god or Titan as his benefactor). Although no-one, on the grounds of these famous verses alone, would conclude that there is progress in human wisdom, nevertheless man’s unceasing and successful quest in order to worry out the treasures of precious stones and ores from the earth should be mentioned. Prometheus’ speech says far less about human achievement.

There are mines for silver
and places where men refine gold;
where iron is won from the earth
and copper smelted from the ore;
the end of the seam lies in darkness,
and it is followed to its farthest limit.
Strangers cut the galleries;
they are forgotten as they drive forward far from men.
While corn is springing from the earth above,
what lies beneath is raked over like a fire,
and out of its rocks comes lapis lazuli,
dusted with flecks of gold.
No bird of prey knows the way there,
and the falcon’s keen eye cannot descry it;
proud beasts do not set foot on it,

and no serpent comes that way.
 Man sets his hand to the granite rock
 and lays bare the roots of the mountains;
 he cuts galleries in the rocks,
 and gems of every kind meet his eye;
 he dams up the sources of the streams
 and brings the hidden riches of the earth to light. (Job 28, 1-11)

Critics might well claim that I am making a comparison between two quite different spheres of thought. Such criticism would, however, be unfounded. Job 28 is a fine poem about wisdom, and is intended to teach that wisdom is completely beyond the reach of man unless his quest is carried out in the setting of the fear of the Lord. Unless I am mistaken, the lesson to be learned from *Prometheus Bound* is also that Zeus reigns and must be obeyed. All later humanitarian features of both Zeus and of the Jewish God do not alter the fact of the ultimate futility of human enterprise. Both authors reveal different and sometimes irreconcilable characteristics in one and the same God ²⁵. Modern theories of Greek religion reflect the difficulties in interpreting Zeus, and this is also true of God in the book of Job. Indeed the ambiguities of the Zeus of Aeschylus and the Jahwe of the Book of Job have always confused and surprised scholars, so much that *Prometheus Bound* has sometimes been claimed as unauthentic and Job 28 as a "later addition" to the whole Book of Job. Whenever modern interpreters of these works find similarities in the concept of Zeus and Jahwe, theologians and classical scholars who have been educated on the basis of the dogma of separation between East (Jewish) and West (Greek) are appalled. Such indignation, however, is biased and unwarranted.

Upon examination of the two passages it can be seen that there is an account of greater human achievement in the Jewish document. Modern scholars might raise objections to a comparison of the two texts because of the humble words of Job which follow immediately after the quoted passage:

"But where is wisdom to be found?
 And knowledge where does it abound"? ²⁶

There is no pride in human understanding here. Some might draw attention to the great difference in the aim of Aeschylus, which was "to stress man's intellectual progress", although I would

²⁵ And in civilization as well. See for Aeschylus: F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (New York 1949), 142. "It would be easy indeed on the strength of other passages in Aeschylus to arrive at very different conclusions as to what civilization meant to him". See *Prom.* 546 ff.; cf. 83 ff.

²⁶ Job 28, 12.

not belong to them. The reason is obvious: Prometheus proclaims his own achievement in every line he utters. There is a programme of his teaching, and men who have learned from him have learned a lot. There is no mention in the work of human achievement, nor of human progress. There is however, mention of better circumstances and of the development from child to man, who has been taught to think ²⁷. Some authors from the fifth and fourth centuries mentioned Prometheus as a benefactor of mankind ²⁸. He is never pictured as representative of man ²⁹.

SOPHOCLES

Sophocles' wonderful verses in *Antigone* are, so it has been said, proof of "his being aware of the marvels of technical progress — from speech to agriculture, sailing, housing, medicine and many others". All these achievements have been cited "as evidence of the surpassing intelligence and indomitable will of man himself" ³⁰. The end of Sophocles' chorus however, is less exalted, and we may take the last antistrophe as being decisive. Although man can subjugate external nature, he is incapable of mastering himself as a political being. The moral development of man is not so impressive, and the poet himself sees a dividing line which he does not wish to cross (364 ff.):

"Clever beyond all dreams
the inventive craft that he has
which may drive him one time or another to well or ill.
When he honors the laws of the land and the gods' sworn right
high indeed is his city; but stateless the man
who dares to dwell with dishonor. Not by my fire,
never to share my thoughts, who does these things".

The summary of Guthrie is, in my opinion, misleading: "All devices are man's, and never does the future find him at a loss. Of subtlety passing belief are the achievements of his skill, and they lead him at times to good, but at times to evil" ³¹. "One can try to see the Greeks as balanced in their judgement: human nature is not wholly degenerate, nor in every way improving". I doubt if this balanced judgement actually existed, and one can

²⁷ The crucial lines are 433–4.

²⁸ See my *Miscellanea* (mentioned in note 23) for passages from tragedy and from Protagoras' myth (Plato, *Prot.* 320c ff.).

²⁹ Although I greatly admire J.-P. Vernant I cannot follow his interpretation of Prometheus as "le présentant des hommes". See his "Mythe et société en Grèce ancienne", Paris 1974, esp. p. 177 ff.: "Le mythe prométhéen chez Hésiode". See also note 79 (below).

³⁰ W. K. C. Guthrie, *In the Beginning*, London, 1957, 83; *Antigone* 332 ff.

³¹ Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 79.

sometimes find, usually in an outburst, mention of both good and evil by the same author in an unconnected way. I have even greater doubts therefore, when reading of the Greeks as a mature and thoughtful people, and have raised objections to these generalizations before³². I find the greatest obstacle to my acceptance of Guthrie's view in his belief that the Greeks were aware of the following paradox:

"What impressed them was the paradox at no time more apparent than at the present day, that a race so gifted with intelligence and capable of such miraculous advancement in the understanding and subjugation of external nature, can yet be so utterly foolish and wicked in mutual relations and the management of its own affairs: unimaginable intellectual progress goes hand in hand with moral imbecility. This is what the Greeks saw".

I am doubtful of it and am still awaiting the evidence³³.

In this respect perhaps we can place greater reliance on the chorus of the later Sophocles³⁴, where it says in *Oedipus at Colonus* "that it were better not to be born, and once born the best that a man can hope for is to die as soon as possible"³⁵.

The amount of attention given to different passages by modern scholars will depend largely upon their own personal views of human progress or decline, and also upon their own prejudices. Let me point out that the frequently quoted passage from *Antigone* contains in itself a problem which can only be solved if one recognises the fact that the text mentions human technical achievement as being just that and not as leading to a higher standard of social life: and furthermore—the *Coloneus* is a case in point—that pessimism, according to *that* standard, is the prevalent attitude in Sophocles³⁶. We may restate our starting point: we are not considering the fact of scientific progress, nor that the tensions created by scientific and technological progress caused moral regression. We are discussing the idea of progress as improvement for whole communities and this is the controversial issue. One can be very well aware of a more optimistic view of human life as is shown by Theseus as depicted in the *Supplices* of Euripides³⁷—this is common ground. Common ground appears to vanish however, in the differences of opinion which existed on

³² Intern. Rev. of Social History 4 (1959), 91–110.

³³ Cf. also Solmsen op. cit., 145 (see above page 15, note 25).

³⁴ Guthrie does not forget it, but he cites it elsewhere (p. 78) and not in direct connection with his chapter on progress.

³⁵ *Oed. Col.* 1224–8.

³⁶ J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism* (1952), *passim*.

³⁷ Eur. Suppl. 201–213. Cf. *Miscellanea* 25.

'la condition humaine'. Whoever proclaims the more optimistic view, shows adherence to the idea of a general and universal progress of society.

DIODORUS

In the survey of debated texts there is one of doubtful origin from Diodorus (between 60 and 30 B.C.), which runs as follows: ³⁸

"The men who were born in the beginning lived, they say, an undisciplined and brutish life, each going off to feed by himself upon the tenderest herbs and the fruits that grew wild upon the trees. When they were attacked by wild beasts they, taught by self-interest, came to one another's aid, and after they had thus been led by fear to gather into groups, they presently came to understand the signs ³⁹ they made to one another. The sounds which they uttered to each other were, indeed, at first obscure and confused; but they soon developed articulate speech, and by agreeing with one another upon symbols for the various objects they met with, they made the signification of these terms mutually intelligible. But since groups of this kind arose in every part of the inhabited world, they did not all have the same language: for each framed his own speech as chance determined. This is the reason why there now exist all manner of languages. And out of these first groups all the original peoples of the world arose.

The first men, therefore, led a miserable existence, none of the things which are useful for life having yet been discovered: they had no clothing, were unacquainted with the use of fire and dwellings, and knew nothing at all of the cultivation of food. And since they were ignorant of the harvesting of wild foods, they made no provisions of fruits against their needs; consequently many of them perished in the winters from cold and lack of food. But gradually they learned from experience to take refuge in caves in the winters and to store up such fruits as could be preserved. And when they had become acquainted with fire and other useful things, they gradually discovered the arts and whatever else is serviceable to social life. For in general it was necessity that was man's teacher, providing suitable instruction in all things to an animal which was well endowed by nature, and had hands and speech and an intelligent mind to assert it in all its efforts. With respect to the genesis of men and the life of the earliest times we shall let what has already been said suffice, since we aim to preserve due proportion".

There is so much in this passage which reminds us of Protagoras that some scholars are ready to see *him* as the father of the ideas

³⁸ Translation from Lovejoy-Boas 221. (Diod. I 8). Commentaries in Guthrie op. cit., 79, cf. 88 and note 9; Dodds, op. cit., 10. See also pp. 35 ff. and 50 ff. below.

³⁹ Or: "one another's characters", which is in my opinion rightly rejected by Lovejoy-Boas: *τοὺς ἀλλήλων τύπους*.

expressed by Diodorus. Guthrie says that it is "hardly controversial" to say that by whatever intermediary it reached Diodorus, there is, in his account, material of the 5th century B.C., some of which may be credited to Democritus the young contemporary and fellow citizen of Protagoras, while some is probably earlier⁴⁰. Hesitantly, Dodds credits Democritus with some features of the anthropology, and Anaxagoras with the reference to "the crucial significance of the human hand, which has made man the only tool-using animal". On the whole, however, Dodds is inclined to think that Diodorus' account, as the author himself says, was derived from a manual which included the opinions of different writers, of whom Anaxagoras alone is mentioned by name. I refer to G. Vlastos—who in my opinion has made the most valuable contribution to the question of the sources—"Diodorus represents a Democritean point of view". However, since we know of Democritus' views only through the filter of Hecataeus and Diodorus, we find ourselves on slippery ground⁴¹. But this is not the main objection to the inclusion of Diodorus' fragment in the controversy on the idea of progress. In the first place the theory of the origin of language seems quite late so far as our subject is concerned, and appears to be derived from Epicurus. Secondly, apart from the theory of progress, there is also the question of an explanation of biological evolution, and of cultural origins. Democritus—and I agree with Vlastos, not only here but in every aspect of his enlightening article—was the first to "expunge all teleological residues, and account for the origin of the human arts, as well as of planets, plants, and animals, as products of physical necessity"⁴².

In fragment 144, Democritus says that the arts were separated out by necessity (*ἀποκρίναι τ'ἀναγκάϊον*). Necessity as the teacher of man is a well-known theory and was also propagated later by Epicurus. "To make a man rich it is better to diminish his desires than to add to his wealth", as Guthrie summarizes it⁴³. We shall see that the idea of necessity being a teacher was prominent in Thucydides. But necessity can hardly be harnessed to the idea of progress, and that is further reason to omit Diodorus I. 8, when dealing with the origins of the idea of progress as such.

⁴⁰ Guthrie, *op. cit.*, note 9 on pp. 140–1.

⁴¹ G. Vlastos, *On the Prehistory of Diodorus*, AJP 67 (1946), 51–59, with the following conclusions: "the value of the passage for Democritus is, therefore, distinctly less than that of a secondary source. It can only be used to fill out ideas for which some independent warrant exists in surviving Democritean fragments".

⁴² Vlastos, *op. cit.*, 57.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, 76. Cf. Democritus, D.K. B 284.

From a somewhat different angle, that of anthropology as such, the problems of the sources have been treated very thoroughly by T. Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*, APA, Philological Monographs XXV, 1967, whose conclusion runs as follows: "(Diodorus) I, 8 is not a unified whole but a collection of excerpts from different parts of another work—the one which served as a source for large portions of Diodorus' *Aegyptiaca*" (op. cit., 187, cf. 16). Cole's treatment offers good arguments for a positive reevaluation of the "Quellenforschung" (cf. esp. op. cit., 11 f.); his bibliography is exemplary (207 ff.). The basis of his work—not of less value because of that—is a pure American belief in progress, with Lovejoy-Boas and E. Havelock, to whom the book is dedicated, as his inspiring teachers. Anti-primitivism can be read through the lines of this intelligent study, in which all the threads lead to Democritus as 'founder' of ancient *Kulturgeschichte*; it accedes to O. Gigon's problematic thesis "das Ziel einer voller Forschung ist doch die Wüste solcher Allgemeinheiten (the tendency to find only "allgemeines Bildungsgut" in surviving accounts) zurückzudrängen zugunsten der gestalteten und gestaltenden Individualitäten" (Gnomon 33, 1961, 776 and Cole 13). As coming from a man with these antecedents and ideals the conclusion about Diodorus I, 8, has to be taken more seriously than in the case of any other modern scholar since Vlastos.

