

## 12. Consultants and workplace democracy: Reproducing the relations of production?

### Abstract

Professional occupations have often been associated with an active role in maintaining status quo relationships in society and with working toward the legitimization of such elements as status, relations of production and forms of government. An intriguing question lies in examining the activity of professionals when the social structure suddenly becomes more open, change is possible and there is opportunity for transformation in social relations. When professionals act as agents of existing social structure or do they become agents of change? This paper examines the role professionals play in crisis situations vis a vis creating alternatives to the traditional capitalist organization of production. The professionals' role is considered as it involves consultation with clients who when faced with economic crises and significant organizational decisions begin to explore alternative firm structures and practices. In this case, workers facing closure of their work organizations consider worker ownership in order to save their jobs. After reviewing research on professionals' relationship with the State and elite social classes as well as studies of professional relations with clients, the paper sketches the theoretical models of Habermas and Foucault to describe professional activity with respect to communication and interaction with client groups. Cases are presented as examples of professional activity in the face of critical opportunities to transform social structures, and discussion centers upon the creation of categories legiti-

ating actions and structures under changing conditions.

### Professionals and existing social relations

A wide range of professions have been examined with respect to their reinforcement of existing social structures particularly regarding the legitimization and reinforcement of relationships. For example, academics in the middle ages engaged in mutually supportive relationships with public authorities of emerging cities (Le Goff, 1980). Accountants act as gatekeepers of capitalist ideology and legitimating agents of existing socio-economic arrangements (Montagna, 1986). Accounting systems have grown hand in hand with capitalism. Capital, as a distinct category, did not exist before the double entry bookkeeping system came into being (Sombart in Carruthers and Espeland, 1991). American lawyers maintain close relations with political and economic elites (Haber, 1991; Heinz and Laumann, 1978). The rapid expansion in law firms' size has been explained by growing interdependence between lawyers and large corporate clients (Galanter and Palay, 1991; Waters, 1992).

Christopher Lasch elaborates these issues in his *Culture of Narcissism* (1979) in arguing: '...the way in which professionals construe and discharge their responsibilities naturally reflects the social surroundings in which they operate'.

He continues later (1979:394): 'The new professionals share so many characteristics with the managers of industry, that the professional elite must be regarded not as an independent class but as a branch of modern management'.

Lasch ultimately asserts that escape from the dominance of professional knowledge and status can only come with the assertion of control by client groups (1979).

This literature on the relations between professionals and the existing social order leads to the general proposition that because professionals have mutually supportive relations with the established social structure, alternatives to the existing structures appear as a threat. So long as we assume a unified view within a pro-

fession, a more specific proposition seem warranted: (1) professionals hold a conservative role, supporting the existing order, when interacting with clients in crisis situations.

The limiting condition on proposition 1 is that professions are not monolithic both because of differences in the clients served, and because there are often competing paradigms guiding the evaluation and use of available techniques, knowledge and practices. Each profession is fragmented or stratified by interest groups (with respect to engineers see Layton, 1976; accountants see Montagna, 1986; lawyers see Abbott, 1988).

As Heinz and Laumann (1978) and Abbott (1988) pointed out, the stratification of lawyers is based on the different clientele the professionals serve. Montagna (1986) identified two competing paradigms within accounting; the dominant is labeled the private value paradigm, and the second, the social value paradigm. The latter also contains a radical subgroup holding – the ‘political economy’ theory. This position identifies its clients differently from the private value and the social value views. While both private value and social value use utilitarian rationality, and are characterized as positivist in quantifying human behavior, the radical political theory gives attention to social interaction in evaluating usage of resources. Radical accountants, according to Montagna, are more likely to support workers participation movements than accountants from the private value school of thought. A professional’s role in a crisis situation would depend on the paradigm to which he subscribes.

The existence of differentiation among professional practitioners leads to a second proposition modifying proposition 1. (2) The manner in which professionals apply their techniques, knowledge and practices will vary based on ideological paradigm differences among practitioners within a field. This proposition means that professionals with a practice paradigm valuing change or opposition to established social relations *may* use their knowledge to help transform social relations under some conditions rather than reinforce them.

## Professional-client relations

The literature on professions deals extensively with professional-client relations. Forsyth and Danisiewicz (1985) divided the early writings on professionalism into two schools of thought, process (see Wilensky, 1964) and trait (see Goode, 1969). These scholars within these approaches acknowledge the authority held by professionals over clients, but do not emphasize its negative implications.

An alternative or power approach emerged in the 1970’s (Forsyth and Danisiewicz, 1985). Writers within this school of thought question the legitimacy of the power exercised by professionals over their clients (Johnson, 1972; Freidson, 1970; Friedson, 1973). Power oriented scholars emphasize the control mechanisms professionals hold over their relations with clients (Friedson, 1973; Stern and Becker, 1973; Montagna, 1986).

These scholars offer two models of professional-client relations, a non-expressive model and an expressive one. The first is best articulated in the work of Foucault (1976). For him, the professional discourse is the structure through which knowledge is transformed into power, and power in turn generates new professional knowledge. A discourse, claims Foucault (1976), has gatekeepers, legitimate subjects, authorized participants and rules of expression. The mentally-ill are the subjects, or clients, of the psychiatric discourse. As clients, mentally ill individuals are not legitimate participants in the professional discourse, and have no way of expressing their needs without adapting a terminology that is used to classify them as sick (Foucault, 1976). Moreover, the professionals themselves are subjects of the discourse, and must obey its rules.

The second model within the power approach is the expressive model. This model is best articulated in the concepts of ‘communicative action’<sup>1</sup> (Habermas, 1970; Habermas, 1975). The expressive model suggests that under special conditions, power can be drawn out of

<sup>1</sup> For an Example of an implementation of Habermas’s theory on relations between professionals and clients, see Forester, 1989.

the discourse. Habermas defined ideology as distorted communication, thus paving the way to ideal type concepts such as the creation of a 'democratic dialogue' (Gustavsen, 1992). According to the expressive model, clients can resist the power exercised by professionals. For example, the student revolt of the 1960's has been characterized as action at least partially taken against the professional dominance of academics (Wenger, 1976).

Habermas and Foucault's 'ideal type' models, could be described as standing at opposing ends of a continuum. Stern and Becker (1973) offered a possible description of the continuum by arguing that, 'Any occupation which allows its client to impose his own judgements rather than to insist that the practitioner decide the client's needs will be unable to maintain the structural and attitudinal criteria of a profession'.

The location of a specific profession on this continuum is determined by the degree to which it controls its discourse with its clients. In this way, the psychiatric discourse is an extreme example of full control held by a professional group over its clients<sup>2</sup>. In other cases, such as that of organizational consultants, the control over the discourse is very limited (Becker and Stern, 1973). Professional consultants attempt to structure their interaction with clients in ways which will permit them to control the process and successfully close the consulting transaction. Successful closure implies not only control over the diagnosis but the ability to recommend solutions without being held responsible for implementation failures.

Professional groups can lose their full control over their discourse with clients and thus move towards the expressive model on the continuum. A good example is the case of lawyers, in which, 'The authority of professionals in relationships with clients has been undermined by weakening of previous sources of legitimacy. The narrowing of the competence gap and the routinization of knowledge have placed limits

on claims to superior expertise' (Rothman, 1984).

We might conceptualize the problem in terms of Habermas' idea (1984) of the ideal speech act which he also calls the discourse. The ideal communication contains validity claims by the parties which include four characteristics: truthfulness, legitimacy, sincerity (1984) and comprehensibility (1975). That is, each participant claims her communication states something which is true, in the appropriate context, is really meant and is ordinarily clear and coherent (Forester, 1983). In the democratic dialogue each party can adequately check or evaluate the claims of the other.

An example of the difficulty in escaping distorted communication lies in the manner professionals interpret and define a situation based on client descriptions or professional assessment and then translate that problem into something other than plain language.