One of the moderate supporters of the existence of the idea of progress states that, in Athens in the second half of the fifth century, the idea had developed in a conspicuous way, and that its diffusion should be seen as distinct from the great expansion of teleological thought⁴⁴. This statement is not completely endorsed by one of the authorities already mentioned, L. Edelstein, who mentions some instances of a teleological interpretation and justification of the ways of God, but says that this "cannot have had wide currency as yet, however, and must have been unacceptable to the naturalists who resigned themselves to the limits of human nature"⁴⁵.

The last part of Edelstein's statement concerning the naturalists is probably right, although in connection with this crucial question nobody knows whether these allegedly "consequent" thinkers deserve such an epithet. The first part of Edelstein's assertion may however be put aside as being completely arbitrary, for we

⁴⁴ So K. Thraede, RAC VIII (1972), Col. 143, s.v. Fortschritt. Cf. p. 40, note 96 below.

⁴⁵ L. Edelstein, op. cit., 55. J. H. Finley, mentioned by Thraede in support of his statement, does endorse it, but only in general terms, Thucydides, Cambr. Mass. 1942, 82. See below p. 40 ff.

know next to nothing about the general feeling and outlook at that time regarding man's position in the Kosmos. It is because of this lack of evidence for the naturalist's viewpoint that Thraede says that teleology had an "allgemeine Verbreitung", whilst Edelstein defends the opposite view. It is remarkable, however, to discover that Thraede is under the impression that Edelstein shares his views.

Modern terminology concerning human activities during the growth of culture—an undeniable fact already evident in Xenophanes, where as we saw (fr. 18) man's inventive powers are mentioned (within the bounds given by the Gods)—has anachronistic consequences: 1) the work of *ἐπευρίσκειν* gives man 'his own responsibility' and 2) it is a self-evident basis for 'free thinking'⁴⁶. Here I hesitate to follow the modern view of intellectual development, which I do not find in Greek thought. Of course I agree that what is called Greek Enlightenment was made possible only through freedom of thought, but I fail to see from the evidence of the fifth century that freedom of thought was a basis for an idea of progress and that man claimed his own responsibility. Even if an idea of progress did exist (and the more I read the artificial interpretations of the texts, the more doubtful I become) it could have developed during the natural course of events. There would be no need for those who believe in its existence to be obliged to develop a laborious argument *via* 'freedom of thought'. It is impossible to say, however, in what way the idea of progress could have developed and become widespread. So much is certain: the authors who praise human achievement were never censured for their words. On the contrary, one can imagine that the audience of Sophocles *Antigone* would have been pleased to hear the chorus sing about man's achievements (332 ff.), having in mind (as the poet probably had) what the Athenians themselves had accomplished.

THUCYDIDES

One author who was not impressed by the accomplishments of man was Thucydides. Nevertheless, in the eyes of many scholars⁴⁷ he is one of the champions of progress. "More important is the idea of progress to which the Archaeology gives expression"⁴⁸—one

⁴⁶ Thraede, *op. cit.*, 142: die geschichtliche Verantwortung des Menschen selbstverständliche Grundlage freien Denkens. Cf. p. 12, note 22 above.

⁴⁷ Apart from Dodds, I mention F. J. Teggart's textbook, *The Idea of Progress* 1949², 39–44; Mme J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'idée du progrès*, *Annali della scuola normale superiore di Pisa (Lettere, storia e filosofia)* 25 (1966), 144–191.

⁴⁸ J. H. Finley, *op. cit.*, p. 82 (see also p. 42 ff. below).

of them pronounces. Let us now try to determine what Thucydides really said. We are entitled to do so because scholars of repute oppose the views of Mme de Romilly and J. H. Finley. I mention Hans-Peter Stahl's book, *Thukydides, Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess*, which was published in 1966, as an example of such opposition. "It seems that Thucydides himself sees the importance of what was the development of human knowledge not in change (Fortschritt) but in the determinant factor of *might*, which remains the same"⁴⁹.

To discover who is right it is necessary to deal carefully with chapters 1-19 of Book I. I hope that my *paraphrases* of passages from this famous introduction will give a preliminary answer⁵⁰.

*Chapter I*⁵¹ Thucydides writes about a unique event—a great war—the greatest disturbance in the history of the Greeks. His studies led him to the conclusion that the history of the preceding period, compared to his own, indicated no greatness, either in warfare or in anything else.

Chapter II. In ancient times, the country which is now called Hellas had no settled population. There was a series of migrations of various tribes who were constantly under the pressure of invaders stronger than they were: there was no commerce, no safe communication routes, either by land or by sea, and because of these factors the tribes were always prepared to abandon their territory.

⁴⁹ H. P. Stahl, op. cit., 27: "Es scheint, dass Thukydides selbst den Wert seiner in der Archäologie vollzogenen Erkenntnis nicht in der Veränderung (dem Fortschritt), sondern in dem kontinuierlich sich gleichbleibenden Faktor der Macht (bzw. des Machttriebes) sah". A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power*, Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. XXIV, Cambr. Mass. 1970, p. 12-13 has given a most admirable conclusion on the Archaeology of Thucydides. I quote the first sentence of his evaluation: "We may look to the opening of Book I, the so-called *Archaeology*, for Thucydides the analyst, analyzing what were the *factors of power and of its generation in Greece*" (italics are mine). A. Menzel, *Griechische Soziologie*, Abh. der Akad. der Wiss. Wien, Philos.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsber., 216 Bd., 1. Abt., Wien 1937, offered a good specimen of a sociological approach, still worth reading: "Aber auch . . . Thukydides beschäftigt sich in den Einleitungskapiteln mit der Urgeschichte Griechenlands, wobei er, freilich mit grosser Vorsicht, aus den Zuständen zurückgebliebener Völker Schlüsse zieht; die ökonomischen Veränderungen spielen dabei eine wichtige Rolle". Nowhere Menzel uses the word "Fortschritt".

⁵⁰ E. Täubler, *Die Archäologie des Thukydides*, Leipzig 1927, is a book of fundamental importance. For the new analysis of K. von Fritz, see *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, Berlin 1967, I i 557 ff.; I ii 262 ff. See also Mme de Romilly, op. cit., 159 ff.

⁵¹ See the English translation, from which I quote some of the following passages: *Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War*, translation by Rex Warner with an introduction and notes by M. I. Finley, Penguin books 1972.

From these two chapters alone it already becomes clear that we have to enlarge upon the statements of Stahl. The historian is anxious to prove that the Peloponnesian war holds more importance than any other event before it. Such digressions are familiar and are called *ἀνέξησεις*, additions to show how important the subject is⁵². For this purpose the writer has *τεκμήρια* which he will emphasise in the following chapters. These 'signs' will demand our attention: in chapter 2 some such signs are already evident, *viz.* invasions, no settled population, no commerce, no safe communication. It is important therefore, for us to be sceptical from the first of the idea set out by Romilly in her important article. She tries to persuade us that the problem of whether 'progress' occurs in I. 1-21, is a simple one. As is to be expected, her answer is in the affirmative, although she has to admit that the exposition deals with the importance of wars and states, the extension of political groups and the size of their means with which to determine the scale of warfare. But, so it is alleged, this is only the framework. The historian's tenet or doctrine is of a clear affirmation, coherent and outspoken, of progress. In my opinion this statement is misconceived and stems from prejudice.

However, Thucydides does give 'signs' for his own view that before the Peloponnesian war there had been no great military achievement in Hellas. The underlying causes for this were:

1. No settled population.
2. Inhabitants always prepared to abandon their own territory.
3. No commerce.
4. No safe communication by land or sea.
5. No surplus left over for capital.
6. Production only of necessities.
7. No regular system of agriculture.
8. This all culminated in lack of protection by fortifications.
9. Invasions at any moment.
10. No reluctance of the population in moving from their homes.

Point 10 brings us back to point 1.

And all these statements are combined by two other signs which

⁵² Cp. von Fritz, *op. cit.*, I. i, 576. With most scholars I take I. 1, 3: *τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν* to refer to the Peloponnesian war, not to the Trojan war; see von Fritz, ii 263-4.

on the surface appear to oppose each other, but which in fact do corroborate the passage as a whole:

11. The most frequent changes of population occurred where the soil was most fertile (e.g. Thessaly, Boeotia and most of the Peloponnese).
12. Attica was remarkably free from political disunity because of the poverty of her soil.

In the conclusions of chapters I and II the 'sign' of Attica is an important and excellent example of the historian's theory (*παράδειγμα τὸδε τοῦ λόγου*) "that it was because of migration that there was an uneven development elsewhere; for when people were driven out of other areas of Greece by war or other disturbances, the most powerful of them first took refuge in Athens which was a stable society, finally becoming citizens of Athens. The influx of people created such an increase in the population that it resulted in Attica becoming too small for its inhabitants and so colonies of people were sent out to Ionia"⁵³.

It should be emphasized again, that in general the author's aim was only to explain how this great war could have occurred. This point is sometimes forgotten by modern commentators. During the course of time there was a development of circumstances which brought about the possibility of war. The purpose of Thucydides in the *Archaeology* was to elucidate the conditions which led to 'the greatest war', and there is no passage, not even a sentence, which does not serve this purpose. There is no need for detail, and the author does not dwell on it; he merely gives the main outline of the theme by the use of brief 'signs' rather than by the use of particulars.

Chapter III. The lack of unity among the inhabitants of early Greece can be confirmed by yet another observation, from Homeric poetry. The words 'Hellas' and 'Hellenes' as a common name for land and population are late in appearing. There is no record of action in any form being taken by Hellas as a whole before the event of the Trojan War. Even the poet Homer, who lived many years after this war, refers only to the population of a very restricted area — the inhabitants of Phthiotis — when using the name Hellenes. It was the followers of Achilles who came from Phthiotis. Neither

⁵³ It is these last paragraphs (6–10) of chapter II that make me inclined to accept the interpretation of *τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν* which was almost universally accepted before Ed. Schwartz; these words have to be taken as referring to Attica and Athens, that is to say as an introduction to the war waged between Athens and Sparta, of which the author intends to write the history; cf. note 49 above.

does Homer use the word 'barbarians', which proves that the people who were later known as 'Hellenes' did not see themselves as a united whole, as distinguishable from foreign outsiders. "In any case these various Hellenic states, weak in themselves and lacking in communications with one another, took no kind of collective action before the time of the Trojan War. And they could not have united even for the Trojan expedition unless they had previously acquired a greater knowledge of seafaring".

Chapter IV. The end of the previous chapter opens the way for the next 'sign': the first Thalassocracy of Minos, Lord of the Cyclades islands, in which he founded most of the colonies. One of the results of his power was security for seafaring people. "It is reasonable to suppose that he did his best to put down piracy in order to secure his own revenues"⁵⁴.

Chapter V. This chapter takes the reader back to the remote past, piracy and the social position of the pirate. Piracy was practised by all the inhabitants of the coastal areas, and success in it was a reason for pride. A similar form of robbery was also prevalent on land.

Chapter VI. (Even now there are still people who live by these means). Personal security demanded the carrying of weapons and people were hesitant to discontinue this practice. In spite of their way of life being filled with menace and danger the Athenians were among the first to lay aside their arms and to adopt a more relaxed and luxurious form of living. A case in point here concerns clothing, and there are two stages to be discerned. In the first stage it was customary for the older members to wear costly clothes, and this was also the fashion among their kinsmen in Ionia. Later came a less pretentious way of dressing—more after the present-day fashion—which was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians. The custom of nakedness when playing games also comes from the Lacedaemonians. Formerly, Greek athletes wore loin cloths, even at the Olympic Games, and this is still the custom among some of the barbarians. "And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other similar customs to those of the present-day barbarians".

An additional observation may not be out of place here. "Human (=Greek) Progress" is not emphasized in this chapter. Its main content concerns the disappearance of violence, — the wearing of

⁵⁴ I iv–viii will deal, directly and indirectly, with Minos' achievements.

arms in ordinary life being no longer necessary, the change in people's manners, and an easier mode of life, illustrated by the trend towards a more simple form of clothing.

Chapter VII. After discussing the conditions of living in the previous chapter Thucydides returns to the question of navigation and its consequences. The art of navigation had been developed at a relatively late stage. A 'sign' of that part of the reconstruction of the past is that older settlements were founded inland, whereas the cities founded in recent times, when navigation had become safer, were built in coastal areas. The geographic position of these settlements protected the newly built harbours.

Chapter VIII. It was because of this protection that attacks from the sea became less profitable and regular commerce began to flourish: it also became possible for Minos to organize a navy and to improve the sea communication routes.

The introduction of this passage in particular confirms the widespread piracy (which was checked by Minos). According to tradition the islands of the Aegean were originally inhabited by the Carians. When Delos was purified by the Athenians⁵⁵ all the graves on the island were opened up, and it was discovered that over half the bodies were those of Carians. This could be recognised by the types of weapons buried with the bodies, as well as by the method of burial. It is important to remember that this, and other archaeological remarks have no direct relation to the central theme—the accumulation of power; he does not say that the Carians exerted their military power over an extensive area. In this connection we should bear in mind von Fritz' observation that the opening of the graves bore out the traditional tales⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ In "this war", Thucydides says, alluding to the purification of 426 B.C., in the sixth year of the war.

⁵⁶ Von Fritz, op. cit., I, i, 579–580: "Vielmehr dienen sie ausschliesslich der Bestätigung der Überlieferung, das Minos bei oder nach der Begründung seines Seereiches Karer, die damals so weit verbreitet gewesen waren, vertrieben habe, also der Bestätigung der Überlieferung von seiner Macht, da ja, was wiederum nicht ausdrücklich ausgesprochen wird, die Karer jetzt nicht mehr in grösserer Zahl auf den Inseln zu finden sind". That modern archaeological research has (probably) destroyed Thucydides' argument, because he or his source incorrectly identified early (geometric) pottery as Carian, is a conclusion which I would not endorse. If it is true (R. M. Cook in BSA 50 (1955), 266–270 is not so certain), this modern discovery does not detract from the merits of Thucydides' combination of archaeology and "tekmeria". But the most important argument against bringing the geometric finds on Delos into the discussion is that Thucydides mentions types of weapons and burial customs (*γνωσθέντες τῇ τε σκευῇ τῶν ὀπλῶν ξυντεταμμένη καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ νῦν ἐτι θάπτουσιν*). More critical is von Fritz, op. cit., I, i, 588; ii 269, note 33.

We are therefore confronted here with one of the first attempts, if not the first, to combine the *τεκμήρια*, the 'signs', with archaeological evidence. The successful organisation of Minos drove out the pirates and brought prosperity to the coastal regions. The results of this prosperity brought with them differences of wealth and power. Minos' measures brought about possibilities for power so that a situation arose in which the coastal areas were able to acquire wealth and their population to lead a more settled way of life. Some areas were more prosperous than others. Differences occurred. Through the acquisition of capital resources the more powerful cities were able to subject the people of the weaker cities. Hellas had already developed along these lines to a certain degree at the time of the expedition to Troy.

Chapters IX–XI. The Trojan War will occupy us only briefly. The appreciation of Thucydides' argument, and in particular the question of history *contra* legend, can be omitted⁵⁷. According to Thucydides the war was the result of one of the concentrations of power, the development of which he had traced in the preceding chapter. In modern literature the evaluation of these chapters, which are filled with names from myths and legends, is not always favourable towards Thucydides. However, this is of no concern to us at the moment. The sensible middle course favoured by K. von Fritz seems to me highly preferable to the hyper-criticisms of Ed. Schwartz and the apologetics of Gomme. If nevertheless I had to make a choice between the interpretations of Schwartz and Gomme, I would side with the latter because of his awareness of the tremendous difficulties in treating this subject from a remote past. To have seen the history in mythology as a central problem, is of great merit. Thucydides perceived this, as he did also in the case of the early history of Attica (II 15–17). In my opinion there is no value in discussing the problem of whether or not we should blame him for mentioning Agamemnon and Pelops⁵⁸. The most important point is that the idea of progress is not mentioned in his account. His impressive treatment of the difficult problems in the early history of Greece has been the reason why scholars have repeatedly made the mistake of comparing him with his predecessors in this respect and seeing progress within the evaluation of the past. This, though, is not the progress of human society as such. Here is the point at which scholars part company⁵⁹. It does,

⁵⁷ I refer to von Fritz, *op. cit.*, I, i 585 ff.

⁵⁸ About this see von Fritz, *op. cit.*, I, i 582.

⁵⁹ Romilly, *op. cit.*, 159: "Il parle de la guerre, mais aussi du commerce, des murs, du port, des armes et du costume. Dans un zèle de démonstration

of course, depend upon the lens through which we are compelled to look. I, for one, do not think that the following quotations have any bearing on progress.

- 1-1: "all the evidence leads me to conclude that these periods (sc. the remote past) were not great periods either in warfare or in anything else".
- 3-1: "the weakness of the early inhabitants" (before the Trojan War).
- 3-4: "these various Hellenic states . . . took no kind of collective action before the time of the Trojan War".
- 10-5: "not a large number went on the expedition" (against Troy).
- 11-1: "the cause (of this small number) was lack of money and want of supplies".
- 11-3: "as it was, just as lack of money was the reason why previous expeditions were not really considerable, so in the course of this one (the Trojan War), we shall find . . . that it was inferior to its fame".

In all these quotations Thucydides attempts to put forward his own subject as being greater than the events of the more distant past. He does not speak about human misery ('misère') but about military 'weakness'. Before the time of the Trojan War the things lacking were the necessary equipment, and the shortage of materials, but not the needs of the population (*χρεία*)⁶⁰.

When we look at Thuc. I 1-11 as a whole we can see that, from a modern point of view, the most vulnerable parts of the exposition are those which draw attention to the most important historical problems⁶¹.

(a) How did the Greeks become conscious of their unity, opposed to the Barbarians? His answer is that Hellen, the son of Deucalion, when he became strong, was invited to the aid of other cities. I see this act as military aid, and cannot endorse von Fritz who draws the conclusion that the fact that Hellen and his sons were invited to other cities shows an awareness of cultural unity, not a unity of language or of race. Neither the first nor the two others are even remotely connected with the passage as I see it. The other states invite them as allies (*ἐν' ὁφελίᾳ*) in a military

sans pareil, il construit un système cohérent entièrement destiné à mettre en lumière l'existence du progrès, tel que le décrivaient les auteurs alors en vogue". See further p. 38 below.

⁶⁰ The other side in Romilly, *op. cit.*, 160: "Si l'on pense que ces termes (quoted above from chapters 1, 3, 10, 11) de misère s'appliquent aux époques mythiques des héros et à la guerre de Troie, on concevra l'importance du retournement par lequel ce passé tant loué devient ici si méprisable. C'est le même retournement qui fait commencer le monde avec la *χρεία* plutôt qu'avec l'âge d'or".

⁶¹ For the following see von Fritz, *op. cit.*, I, i 583 ff.

enterprise. So Thucydides proclaims military reasons for the unity of the Greeks.

(b) Commerce and economic growth are only possible when the sea is free from piracy. That means also that one state has to possess the maritime power to impose its peace on the others.

(c) The origin of power in the Greek world. It started with Mycenae, which nobody nowadays will deny.

(d) The Trojan War. The historicity was never doubted in ancient times. Thucydides scrutinizes the circumstances under which such an enterprise could take place.

We must agree with von Fritz that to put these four problems clearly before his audience is 'eine grossartige Leistung'. Might is proclaimed without any moral commentary. H.-P. Stahl's statements (see note 49) seem to be the most satisfactory.

There are still eight more chapters to be treated and these deal with the more recent past. Here especially, there is the temptation to glorify one's own time. This temptation is sometimes irresistible to the human mind. Did Thucydides have the intellectual power to resist this popular view? The question is worth our consideration.

Chapter XII deals with the period after the Trojan War. The summary is very brief and it is not possible for any ancient or modern historian to do more until rather more progress has been made with recent archaeological research⁶². We might safely say that in this chapter Thucydides sketched the *decline of power* only "very superficially". But, we can ask, who has done it better over the centuries? And in any case his purpose was to produce no more than a superficial sketch. A superficial sketch of this type left the way clear for him to deal with the new concentrations of power and with the question of how such concentrations of power could arise. He alludes briefly to the period of colonization, because this was yet another means of gaining power. Even making allowance for brevity, the words "Ionia and most of the islands were colonized by the Athenians, the Peloponnesians founded most of the colonies in Italy and Sicily", are very unsatisfactory. They should be understood as meaning only that colonization was one of the great causes of enhancement of power which led to the war, and be taken as a hint as to what would occur much later.

⁶² For chronological determination of the Trojan War, see Addendum, p. 58.

Chapters XIII–XIV. It is often said that this passage lacks coherence⁶³, but I am not convinced of this. Thucydides makes himself perfectly clear. He demonstrates the differences between monarchy and tyranny from the position the economy holds in both forms of government. The patriarchal kings get their ‘share’, their “gifts of honour”—I insist on giving the original meaning to *γέγρατα* mentioned in this chapter. However with the introduction of new forms of wealth the old aristocracy—which inherited its power from the kings—was no longer master of the situation⁶⁴. As Hellas grew more powerful and continued to acquire still more wealth than before, tyrannies began to be established in most of the cities, along with the increase of their revenue, whereas before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives.

A shift of power follows, and a city organised along this pattern of tyranny and based upon the higher and lower levels of its citizens, requires centres of power. One such centre of power was the navy.

When Thucydides’ account is reconstructed in this way much of what appears strange and ‘unfinished’ becomes clear. He does not speak about the oligarchies which proceed tyranny, because they were not essential to his purpose—the development of the state and the powers of the state. He does not touch upon all possible centres of power, but only upon maritime power, for he knows that it is precisely this which will explain the military conflict. Corinth and Athens⁶⁵ rise from the shadows of time. It comes as no surprise that Thucydides places maritime history at the centre of the stage, so to speak, for he had already done so in chapter X, when discussing the partners of Mycenae in the Trojan War. He does the same again in chapter XIII, first with Corinth, when he mentions shipbuilding, the types of ships, and the construction of harbours and docks⁶⁶.

Here also I am disinclined to follow those scholars who accuse Thucydides of a passing and superficial treatment of his subject matter. In my opinion his report is remarkably to the point. Once again H.-P. Stahl’s characterization of the ‘Archaeology’ of

⁶³ So von Fritz, op. cit., I, i 591 “Auch sind einige Abschnitte in diesem Teil von solcher Kürze, dass es schwer ist den Gedankenzusammenhang zu verstehen”.

⁶⁴ I 13. 1: “As the importance of acquiring money became more and more evident” (Warner) is anachronistic; “continued to acquire more wealth than before” (Forster Smith in the Loeb edition) is better. *τῶν χρημάτων τήν κτήσιν* has nothing to do with mint economy.

⁶⁵ About Sparta and its peculiar development, see Ch. XVIII.

⁶⁶ See the good note about these concomitants of shipbuilding by C. F. Smith in the Loeb edition. Cf. Gomme, Commentary I, p. 120 ff.

Thucydides proves to be the right one. All Thucydides' observations are centered around the development of power, which means that he needs no more than a minimum of material for his sketch. This is where the master reveals himself⁶⁷. He reveals himself as being not only master but also as an unbiased judge of persons and events. It does not seem accidental that this passage ends with the end of the naval history of Greece, at it were, through the achievements of Themistocles. Thucydides praises Themistocles elsewhere in what is, for him, unusual eulogy⁶⁸.

The particular mention given to the enormous achievements of the Phocaeans could be based on the oral tradition, or it might be due to the influence of other authors, among whom Hecataeus is likely to have been the first. I believe Thucydides was right to mention the founders of Massilia who, before they built their settlements there, had defeated the Carthaginians⁷⁰. After all, he could hardly have found a better illustration of such successful Greek initiative at sea.

Chapters XV and XVI are the counterparts of the two previous chapters. They are not so brilliantly worked to a climax, but nevertheless they serve the author's purpose well in his efforts to elucidate the development of power on land. The author himself explains the reasons for the impression of their being less satisfactory and lacking the depth of chapters XIII and XIV, when he states: "There was no warfare on land that resulted in any considerable accession of power". One might reproach him for viewing the wars on land only as important skirmishes between neighbours, for omitting the expansion of Argos and the power of its king Pheidon. But I repeat my earlier statement that Thucydides' intention was not to give a brief survey of history — he chose historical landmarks only for his main thesis, which was the development of concentrated power. I think that perhaps he was right in not considering the

⁶⁷ For chronological data in this passage, see Addendum, p. 58.

⁶⁸ Differently from Fritz about Ch. X–XII (op. cit., i, 592): "Aber statt dass nun ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem Aufkommen der Tyrannenherrschaften und der Bildung von Seemächten aufgewiesen würde, was bis zu einem gewissen Grade durchaus möglich gewesen wäre, werden in ziemlich desultorischen Weise Nachrichten . . . aneinandergereiht. Selbst Polykrates, der als Tyrann von Samos, wenn auch nur für eine kurze Zeit, eine Art Seeherrschaft in einem Teil der Ägäis ausübte, wird nur im Vorbeigehen erwähnt, bis das Ganze mit der Bildung neuer Seemächte in Sizilien, Kerkyra und zu einem gewissen Grade auch in Athen unmittelbar vor dem Xerxes-krieg endet".

⁶⁹ I, 138.

⁷⁰ It may be that Massilia had been founded already, and that Thucydides means that the victors went there as additional settlers; Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 124–5.

Messenian war as a part of the development of concentrated power. After all, in spite of the success of the wars, Sparta was, in the early stages, isolated from the mainstream of *Greek* development of power. So far as Thucydides was concerned, *Greek* development of power was connected with ephemeral alliances between states more than with the formation of leagues, and so far as archaic Sparta was concerned such alliances were not so evident.

The nearest approach to collective action was the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria (the Lelantine war). During this war the rest of the Hellenic world sided with one or the other of the two combatants (end of Ch. XV). The counterpart to this conclusion is the fact that the different states which were isolated from the others suffered all sorts of obstacles to their continuous growth. The Ionian cities suffered greatly from their lack of alliances with each other. The Persian Empire stands as the great example of unity, subduing Lydia and the Greek cities in Asia and, "strong in the possession of the Phoenician navy", conquering the islands as well.

Chapter XVII. In the same perspective it is necessary to try to understand the failure of the tyrannies—even those which succeeded in maintaining themselves over shorter period: "since they had regard for their own interests only". The exceptions amongst these were the tyrants in Sicily who (as we have to interpret their being mentioned by the author) went beyond their immediate local interests. Indeed, the menace of Carthage and of the Siculi sometimes forced the Greek settlements to unite their forces.

From this we must conclude that in almost every case a concentration of power was lacking. This was the reason for so many states falling victims to the great powers, the Persians and the Lacedaemonians. Thucydides does not explain why these two forces were the exceptions. However much one would have liked to have the opinion of Thucydides about the Persian Empire, it did not concern him. His aim was the situation in his own time and an explanation of the predominant position of Sparta, which is given in the next chapter. Here, though, he does have to make some remarks on the glorious war against Persia.

Chapters XVIII and XIX. The conclusion of the former chapters is summarized in the last passage of chapter XVIII: "So for a long time the state of affairs everywhere in Hellas was such that nothing very remarkable could be done by any combination of powers and that even the individual cities were lacking in enterprise".

Now *chapter XVIII* brings forward another factor in the remarkable report of Thucydides: the stability of Sparta was based on the stability of its constitution. This idea was also present in the preceding chapter, if we bear in mind that the possibility for tyranny was made easier because of the lack of unity amongst the victims. Tyranny is always a product of political instability. Sparta had never been under tyranny and so continued as a politically stable society⁷¹. This development was all the more remarkable since Thucydides knew that "from the time when the Dorians first settled in Sparta there had been a particularly long period of political disunity".

By taking Sparta as an example it can be seen that it is possible for a land state with no strong economic basis for power to be powerful as the result of a good and stable constitution. Such power, however, has its limits, and there are dangers which threaten its existence. Although there are great risks involved when there are numerous concentrations of rather weaker power: these are sometimes more dangerous than confrontations between two strong centres of power, because these provoke pockets of resistance. This phenomenon can be seen from chapters I–XVII, and is further confirmed in chapters XVIII–XIX; sometimes explicit statements on it are made, and sometimes it can be deduced by implication⁷².

The Persian Wars demonstrate the creation of two different concentrations of power on mainland Greece – Athens and Sparta. This is shown in Chapter XVIII by the facts of Marathon, the naval preparation, and Sparta's command ten years later. Rivalry arose in spite of the common effort, and the war-time alliance was short-lived.

Chapter XIX underlines the significance of the two concentrations of power. Sparta and her allies, who did *not* have to pay tribute, Athens and her allies (whose fleets had been taken over in the course of time by Athens, with the exception of the fleets of Chios and Lesbos) who did have to pay contributions of money. This then was the situation within the concentrations of power, and

⁷¹ For the date of the Spartan Constitution, see Addendum p. 59.

⁷² The former is practically a translation of von Fritz's conclusion (i 597). "Wie das Beispiel Spartas zeigt, kann eine Landmacht auch ohne starke wirtschaftliche Grundlage durch gute politische Einrichtung entstehen, aber ihrer Ausdehnung sind ohne solche Grundlage gewisse Grenzen gesetzt. Eine zu starke Machtkonzentration ruft Widerstand hervor, der ihrem Bestehen gefährlich werden kann, aber eine lose läuft auch die Gefahr der Auflösung. Alles das ist in der Archäologie teils explizit ausgesprochen, teils implizit enthalten". For power-blocks in international affairs, see Woodhead, *op. cit.*, 200, note 3.

the purpose of Thucydides was to illustrate it in the chapters mentioned.

At the end of Thucydides' survey two things became clear. He works by the method of *tekmèria*—'signs'— . These 'signs' prove the importance of concentrations of power. Moreover, the economic factors are given more importance than was ever given by a Greek historian⁷³. Throughout the whole course of Greek historiography economic factors were never accorded much importance. As with so many great innovators, there were no successors to Thucydides, nor even imitators. When attention was given to economic factors during the new developments of historical research in modern times, Thucydides was not represented as a forerunner. The inspiration of these researchers was derived from (modern) social and economic sciences and not from antiquity. In antiquity all that was written about the influence of social and economic data was mostly too theoretical to be of any importance to the practical work of the historian, or it was limited to one or two observations about a restricted problem in a restricted period. Aristotle is a case in point here, and some data from Xenophon can illustrate it⁷⁴.

On the basis of the foregoing treatment of Thucydides' *Archaeology*, it is my intention to emphasize that a similar development can be traced concerning 'progress'. Thucydides does indeed give some examples of the improvement in the relationship between the human race and its environment, but these remarks are merely used as background for his main purpose, which was the exposition of the development of 'power'. It is therefore understandable that Lovejoy and Boas should have paid little attention to his work in general⁷⁵. One of the texts in G. H. Hildebrand's revised edition of F. J. Teggart, *The Idea of Progress* (1949), is taken from the *Archaeology*, but the great champions of Thucydides as a proponent of the idea of progress are Mme de Romilly and E. R. Dodds⁷⁶. A single quotation from Dodds is probably sufficient to illustrate their point of view: "Thucydides saw the past history of Greece as pursuing a gradual upward course"⁷⁷. Others must

⁷³ Ch. XIII, 1 and XV, 1, are, in my opinion, most conspicuous.

⁷⁴ M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, London 1973, Ch. I: 'The Ancients and their Economy', is revealing in this respect. And in the whole book Thucydides is not mentioned, which is not surprising.

⁷⁵ Which has implicitly been blamed by Mme de Romilly, *op. cit.* 159, note 69.

⁷⁶ J. de Romilly in *Annali Pisa*, 1966, already mentioned (note 47), and E. R. Dodds in *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, Oxford, 1973. See also L. Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity*, 1967, 31 e.a.

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, 12.

judge between these words and my treatment. I must confess that I cannot find in Thucydides what Dodds states here in general terms.

Ever since the middle of the 19th century, there have been constant efforts to discover in antiquity certain ideas which are to be found in modern thinking. Best known among such efforts are studies on ancient 'communism' and 'socialism', on 'nationalism' and 'capitalism'. The dangers created by the use of modern terms in connection with antiquity are also well known. It seems, therefore, that the historian need not be apprehensive of such dangers if he heeds the warning against such rash application of modern terminology. Clear and exact definitions can prevent both abuse and error. Besides all else, the use of modern definitions can give the impression that one has discovered a phenomenon which bears some *prima facie* likeness to what might only seem to be similar occurrences. So much depends upon the definitions used to describe the phenomena from the various different periods or cultures. The abuse of terms remains a real danger⁷⁸. From our explorations of the Idea of Progress we can say that even as early as the early 'classical' period of 5th century Greece, two ideas about human existence were current. The oldest idea originates with Hesiod—the different ages from gold to iron: this concept is the more usual one⁷⁹. It is the 'way down'. Parallel with it runs a 'way up', especially through technical achievement. The way up can perhaps be seen in the work of Protagoras and certainly in the work of Critias, and possibly again in Anaxagoras⁸⁰. At the

⁷⁸ There is a nice lemma in Hans Lamer's *Wörterbuch der Antike*, *viz.* 'auch schon' (= 'too'). "Did the Greeks possess this too?" said of technical inventions.

⁷⁹ J.-P. Vernant, in: *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris 1965) pp. 19–47; and: *Le Mythe hésiodique des races*, *Revue de philologie* 3d. ser., 40 (1966), most ingeniously argues that the myth of the five races is not chronological. I find his two arguments very weak. For all modern interpreters the heroic race is a mystery, both structurally and chronologically. But that is not the point. The ages follow a line of decline. "The opening of the Works and Days contains one of the most famous of primitivistic tales" (M. I. Finley, *The use and abuse of history* (1975), 16): "Each race of men is destroyed and replaced by a new generation" (Finley, *loc. cit.*). But this cannot be explained as a fresh start with hope for the future (as in Vernant's "structure" theory). Neither can Hesiod's lament: "I would I were not among the men of the fifth generation, but either had died before or been born afterwards" (lines 174–5) suggest a better future. It only contains the lament of a man in trouble: "Life can not be worse than it is now". Indeed, as Finley puts it, "Hesiod was not historically minded". When he uses this very true observation to explain the heroic age, injected between the bronze and the iron—which is "patchwork, unavoidable because the heroes were too deeply fixed in the (Greek) mind" (the four metallic ages being oriental), and very convincingly argues that Hesiod is not historically minded, the same argument has to be applied as far as lines 174–5 are concerned.

⁸⁰ Plato, *Prot.* 320 c ff.; Critias, *Sisyphus* (D.K. 88, fr. 25); Anax. (D.K. 59, fr. 21^b).

base of this concept is a theory about the origins of the *Kosmos* created out of four 'elements', water being the lowest, and fire the highest. The mixture of the four elements created life on earth, and life also in the form of its lowest and highest orders: plants, animals, men. In the beginning human life was un-ordered and 'beastlike', but man developed from a lower order to a higher one, and this was due to his gradual acquisition of power over dead vegetable and animal matter. For these ideas, however, I would avoid the term 'Enlightenment'. At best one may put these two developments, "the way up" and "the way down", next to each other without any conclusion whatsoever.

The important question is, however, whether the way up is a continuous process which might be called progress. We have seen that this is not so. The next question to be asked was whether Thucydides, in his history, proclaimed some sort of progress. An analysis of the 'Archaeology' in Book I showed us that this also was not the case.

Generally speaking, it remains very frustrating and unsatisfactory that the opinions of so many of the modern interpreters differ so widely; for this reason it might be worthwhile to explore further the points which appear to be arguable. With this purpose in mind I shall take Mme de Romilly's study, not to emphasize my disagreements with her, but to enable me to do justice to one of the most respected of modern scholars, and one to whom I owe so much for my own interpretation of Thucydides. After all there seems to be much common ground. There is no doubt at all that the tragedians spoke about the conquests of civilization, but even the most optimistic of them has a habit of adhering to Hesiod's Ages of Man. This very habit renders their words inconclusive where the idea of progress is concerned.⁸¹

Even less convincing are passages from the *Corpus Hippocraticum* — as far as they originate from the fifth century B.C. — when mention is made of the new discoveries in the field of medicine. This is one of the most debatable points. Today, too, the finest experts in the field of medicine who are well versed in the survey of all the recent achievements in their profession are frequently sceptical about such claims of progress. Although their achievements are impressive, they do not subscribe to an 'idea of progress'. The same attitude can be found in treatises from antiquity. Mme de Romilly is fully aware of this when she concludes from a survey of various ancient texts:

⁸¹ See *Miscellanea*, 25.

"Tout ceci permet d'établir de façon certaine l'existence d'un courant de pensée et d'une mode. Sans doute est-il un peu abusif de dire qu'il s'agit du progrès, car beaucoup de ces textes évoquent les diverses inventions faites sans les situer dans une suite chronologique".

All these passages bear testimony to the fact that man is aware of different stages in his life, that periods of happiness follow periods of sorrow and that periods of prosperity follow periods of hardship.

The development of man himself is no less important than the gradations in the 'elements' and in animal and vegetable life. There is no need to follow up Mme de Romilly's lucid exposition on this point. What she has to say about Protagoras and Democritus⁸² does not touch upon our controversy as a whole. The concept of *usus* (*χρεία*) is important. The means of coping with the problems of survival are always created by need. And need stimulates the powers of invention. Thus Plato depicts the origin of cities as the result of *χρεία*.

After this point of general agreement, however, the argument produces a springboard to conclusions which are difficult to endorse. Undoubtedly it is true that man is weak, but it is also true that he is an inventive creature and that his astuteness allows him to find a way out of his misery. Taking this as a fact, Romilly's conclusion runs as follows: (i) "la *χρεία*, seul agent du progrès"; (ii) "le plus beau des paradoxes humains — celui qui lie faiblesse et grandeur de l'homme, et qui devait connaître un tel rayonnement — est donc né dans la Grèce du V^e siècle et il porte le marque de cette origine"⁸³. In the first instance, "the birth of the most beautiful human paradox" was not of Greek origin, for it was said in the psalms of Israel (Ps. 8), and I would not even be surprised to learn that Sumerian and Egyptian texts carry the same revelation. The most serious accusation which can be made of this hellenocentric view of civilization is that there is no text which has been treated by those who champion the paradox as a Greek product from which proof can be derived that it really did exist in the minds of the ancient writers. The most famous text, attributed to Democritus and preserved by Diodorus, describes the development of man and of man's environment from the very beginnings. It tells us that man learned by need to maintain himself and to

⁸² For Protagoras, see *Miscellanea* 23, for Diodorus I 8 (and its possible Democritean origin) see this study pp. 18 ff. and 50 ff.

⁸³ Romilly, *op. cit.*, 158 for conclusion ii. Conclusion i is implied in her interpretation of Diodorus I 8. For Diodorus and his source see G. Vlastos *AJPh* 67 (1946) 51–59. See p. 19 above.

prevail against the beasts. But nowhere in it can the paradox of Mme de Romilly be detected.

PROGRESS IN THUCYDIDES AGAIN

As we have already seen, in his *Archaeology*, Thucydides deals with war, commerce, navigation, piracy, city-walls, arms, clothing. Regarding these passages, Mme de Romilly informs us as follows:

“Dans un zèle de démonstration sans pareil il construit un système cohérent, entièrement destiné à mettre en lumière l’existence du progrès, tel que le décrivaient les auteurs alors en vogue”⁸⁴.

It is true that Thucydides says (and it was also said by others before him) that in the beginning the Greeks lived as (some) barbarians still live. However, nowhere in the *Archaeology*⁸⁵ does he mention that man’s need drove him to develop the building of cities. It is also worthwhile to bear in mind that what is stated about the barbarians has no connection with an idea of progress as such but rather with a feeling of pride in Greek superiority. Moreover, it is true that some of the pirates acquired wealth and status and began to live a more settled life (Ch. VIII), but this can hardly be taken as a sign of general progress—and it was not the author’s intention either to show it as such. We have observed more than once that Thucydides’ originality is no proof of his confidence in scientific progress; there is mention of the improvement of war equipment and the development of technical skill, but this process is not depicted as the progress of man. Indeed there is not the slightest hint of man’s progress to be found in the text. “Unlimited progress was perhaps not a Greek notion, but unlimited progress is one of those philosophical notions which have seldom been very important to historians”⁸⁶.

Three passages which do not come from the *Archaeology* are often quoted as proof that Thucydides shared a belief in the concept of progress. These passages come from the speeches of his characters and this presents us with the wider problem of how far these represent the views of Thucydides himself⁸⁷. But then, even if we

⁸⁴ Romilly, *op. cit.*, 159. The passage has been mentioned already on p. 27, note 59. About “les auteurs alors en vogue” I cannot say one sensible word, as I do not know anything about the popularity of certain authors, and how wide their influence was. For my different opinion on the *interpretation* of fifth century sophists I refer to my contribution in *Miscellanea Kamerbeek*, 23 f.

⁸⁵ See Thuc. I 6 and 7, where founding of cities is mentioned, but without any allusion to *χρεια*.

⁸⁶ A. Momigliano, *Time in Ancient Historiography. History and Theory*, ‘Beihefte’ 6 (1966) 1–23, esp. p. 18 (=Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, Middletown 1977, 193–4).

⁸⁷ Cf. Gomme in *Commentary*, Vol. I, p. 233.

allow that the words in the three passages should be accepted as representing the views of the historian, it can be seen that none of the passages really advocates an idea of general progress. The difficult problem of the character of the speeches may therefore remain outside our discussion.

In the Corinthian speech at Sparta, before the declaration of war, the envoy says to the Spartans:

"At the present time your whole way of life is out of date when compared with theirs (i.e. of the Athenians). And it is just as true in politics as it is in any art or craft: new methods must drive out old ones. When a city can live in peace and quiet, no doubt the old established ways are best: but when one is constantly being faced by new problems, one has also to be capable of approaching them in an original way. Thus Athens, because of the very variety of her experience, is a far more modern state than you are" ⁸⁸.

It stands to reason that the crucial words are: "And it is just as true in politics as it is in any art or craft: new methods must drive out old ones" or in the words of Dodd's translation: "in politics, as in any *technè*, the latest inventions always have the advantage" ⁸⁹.

The importance of the development of technical skill is obvious, but does it have any connection with an idea of progress? Dodds calls the new importance attached to the concept of *technè* "less ambiguous evidence for the 5th century faith in progress" ⁹⁰. Does this really show a faith in progress? I doubt it, even after careful digestion of Gomme's statement on Thuc. I 71. 3. On the basis of this passage he interprets Greek thought along the same lines as Dodds: "a passage to be kept in mind by those who deny the Greeks the ordinary concept of progress" ⁹¹.

I am not sure that Gomme would have been a fervent adherent of Edelstein (who quotes this passage) or an adversary of J. B. Bury. I doubt whether "the ordinary concept of progress" is the same as faith (the word is Dodds') in progress ⁹². Because of his enthusiasm

⁸⁸ R. Warner's translation of I 71 in 'Penguin Classics', revised edition, 1972 (cf. above p. 22, note 51).

⁸⁹ Dodds, op. cit., 11.

⁹⁰ Op. cit., 11. "Less ambiguous" than the passage in Diodorus—which must be kept in mind: one of the best defenders of the ancient concept of progress hesitates to accept 'Democritus' as evidence for the fifth century (cf. p. 19 above).

⁹¹ Commentary, I, p. 232.

⁹² It is well-known, also from his Commentary, that Gomme did not hesitate to specify his opponents. On the contrary, all his studies are full of controversy, sometimes paying too much attention to the errors and follies of others, as H. T. Wade-Gery rightly pointed out in his review of *Commentary I*, JHS 77, 1949, 83–5.

Edelstein has found fellow believers everywhere in an 'oversimplification' of Thucydides' work. This tendency has been exposed in a recent article by K. von Fritz⁹³.

Is a passage such as that quoted above about "progress" evidence of a specific attitude in a specific situation, or of a general principle, a faith to which one adheres? My feeling is that the former interpretation is the better. In a different situation Cleon asserts that "a city is better off with bad laws, as long as they remain fixed, than with good laws that are constantly being altered: lack of learning combined with sound common sense is more helpful than the kind of cleverness that gets out of hand: as a general rule states are better governed by the man in the street than by intellectuals"⁹⁴. Diodotus answers this startling observation with a vigorous defence of the good counsellors who are not afraid of the terrifying methods of the opposition, and defends his case in fair argument (III 41). With regard to Cleon's statement about the laws Diodotus' reply is hardly satisfactory. It is a sad confession that the law cannot be upheld — "cities and individuals alike are by nature disposed to do wrong, and there is no law that will prevent it". He concludes that, "it is impossible (and only the most simpleminded will deny this) for human nature, when once seriously set upon a certain course, to be prevented from following that course by the force of law, or by any other means of intimidation" (III 45). J. H. Finley interprets these words as a sketch of "the evolution of law in much the same spirit as that of the tract *On Ancient Medicine*"⁹⁵.

It becomes clear that Finley sees Diodotus' pessimism about human nature as progress, and compares his attitude to that of Pericles' well-known words of the achievements of Athens. Finley maintains that the attitudes of Pericles, Diodotus and Thucydides himself (in the Archaeology) correspond exactly, and that they reflect the general sense of great contemporary progress⁹⁶. Even

⁹³ K. von Fritz, *The Influence of Ideas on Ancient Greek Historiography*, *Dictionary for the History of Ideas* (1972), p. 502. Mme de Romilly says, however: "ce passage (Thuc. I 71, 3) constitue donc un véritable manifeste du progrès", and she also speaks of "professions de foi". She returns to the same passage in her admirable little book "*La loi dans la pensée grecque des origines à Aristote*", Paris 1971, 214 ff. I agree with H. Lloyd-Jones in his criticism of her views on progress, once more expressed here. He admires the book as a whole, "whatever doubt one may feel about the pattern of Greek development which it presupposes" (JHS 93 (1973), 243-4).

⁹⁴ III 37. 3f. in the Mytilenian debate.

⁹⁵ See below p. 48 ff.

⁹⁶ J. H. Finley, *op. cit.*, 83. Cf. K. Thraede, *RAC VIII* (1972), s.v. Fortschritt, Col. 143: "Im Athen der 2. Hälfte des 5. Jh. v. C. ist, abgesehen von der allgemeinen Verbreitung teleologischer Denkweise . . ., die F. idee vernehmlich entwickelt", referring to Finley. See also above p. 20, note 45.

Romilly refuses to follow him in this respect: "The text of Diodotus is not a plea for the idea of progress"⁹⁷.

Neither, in my opinion, is the defence of military action given by Alcibiades⁹⁸: "Remember, too, that the city like everything else, will wear out of its own accord if it remains at rest, and its skill in everything will grow out of date; but in conflict it will constantly be gaining new experience and growing more used to defending itself not by speeches, but in action". Romilly says it is clear that such argument puts forward the idea of a programme. Effort is needed to acquire an advantage over your enemies: new technical developments are necessary. Imperialism is represented as being a true means for perfection ("L'imperialisme est présenté comme une vraie discipline de perfectionnement!"). According to Romilly such reasoning can only be understood properly in a world where the people are conditioned to the praise of progress, but her conclusion here does not stand up to a sober interpretation of the text. Of course it can be generally agreed that, within a state which needed to maintain its power over other states, it was necessary that people should be aware of the urgency of the development and application of methods to achieve this end successfully.

Alcibiades advocates the continuation of an aggressive policy: one has to go on, to proceed. But such forward movement cannot be identified with progress in the cultural sense, as improvement. Necessity, *anankè*, which urges on politicians and military leaders does not "preside" over progress. Necessity in this form produces merely a continuation of brute force and coercion, not "a law of evolution"⁹⁹. This last conclusion cannot be drawn from the text on which it is based and which runs as follows: "The fact is that we have reached a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got, because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others unless others are in our power"¹⁰⁰. This statement is very clear; it is comprehensible to all Athenians who had not the slightest idea of progress, let alone of a law of evolution.

The unbridgeable gap between two types of interpretation of the Archaeology and of Thucydides as a historian is marked by

⁹⁷ Romilly, *Ann. Pisa* 1966, 172.

⁹⁸ Thuc. VI 18, 6-7; cf. Romilly *op. cit.*, 173.

⁹⁹ The French words are remarkable: *L'ἀνάγκη* qui préside si souvent au progrès se retrouve donc ici (in Alcibiades' words), muée en une contrainte continue (and that may be true) et en une loi d'évolution (and that is certainly untrue).

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. VI 18.3.

two well known works. These are the book by K. von Fritz on Greek Historiography (1967) and the book of J. H. Finley on Thucydides which appeared twenty-five years earlier. The view of von Fritz, as we have seen, connects the 'scientific historian' with the beginnings of geography, and the development of the sciences. The speculative idea of progress is not used as a basis for his interpretation of the Archaeology, and I think his perspective in this is right. In this respect one can only praise the wisdom and insight of Lovejoy-Boas when they omitted Thucydides from their *Primitivism in Antiquity* (1935). Hildebrand no more than added to the deplorably confused ideas about progress in antiquity by including part of the Archaeology in the scanty collection of Greek texts in his work *The Idea of Progress* (1949). In the foregoing pages we have given a survey of Thuc. I. 1-19, the Archaeology, and in many of the details we have followed von Fritz. Thus it is only fair for us to add the survey of J. H. Finley¹⁰¹, who is the champion of the viewpoint that the idea of progress occurs in Thucydides. He starts with the following translation and (or) paraphrase:

"In very early times no settled life existed. Men fought over the better land, and since it was not adequately fortified, the weak were constantly forced out. Attica, where the soil was poor, provides the exception proving the rule. For the same people were able to maintain themselves there permanently. In this purely tribal stage, there existed as yet no sense of common Greek nationality. The period came to an end only when Minos, by creating a navy, enforced the conditions of settled life. That piracy had been extremely common is shown by the fact that in Homer it involves no stigma. In western Greece, where man still carry arms, one sees a living remnant of a way of life once quite general. Indeed, it is not many generations since Athenians gave up carrying arms and assumed luxurious habits of dress and adornment. The Spartans, on the other hand, early adopted the soberer dress common at the present, as well as the fashion of exercising stripped. The earlier Greek habits in this connection more resemble the barbarian habits of the present.

With the naval domination of Minos, men were for the first time sufficiently peaceful to acquire wealth. Instead of living inland through fear of piracy, they now built walls and occupied advantageous positions by the sea. These new foundations, by fostering commerce, further raised the level of civilization, the weak meanwhile submitting to the strong, not only through force but for the sake of profit. Similar financial authority and naval power (not, as has been said, the oaths of the suitors) enabled Agamemnon later to muster the Trojan expedition. Nevertheless, from Homer's catalogue of ships it is evident that this

¹⁰¹ Op. cit., 84-87.

expedition, representing as it did the full power of Greece, fell far below the standard of the present war. (It has, indeed, been assumed from the small remains of Mycenae that Agamemnon's power must have been small, but the inference is incorrect, since the small remains of Sparta would give no indication of her actual power). The real difficulty of the Trojan expedition was the relative poverty of the times. The Greek force could not be adequately provisioned, and hence a part of it was always foraging away from Troy.

After the Trojan War fell the troubled period of invasions, followed in turn by that of colonization in Ionia and the west, and only gradually were the conditions of settled life restored. With the increase of trade, great advances were made once more, particularly at Corinth, which was very powerful commercially (the trireme was invented there). Somewhat later Samos likewise acquired naval power, and later still the Phoceans of Massilia, the Syracusans, Corcyreans, and Athenians. These successive navies continued the main source of dominion in Greece, military undertakings being for the most part brief and local. Nevertheless, even these earlier naval developments did not totally fulfil their promise, having been checked, in the case of Corinth, by the rise of the somewhat unadventurous tyrants and, in the case of Samos, by the Persians. Only in Sicily occurred any considerable development of power. Eventually, however, largely through Sparta's efforts, the strength of the tyrants was broken. (Sparta alone maintained the normal form of government continuously and owed her position to that fact). Finally, after the Persian wars, the naval state of Athens and the military state of Sparta emerged as the dominating forces in Greece. Athens created an empire and Sparta a league of oligarchic cities subordinate, if not tributary, to herself. Whether against each other or their rebellious allies, both states gained great experience in arms during the fifty years before the war".

Finley is well aware that the main conclusion to be reached is one of material progress. He says: "For him (Thucydides) power meant unification and unification, material progress"¹⁰². This is perfectly true, but he introduces his survey of the Archaeology by a summing up of Thucydides' achievements, of which the most important in his eyes is "the idea of progress to which the Archaeology gives expression". This progress is not restricted to material progress because, as he puts it, "that Athenians generally should have believed in progress through the great period of the mid-fifth century is both natural in itself and well attested by our sources"¹⁰³. He goes on to sum up passages from tragic poetry, the tract *On Ancient Medicine*, Protagoras; in short all well-known passages which do not in fact demonstrate what he is trying to convey.

¹⁰² Op. cit., 89.

¹⁰³ Both quotations from op. cit., 82.

On the other hand, his abbreviated survey of the relevant texts in the Archaeology is eminently fair and clear.

A careful reading of *On Ancient Medicine* gives no basis for such a generalized conclusion on the part of Finley¹⁰⁴. Perhaps it is this which explains his more sober conclusions (quoted above from p. 89 where he speaks only of material progress) which were made after his brief exposition of Thucydides' argument. Gomme and Mme de Romilly, Guthrie and Dodds have all shared Finley's viewpoint. Some of them shared his views completely (or went even further, as in the case of Mme de Romilly when she speaks of "laws"), while others had some doubts (like Dodds, who omitted the Archaeology from the passages he dealt with)¹⁰⁵. The German authors are even more reserved, as can be seen by von Fritz's exposition, although he gave no explicit opinion about the idea of progress in his work on Greek Historiography¹⁰⁶. H.-P. Stahl showed himself to be against the interpretation of the Archaeology as a document on the idea of progress¹⁰⁷.

This, then, is the situation as it stands at the moment, and it is far from being a satisfactory one. Our conclusion must be that so far all endeavours to make Thucydides' Archaeology a link in the chain of passages on "Progress" have failed to carry conviction. The last words of Täubler's monograph are still of great importance:

"Die Dynamis des Krieges, aus dem materiellen Trägern politischer Wirkungen entwickelt und als grösster Ausdruck dieser Wirkungen erkannt, ist der Gedanke der den Beweisgang der Archäologie beherrscht".

Täubler quotes Kant, who agreed with Hume, that the first Book of Thucydides is the only true beginning of real history¹⁰⁸.

EXPLANATION

Is there any possibility of explaining the different views on "progress"? I think there is. Undoubtedly there was material and technical progress, but I do not think it is upon this issue that the real foundation of the controversies over the question of progress rests. There is an immense difference between science and

¹⁰⁴ See for the other passages, *Miscellanea*, 17-27.

¹⁰⁵ See Dodds op. cit., 11-13.

¹⁰⁶ He actually did give his opinion in his *Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft*, Berlin 1971 (see below).

¹⁰⁷ See above, p. 22. Chr. Meier, s.v. Fortschritt in: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Stuttgart 1976, 357, is of the same opinion as Stahl: "Es gab wohl keine Verbesserung, 'die die Zeit bringt'". I have to thank H. W. Pleket, who brought Meier's remarkable survey to my attention.

¹⁰⁸ E. Täubler, *Die Archäologie des Thukydides* (Berlin 1927), 119 and Kant's statement: *Das erste Blatt von Thukydides ist der einzige Anfang aller waren Geschichte*".

philosophy. The philosopher makes general statements whilst the scientist works in a particular field. Sometimes great scientists have also been great philosophers. One of the most outstanding physicists, having the insight of both science and philosophy, maintained: "Almost every (act of) progress in science has been bought with loss. The claims of scientists to arrive at an understanding become even smaller"¹⁰⁹. This view is not a popular one. On the contrary, science maintains a pretension of being general. In philosophy different contradictory explanations of the world are offered and as a consequence the impression is given that no "progress" has been made. Because of this the positivist representatives of science think of philosophy as meaningless. It is undoubtedly true that science proceeds ever forward, discovers *new ways*, makes mistakes but corrects these and reaches conclusions which can be agreed upon by all scholars. New research is undertaken, based on the knowledge which has been generally accepted. In this respect philosophy is less fortunate, for in it there is no unchallenged progress¹¹⁰.

There is more to be said on this theme. The knowledge of the scientist can be preserved—in great store houses, as it were. This store of knowledge can be accumulated, multiplied. It can be used as an instrument for the acquisition of yet more knowledge of the subject. But what of the existence of the sort of knowledge which is not transferable; that which a person evolves for himself, thus creating his own philosophy of life, which perhaps even loses its value when transferred from one man to another by direct communication? I claim the existence of such a form of knowledge, and that philosophy comes within it and attempts to acquire insight of this type. It is certainly true that such knowledge cannot claim progress in the same way as pure science and, in my opinion, the reason is obvious. The acquisition of philosophical knowledge requires a very personal effort. *One has to appropriate it for oneself and thus to make it one's own.*

Scholars have quarrelled endlessly about the question of whether knowledge acquired by the latter method is real knowledge. In the days when biased scholars would admit only one type of science, some spoke of the 'humanistic fallacy' and others about the 'scientist's fallacy'. I feel such controversies are useless. The study

¹⁰⁹ Heisenberg: "Fast jeder Fortschritt der Naturwissenschaft ist mit einem Verzicht erkaufte worden. Die Ansprüche der Naturforscher auf ein Verständnis werden immer geringer", quoted by von Fritz, *Grundprobleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft* (1971), 5.

¹¹⁰ I think this reaction of von Fritz and others to the statement of Heisenberg is perfectly justified.

of philosophy, literature and history must take its place under the heading of "humanistic". Of course there are certain indispensable facts which come under the heading "science" and belong to the same category as the knowledge of the scientist. To illustrate this point, let us consider the fact that on 15 March 44 B.C. a man called Caesar was murdered. Scientist and historians agree on this 'fact'. When one attempts to find out more about him and the nature of his death, then one reaches a stage of what has been called "re-enactment of the past in the historian's own mind"¹¹¹. This is "humanistic".

But let us now return to our problem, "Progress in Antiquity"¹¹². We have seen that man has always considered the question of how human civilization should be estimated, whether in terms of "progress" or of "decay". These two aspects of the question comply with two natural tendencies in the human mind. Reminiscence of our childhood will invariably prompt us to see the past in beautiful colours. The hope of ameliorating the position of man, socially and politically, causes us to believe in the possibility, or even the reality, of a state of continuous progression. This belief is further supported by the undeniable existence of material progress; and material progress was the first 'fact' that the Greeks discovered. Because all new discoveries have to be paid for in some form or other, technical or material progress brought about an alienation from living nature. Thus the undeniable 'progress' in these specific domains gave rise to pessimistic views on the overall pattern of human life. In antiquity these views were paramount. The clearest expression of this can be seen in the myth of the Golden Age. The only optimistic viewpoints were those connected exclusively with technical progress as such. In more recent centuries, however, the word progress has been accorded a wider meaning and no restrictions are put upon its use. The Greeks of the 5th century (and also in later periods) saw 'progress' only as technical achievement and, seeing the possible dangers in it, had many misgivings about it. It is the difference in interpretation of the word progress which renders most studies about the Greeks anachronistic, and therefore unsatisfactory. Two sketches of the modern ideas of progress are given in the following quotations.

¹¹¹ R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford, 1946. See about this much debated book: L. O. Mink, *Mind, History and Dialectic. The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood* (1968), and by the same author 'Collingwood's Dialectic of History', *History and Theory* 7 (1968), 1-37. See also W. den Boer, *Benaderbaar Verleden*, Leiden 1952, 37 ff.

¹¹² For what follows see also von Fritz, *op. cit.*, 712, but in a slightly different form, I think, because I doubt whether he gives to progress the same limited value, *viz.* limited to technical achievements, as I do.

They could be multiplied (and varied) endlessly¹¹³, but are representative for this genre of historical thought. The first sketch is by K. von Fritz:

"In den letzten Jahrhunderten seit dem Zeitalter der sog. Aufklärung ist die optimistische Grundansicht vorherrschend gewesen und hat einerseits zu der vor allem in Amerika herrschenden Auffassung von einem immerwährenden Fortschritt der menschlichen Zivilisation in jeder Hinsicht und der Spencerschen Entwicklungstheorie geführt, andererseits in der Vision eines zukünftigen Paradieses auf Erden Ausdruck gefunden, dem naiven Traum der Sozialisten des 19. und des beginnenden 20. Jahrhunderts, der, nachdem sich die Versuche seiner konkreten Verwirklichung in den sog. sozialistischen Ländern als ein wenig unvollkommen erwiesen haben, bei den pubertären revolutionären Studenten unserer Tage in gänzlich vagen und phantastischen Gestalten wiederkehrt".

The second passage is taken from J. H. Plumbs article "The Historian's Dilemma":

"One of the most astonishing facts about the idea of progress is that it arose very late, indeed, in human history. It is a purely Western idea; neither Islam nor Classical China nor India possessed any similar concept. It began to emerge in the sixteenth century: and the writers who began to formulate it—Bodin, Bacon and their followers—gave their reasons quite simply: the discovery of the New World, the mariner's compass, the invention of printing and gunpowder—to their minds these represented a triumph over all previous ages and presaged future victories. And as might be expected, the idea of progress developed as the scientific revolution got under way. It is no accident that its complete formulation was made by the Abbé Saint-Pierre and Fontenelle, contemporaries of Newton, Boyle and Leibniz. By then, the idea of progress had come to embrace not only the idea of man securing control over his material environment through the application of his reason, but also predicated moral and social progress. The golden age no longer belonged to the past; it was projected into the future".

I feel bound to say that I endorse von Fritz's sketch, and that one correction seems to be necessary concerning Plumb's text. He forgets to mention technical progress, something which man was aware of even before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Greeks also were aware of it.

¹¹³ E.g. M. Isnardi Parente, *Techne, Momenti del pensiero greco da Platone ad Epicuro*, Firenze 1966; G. Cambiano, *Platone e le tecniche*, Torino 1971. For the following quotations cf. K. von Fritz, *op. cit.*, 712–3, and *Crisis in the Humanities*, Hammondsworth 1964, pp. 34–5, a volume of papers written by different scholars, of which Plumb himself is the editor.

The treatise *On Ancient Medicine* which I think must have dated from the fifth century—the latest datings of modern scholars are not convincing—deals with innovations in diet and describes the gradual improvement of foods.

From the translated text, given in full here, only the passages which are in italics are given special attention:

Ch. III. For the art of medicine would never have been discovered to begin with, nor would any medical research have been conducted—for there would have been no need for medicine—if sick men had profited by the same mode of living and regimen as the food, drink and mode of living of men in health, and if there had been no other things for the sick better than these. But the fact is that sheer necessity has caused men to seek and to find medicine, because sick men did not, and do not, profit by the same regimen as do men in health. To trace the matter yet further back, I hold that not even the mode of living and nourishment enjoyed at the present time by men in health could have been discovered, had a man been satisfied with the same food and drink as satisfy an ox, a horse, and every animal save man, for example the products of the earth—fruits, wood and grass. For on these they are nourished, grow, and live without pain, having no need at all of any other kind of living. Yet I am of opinion that to begin with man also used this sort of nourishment. *Our present ways of living have, I think, been discovered and elaborated during a long period of time.* For many and terrible were the sufferings of men from strong and brutish living when they partook of crude foods, uncompounded and possessing great powers—the same in fact as men would suffer at the present day, falling into violent pains and diseases quickly followed by death. Formerly indeed they probably suffered less, because they were used to it, but they suffered severely even then. The majority naturally perished, having too weak a constitution, while the stronger resisted longer, just as at the present times some men easily deal with strong foods, while others do so only with many severe pains. For this reason the ancients too seem to me to have sought for nourishment that harmonised with their constitution, and to have discovered that which we use now. So from wheat, after steeping it, winnowing, grinding and sifting, kneading, baking, they produced bread and from barley they produced cake. *Experimenting with food they boiled or baked, after mixing, many other things, combining the strong and uncompounded with the weaker components so as to adapt all to the constitution and power of man, thinking that from foods which, being too strong, the human constitution cannot assimilate when eaten, will come pain, disease, and death, while from such as*

can be assimilated will come nourishment, growth and health. To this discovery and research what juster or more appropriate name could be given than medicine, seeing that it has been discovered with a view to the health, saving and nourishment of man, in the place of that mode of living from which came the pain, disease and death?"

(It is curious to note that the role of women as cooks seems to have been non-existent). The writer claims the glory for having produced better foods on behalf of medical science and its practitioners, the founders of the art of medicine. The words "elaborated through a long period of time" have been interpreted as "progress"; I shall not raise an objection against the use of this word, if explained as the briefest indication for improvements which are unequivocally profitable. His experience made him sceptical about the innovations of many of his medical contemporaries. His attitude is ambivalent ¹¹⁴.

Dodds includes the author of the essay *On Ancient Medicine* among those who "have an explicit faith in the future as well as pride in the past". The anonymous author, however, does not speak about civilization as such; and his words cannot be generalized as progress, only as a development in human achievement, in his own (medical) profession. I believe it is in this light that we should read his assertion: "Many splendid medical discoveries have been made over the years, and the rest will be discovered if a competent man, familiar with past findings, takes them as a basis for his inquiries".

Another point which is quite often put forward by Dodds and others in favour of 'progress' is the fact that the Greek writer makes it clear "that progress of medicine is for him neither accidental nor god-given, it is the fruit of cumulative observation". "In the same spirit", Dodds continues, "another possibly fifth century essay, that *On the Art of Medicine*, declares: 'To make new discoveries of a useful kind, or to perfect what is still only half worked out, is the ambition and the task of intelligence' ¹¹⁵. Here we have a good example of the anachronistic attitude to which I have repeatedly referred throughout this study: A medical man with pride in his profession could, because of its influence in

¹¹⁴ On Ancient Medicine III, translated by W. H. S. Jones, Hippocrates, Loeb Class. Libr., London 1923, I, p. 17-21; cf. Guthrie op. cit., 96; Mme de Romilly op. cit., 147; cf. 165: "une belle confiance dans le progrès scientifique, comparable à celle dont l'Ancienne Médecine se fait volontiers l'écho". See also Lovejoy-Boas, op. cit., 203-4 and p. 7 above.

¹¹⁵ Dodds op. cit., 11 f.; the passage from *Vet. med.* (1.570 ff. Littré, ch. 2, 12, 14; from *de arte* 6.2. ff. Littré, ch. 1).

the past, judge that medicine would have a task in the future. One might well ask: why modern scholars credit this doctor's attitude with a surplus-value, which cannot be found in the text: a speculation about the growth of his profession from the past to the future, in a society taking the same path? The answer is, that some of us find it difficult to imagine it possible to have an optimistic attitude about the developments of one's own profession, without having a background in philosophical thought. In my opinion, the author is writing of the genesis of medicine – of single final discoveries, some already made, some to be made hereafter, part of a better future.

But what of the idea of the sufficiency of the human mind and the deliberate omission of the god? Is this perhaps a deadly blow for my viewpoint? I think not! I am prepared to maintain that the ancient doctors of the fifth century, by secularizing their 'art' and freeing it from the religious practices of 'medicine men' and from the influence of the 'women's quarters', did not think of this expulsion of superstitions as part of a progressive programme nor of themselves as executives of such a programme, having written 'progress' on the banner they carried. In other words, the gods were not driven out in the name of progress. On the contrary, defence could be made of the view that the gods were introduced to encourage human society to observe law and order. This was what Critias did, although he also made no connection between his views on the origin of religion and the idea of progress. Nevertheless his poor opinion of human behaviour in the matter of religion might be used as a basis for those who saw religion as a good means of keeping the masses quiet and governable ¹¹⁶.

I shall not stress this point, but I wish to lay stress on the anachronism in the viewpoint of those who see the decline of religion in a modern civilization as a sign of progress, and who take the same view of the decline of religion in civilizations of Antiquity (which it is their right to do, even if it is not a very scholarly observation). More serious, however, is their inclination to apply their own viewpoint to the remote past in such a way that the man of the past is turned into the atheist or agnostic of the nineteenth or twentieth century A.D. This goes too far, and seems to me a distortion of the historical evidence.

On pages 18 ff. we saw that the development of civilization as portrayed by Diodorus is sometimes ascribed to Democritus, but that it is doubtful if we can credit him with the authorship ¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁶ Critias, D-K.⁶, 88,25 (see above p. 35).

¹¹⁷ See above all, Vlastos in the article quoted on p. 19. Von Fritz,

One remarkable part of the theory demands our attention once again. That is the notion that man became inventive through *need*, and was compelled to be inventive because of the force of circumstances. So progress (that is technical progress) was stimulated and created by *χρεία*, need.

When, however, civilization reaches a certain level of comfort and when the stimulus of need disappears, the result is often that man will relax his efforts, live in idleness, and lead an unproductive life which will cause illness and disease. So a period of prosperity is often followed by a period of decline because *ἀνάγκη*, the motivating force of a need to progress, has disappeared. A period of decline of this sort will always be followed by a fresh process of improvement when need enters the picture once again to force man to 'progress'. This is one possible way of combining the conflicting tendencies of the ideas of progress and of decline: alternatively there are particular periods when these phenomena can be distinguished.

There is yet another possibility, an alternative to the theory of need. This possibility is already known from antiquity. According to this view all civilization develops in cycles which are identical to each other. It is a theory inspired by animal and vegetable life which depicts the process of civilization as moving from embryonic life, through childhood, to maturity—with its relative perfection and completeness; a period of ageing then begins which generally cripples movement, until finally old age sets in. Civilization fades and finally dies, but whilst this cycle continues there are new cycles beginning, and these pass by in a never ending succession.

The difference between these two viewpoints is that the latter is of a rather more fatalistic character¹¹⁸ and does not require *χρεία* (need) as First Mover. It is possible to have another source of impulse. It is also a plausible suggestion that Democritus and his successors saw the human intellect as just such a motivating power towards prolonging the period of completion which is reached in maturity, the continuation of which is highly desirable. There are no means, however, of preventing the process of ageing and dying, although both can be delayed for some time by certain effective means.

That need and cycle can be taken together in a mixed theory need not occupy us here. Such a combination of both theories can be found in Polybius, and naturally it would be interesting to make a comparison of the ideas of von Fritz and the opinions of

op. cit., 713: "Gewisse Schüler oder Enkelschüler Demokrits—vielleicht bis zu einem gewissen Grade schon Demokrit selbst, obwohl sich das nicht mehr im einzeln nachweisen lässt".

¹¹⁸ See von Fritz op. cit., 713–714 whom sometimes I follow closely.

F. W. Walbank about this historian—especially those advanced in the latter's Sather lectures ¹¹⁹.

But I prefer to return to the historian whose Archaeology has occupied us so far in this paper, and to investigate what stand Thucydides takes on this problem. Does he base his reconstruction of the past on need or on cycles? Both are to be found in his work. The first view (need) is repeatedly stated (see p. 19, p. 37, and p. 41 above) and to my knowledge there is no disagreement on this ¹²⁰. The cyclical view of history is quite a different subject, however.

THUCYDIDES AND THE "CYCLICAL VIEW" OF HISTORY

It requires no little courage to treat this subject, especially when one supports a less popular view. J. H. Finley is among those who have recognised Thucydides as an adherent of the cyclical view of history: "When he (Thucydides) states . . . that his work will be valuable to future generations because history repeats itself, it is clear that he finally adopted a cyclical view of history very similar to Plato's ¹²¹.

We can omit Plato and concentrate on Thucydides. Since the publication of Finley's book I have read only authors whose opinions differ from his. Some of these authors mention him by name, A. W. Gomme, F. Vittinghoff, Mme J. de Romilly, C. G. Starr, E. R. Dodds, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix ¹²². It is small wonder therefore that according to some scholars the whole question of the problem of cyclical history has been quite definitely expelled from the discussion on Thucydides, and even, in a manner of speaking, banished from the very annals of ancient history as such. "No notice need be taken of the notion that the Greeks had a "cyclic" view of history" ¹²³.

Let us venture into the problem once again, starting from the

¹¹⁹ Polybius (1972); for a survey of this book, also on the matter of cycles and need, see my review in T.v.G. 87 (1974), 464–6.

¹²⁰ In the form of necessity (*anankè*), which is inseparable from need, there is no practical difference between "need" and the "necessity" to fulfil the need.

¹²¹ J. H. Finley, Thucydides, Cambridge Mass. 1942, 83.

¹²² Gomme, Commentary *ad* I 22,4 and III 82; see also Index to Commentary vol. III, s.v. "concept of history", where one finds references to all the passages in which Gomme dealt with the subject in his Commentary; Vittinghoff, *Zum geschichtlichen Selbstverständnis der Spätantike*, Hist. Zeitschr. 198 (1964), 529–574; de Romilly, *Annali Pisa* 1966, 177; Starr, *The awakening of the Greek historical spirit*, New York 1968, 10, 139; Dodds *op. cit.*, 6 ff.; de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London 1972, 32.

¹²³ L. G. Patterson, *God and History in Early Christian Thought*, London 1967, 156.

crucial passage of Thucydides which is the starting point of the whole controversy (I 22.4).

"It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being as it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same way, be repeated in the future. My work is not designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever" (trans: Rex Warner).

The most recent scholarly paraphrase I have been able to come by does not differ very much from this one:

"It will be sufficient if my work is judged useful by those who wish to examine the clear truth both about what is to be at some time in the future and will, as long as the nature of man remains the same, be the same or similar" (G. E. M. de Ste. Croix).

The most debatable words are *kata to anthroponon*. The two translations do not differ very much, the less so since the latter author suggests that we have a right to infer, that Thucydides felt human nature would not change much in the foreseeable future¹²⁴.

It is useful to compare a statement¹²⁵ on revolution with the foregoing passage: "In the various cities these revolutions were the cause of many calamities, as happens and always will happen while human nature is what it is, though there may be different degrees of savagery, and, as different circumstances arise, the general rules will admit some variety" (transl. Warner). This passage indicates clearly that Thucydides makes allowance for differences. In his mind what will happen in the future will not necessarily be an identical copy of what happened in the past. What will occur later, however, will contain elements of past history which are recognisable because of the very fact that they have occurred previously. It is because of this possibility of recognition that man can take advantage of his knowledge of the past. This *method* of combining analogies and similarities on the one side (*toiauta kai paraplèsia*) and also the lack of identical situations is expressed very well in the passage quoted above (Thuc. I 22,4).

It would indeed be a misconception to conclude from the text that Thucydides expected the future to be a duplication of the past. On this issue I agree with the Ste. Croix when he says: "Thucydides, of course, was not such a fool as to think that 'history repeats itself'"¹²⁶, and also with Dodds, that Thucydides'

¹²⁴ G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, op. cit., 31-2 and 12, note 20.

¹²⁵ Thuc. III 82, 2.

¹²⁶ Op. cit., 32.

expectation of recurrence is not based on cosmic cycles but on the permanence of the irrational and unteachable elements in human nature¹²⁷. Nevertheless, the recurrence of past events, modified according to circumstances but essentially the same, was a part of Thucydides' convictions. I cannot understand why the stress on this similarity of behaviour patterns cannot be termed "history repeats itself". No historian of modern or ancient times would claim that events are exact duplications of past events. Even Aristotle made no such claims, when half a century after Thucydides, he argued that, in dating the Trojan War one might as well count from a new Trojan War in the future, back to the present, as count forward from the Trojan War of the past¹²⁸. Although the taking of such a course presents the opportunity of showing the future as having been identical to the past, Aristotle does not draw such a conclusion-or at least he does not declare it. Aristotle's very silence on this question could be interpreted as a claim in favour of the subtlety of an expectation of recurrence on the part of Thucydides. He does not label future events with names from the past, as for instance 'the Trojan War'¹²⁹. Thucydides saw features of events which were similar and which resembled past events. For him this was an incentive for historical study. No modern adherent of a cyclical view of history has preached duplication, only similarity. I do not see why Thucydides should escape the description of being "a historian seeing history repeat itself"¹³⁰. In the same light it would be equally unfair to accuse a modern historian who educates his pupils on the basis that "history does not repeat itself" of being blind to the analogies and similarities in the patterns of human behaviour throughout the different periods of the past. In my opinion every historian must accept the "*toiauta kai paraplèsia*" of Thucydides: things are repeated in the future in much the same ways. It is possible to be an adherent of "cyclical history" in metaphorical terms without believing in actual circles.

The translation of *toiauta kai paraplèsia* is essential to the argument. It does not say that things occur in the same way; the future events are not identical, not *ta auta*, but *toiauta*. That similar

¹²⁷ Op. cit., 12.

¹²⁸ Aristotle, Probl. XVII, 3 (916a, 19-39).

¹²⁹ Though it is possible to do this in a harmless way, as Winston Churchill did in his "Modern Armageddon". This tactic was used merely to characterise the all-embracing Second World War; it was only a figure of speech inspired by the Book of Revelation.

¹³⁰ I worked this out in *Gestalten der Geschiedenis*, 1977², 45-47. Cf. the essay "Geschiedenis en toekomst" (=History and Future) in: *Tussen kade en schip* (1957) 168 ff.; 174 ff.

situations imply an ever recurring return of comparable – though not the same – events is practically certain, because it is, as we have seen, highly improbable that Thucydides expected any change in human nature. The sufferings of revolution (III 82) are a good illustration of what the author had in mind. Revolutions have occurred, and always will occur – to a greater or lesser degree – so long as the nature of mankind remains the same. In no way is uniformity implied, let alone identity of situation. The author's inference was an eternal return of the phenomenon, revolution as such: *toiauton kai paraplèsion* ¹³¹.

It must be made perfectly clear that Thucydides does not 'teach' a fatalistic circular course of events, neither does he support a theory (popular since modern positivism), that history is only exclusively 'einmalig'. The latter view has been attributed to him by nearly all modern scholars. H.-P. Stahl, however, is more cautious and is in my opinion right to point out "wiederkehrende Strukturmomente des Geschehens" ¹³². This almost concurs with the "patterns of behaviour" of de Ste. Croix. I fail to understand how, whilst recognizing these patterns which are part of the historical process, the British scholar accepts on the one hand that Thucydides states "these patterns are likely to be repeated", and, on the other, simultaneously maintains "history repeats itself" as the viewpoint of "fools".

I must emphasize once again that the slogan "history repeats itself" should not be taken as a "confession" by those who see in history repetitions of *identical* processes. I have never yet met any historian who accepts literally that history repeats itself. Could it be that these accusations are the products of the imagination of those scholars who try to deny the idea of 'recurrence' in Thucydides' work? If this is so, and I fancy it is so, then their controversy has little chance of success and is no more than tilting at windmills.

The words *homoios* and *paraplèsios* must be studied carefully, and as a starting point we can use the following passage from Diogenes of Apollonia.

¹³¹ I have to confess that on this point I disagree with A. Momigliano's brilliant essay, *Time in Ancient Historiography, History and Theory*, 'Beiheft' 6 (1966), 11 and 12 (= *Studies in Ancient and Modern Historiography*, Middletown, 1977, 187). First of all he translates *toiauta* as 'in the same way' and holds that the author vaguely suggests that the future events are identical. In my view neither can be found in I 22,4. This seems to bring me close to Mme de Romilly and others (mentioned p. 52). But the agreement is only marginal. The point at issue is that Momigliano says "no eternal return is implied". Here while most of the scholars mentioned agree with him, I must claim the right to differ in one essential point. The return does not imply identical situations.

¹³² H.-P. Stahl, op. cit., 128 ff.

Diels-Kranz⁶ 64B5 17: ὅμοιον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ θερμὸν οὐδενὸς τῶν ζώων ἐστίν (ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλήλοις), ἀλλὰ διαφέρει μέγα μὲν οὐ, ἀλλ' ὥστε παραπλήσια εἶναι. οὐ μέντοι ἀτρεκέως γε ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οἷον τε γενέσθαι τῶν ἑτεροειδῶν ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, πρὶν τὸ αὐτὸ γένηται.

German scholars give slightly different translations of this passage: "Gleich ist aber diese Wärme [der Luft and der Sonne] bei keinem der Lebewesen (da sie auch bei den Menschen untereinander nicht ist), sondern sie ist verschieden, nicht sehr, sondern so dass sie ähnlich bleiben. Aber freilich ganz genau kann kein *Ding*, das der Veränderung unterworfen ist, dem anderen ähnlich werden, ohne geradezu dasselbe zu werden" (Diels-Kranz).

The better translation of the last sentence is that of K. von Fritz¹³³. "...kein der Veränderung unterworfenen Ding einem anderen *ganz ähnlich* werden kann, ohne mit ihm identisch (τὸ αὐτό) τὸ αὐτό) zu werden". The difference between the two translations lies in the words ἀτρεκέως γε ὅμοιον. There is a closer connection between these two words in von Fritz's translation; ὅμοιον alone would be the equivalent of "similar", but Diels translates the words as an equivalent of παραπλήσιος (ähnlich).

The word παραπλήσιος does not appear in the quotation of the text by von Fritz, so I am unable to compare the two translations of the word by these two German scholars. I must stipulate, however, that παραπλήσιος is less akin to 'an identity': it presupposes two different things, "about as large", "about as warm" etc.

In my opinion, the importance of Thuc. I 22 is that neither (ἀτρεκέως) ὅμοια nor τὰ αὐτά is used. So a complete identity of two events is not presupposed. Thucydides bases his statement on the *similarities* in human behaviour (κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον). One says: "this is such as", or "such like" (= τοιοῦτον), one can also say, "this almost resembles", "there are about as many as". In this context, and only in this context, one can say that history repeats itself. Because of his pessimistic evaluation of man, Thucydides did not expect to escape such 'repetition'. What is usually termed 'cyclical history' is no more than this. I fail to see the harm of claiming Thucydides as belonging to the group of historians who detect similarities. That he belongs in this group cannot be denied. But to associate him with the opposing group (those who insist that history does not repeat itself) is, according to some other authors, to invent a species of historian who worked with (identical) cosmic circles, whereupon they triumphantly state that Thucydides did not belong with these. My question is, who *does* belong with

¹³³ R.E. s.v. Xenophanes (1967) (II 18, Col. 1550).

them? As yet I have found no-one. "I cannot foresee history ever becoming (and I add: having been) a science of the permanent"¹³⁴.

It is obvious why so many modern historians try to find the idea of progress in Thucydides' work, even though it simply does not exist in the way they claim that it does. It is obvious, too, why they refuse to detect in the same author the view that history repeats itself (for this can be seen clearly in both I. 22.4 and in III 82.2). They have been blinkered by almost two centuries of dealing with the Greeks, and especially Greek writers, as if they were the offspring of Enlightenment and rationalism¹³⁵.

It is this blindness which prevents them from accepting what is so clear to others, and forces them to seek a rational idea where there is none to be found. It would certainly be worthwhile to make a study of the learned commentaries, on the sources of Greek culture which have been made over the last one hundred and fifty years. Such a study would enable us to discern this phenomenon which has so often given us a false impression of the Greeks and of their civilization, communities, way of life and of their thinking.*

SUMMARY

The diffusion of 'the idea of progress' in antiquity (in the fifth century B.C.) was limited. There was praise of material progress – and of progress in *σοφία* too, although applied to craftsmanship only. Thucydides is talking about the generation of power, not about progress. 'Hippocrates' is speaking of a once-for-all acquisition of sufficient medical skill, not of always-improving medical research.

¹³⁴ The quotation is from A. Momigliano, *Historicism revisited*, Mededelingen der Kon. Ned. Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.R. Deel 37, 1974, No. 3, p. 7 (=Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, Middletown, 1977, 369).

¹³⁵ Even Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational* (1951), shows this predilection for the rational elements in Greek culture. Even more does his *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (1965) bear testimony to his preference. This attitude can be better understood since his autobiography *Missing Persons* (1977) shed light upon his personality.

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ADDENDUM

In Thucydides' *Archaeology* there is a very strong element of tradition, stronger than would be conceded by those scholars who make him champion of progress. The most conspicuous argument is to be found in his main chronological pattern, that of genealogical chronology. Three explicit determinations in time, in the matter of isolated data, are of particular importance.

1. XII. The Boeotians settled in what is now known as Boeotia, sixty years after the fall of Troy. The Heraclidae made themselves masters of the Peloponnese twenty years later, that is eighty years after the expedition to Troy. 'Eighty years' reveal a genealogy of 40 years per generation in accordance with the later lists of the Spartan kings. According to another genealogical pattern 'sixty years' make two generations, each having thirty years. Both systems are well known from antiquity¹³⁶. Thucydides found these patterns of time-reckoning in the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, and we know well enough how he tried to correct the deficiencies of the system; but it was a system he could not avoid¹³⁷.

2. XIII. Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright (only mentioned here) went to Samos and built four ships for the Samians. This occurred 300 years (=10 generations) before the end of the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides adds that the first naval battle on record was that between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, about 260 years before his time. Taking the 30 years system as a standard measure of a generation, 300 years cannot be reconciled with 260 years, nor can it be reached by means of any of the other systems of counting by generations¹³⁸. We must assume therefore that it was a subtraction of 40 years from the 300 which led to the conclusion that the naval battle took place 260 years earlier. These 40 years stand for one generation. All this is testimony of the 'mixture' of different methods of genealogical chronology. The most famous example on record is Herodotus, who says that he counts with three generations to a century, but nevertheless applies

¹³⁶ See OCD² (1970), s.v. Time-reckoning, and my *Laconian Studies* (1954), 5-64.

¹³⁷ See *Mnem.* 20 (1967), 30-60, where relevant bibliography (especially 40-49).

¹³⁸ The other systems operate with generations of 25 or 35 or 40 years, or (Herodotus' genealogical system) three generations to a century.

the Spartan method of 40 years in his dating of Heracles and the lists of the Spartan kings¹³⁹.

3. XVIII. The Spartan constitution went back to an early date (ca. 800 B.C.), according to Thucydides as far back as 400 years from the end of the late war (= the Peloponnesian war), that is ten generations from 404 B.C., according to the Spartan kings' lists¹⁴⁰.

4. XIII. In addition to the three chronological indices above, it seems strange and can hardly be considered to be accidental, that of all the islands conquered by Polycrates, Rheneia—which according to Thucydides was dedicated to Delian Apollo—is the only one mentioned by name¹⁴¹. Although it is only a hypothesis, with no confirmations whatsoever from any other source, there might be a connection here with a list kept in the temple of Delian Apollo. We might assume such a list of "dedications" kept in this centre of worship. At Delphi there was a list of the victors of the Pythian games which, already in the fifth century, is likely to have been kept in chronological order. We know that Aristotle scrutinized and re-arranged that list¹⁴²; it is certain that it played a rôle in the chronology of his time. One might ask whether an analogous list was also kept in the temple on Delos, but for a different purpose, that of recording "dedications" to Delian Apollo. Such a hypothesis would explain why Rheneia, one of a number of islands conquered by Polycrates, was specifically mentioned in Thucydides' sketch of that tyrant's exploits.

¹³⁹ See *Laconian Studies*, 12–25, and *Mnem.* 20 (1967), 36–38.

¹⁴⁰ See *Laconian Studies*, 83 ff. For the whole problem of genealogical time-reckoning: *Encyclopedia Brit.*, last edition (1975) s.v. Time-reckoning.

¹⁴¹ Also *Thuc.* III 104.2.

¹⁴² *Laconian Studies*, 94 ff.