McKnight's critique (1977) of professional behavior argues that the language of modernized professional services mystifies both problem and solution so that citizen evaluation becomes impossible. The only people 'competent' to decide whether the servicing process has any merit are professional peers, each affirming the basic assumptions of the other. The client is unable to check the validity of the consultant's claims without the assistance of another professional, perhaps one with a different paradigm for thinking about professional practice or by becoming technically expert in the professional's area.

These literatures suggest that professionals will attempt to be responsive to client requests and work to facilitate their interests. However, they will do so as they interpret the clients needs in terms and with practices which are familiar to their profession. In the empirical descriptions which follow, professionals were hired by workers. The literature on clients-professional relations lead us to a third hypothesis: (3) The closer a profession comes to an expressive model of professional-client relations, the more the practitioner will adapt to new clients, facilitate clients requests, and thus become change agents. Lawyers are seen as coming closer to the expressive form of relations with

<sup>2</sup> To learn more about the fundamentally different models and levels of analysis Foucault and Habermas offer, see their analysis of the psychiatric discourse (Foucault, 1976 and Habermas, 1970).

clients than are accountants. The limiting condition here however, is that the professionals will be bound by their existing knowledge and practice. Thus, they may, even unconsciously, provide advice which reinforces existing social relations. Some condition must change, perhaps through social invention (Whyte, 1982) to facilitate the creation of new forms of organization structure.

The cases which follow provide data about the interaction between professionals and workers who hire them as consultants. We have suggested three operational hypotheses stemming from a general proposition based on existing literature. The first hypothesis argued that lawyers and accountants would resist workers attempts to gain control over their work places because of their close relations with the establishment. The second argued that a professional, such as an accountant, would act according to the paradigm to which she belongs within a profession. Third, a profession such as lawyers, that loses some control over the discourse with clients, and holds an expressive model of relations with clients as a result, would adapt to the new clientele and thus facilitate its request.

### **Worker ownership-worker control and third party consultants**

Cases of worker ownership began to reemerge in the U.S. in the mid 1970's as a result of the economic decline of firms. Threats of closure, particularly for subsidiaries of conglomerate organizations captured newspaper headlines as workers and communities made decisions to attempt to purchase threatened factories to avoid local economic catastrophes. Though these cases ultimately represented only 1% of the worker ownership cases in the U.S. (Blasi, 1988) they were highly significant first for being the forerunners of a larger scale movement toward worker stock ownership and second for raising the opportunity to transform traditional management controlled firms to worker controlled ones. However, the vast majority of these cases ultimately looked much like conventional firms with the singular difference that

substantial proportions of stock were held by employees. Further, the first generation of these cases were structured to produce far lower levels of worker participation in decision-making than were later cases.

When facing severe economic threats while possessing very limited knowledge of the financial mechanisms needed to purchase a firm, worker groups often turned for help to outside professionals, particularly lawyers and accountants who served as consultants, occasionally without charge (Stern and Hammer, 1978). Client groups consisted of workers and managers who presented two fundamental goals to consultants. The first was to save employee jobs by purchasing the factory and keeping it open. The second was to provide greater levels of worker (owner) input into decision-making as workers had not only been excluded from decision-making but also held images of owners as decision makers. Such images proved to be unrealistic particularly with regard to worker competence in making managerial decisions, but were strongly held while only weakly articulated in the earliest cases.

Consultants who joined these purchase efforts often had experience with corporate financing, formulated proposals to potential funders or held connections to those with financing experience and resources. They had little or no experience with forms of worker ownership and even less familiarity with corporate forms associated with high levels of worker control. Further, the idea of worker control seemed to question the conventional political organization of firms. For example, union officers and consulting lawyers from a threatened International Paper Co. plant traveled to Cornell University to receive advice from academics on the issues surrounding buy-outs and worker control over decisions. After some time in a large group meeting discussing the importance of employee control and participation in decision-making, the group's lawyer turned on one of the senior academics and shouted, 'We're here to save jobs. What your suggesting is socialism or communism.' The suggestion of worker control was dismissed with an emotional and ideological label.

Most consultants lacked tools to structure

worker control into the new firm in currently institutionally acceptable ways. They acted primarily on the task they understood, first defining the problem as organizing the financial arrangements, and second structuring the organization in ways which they believed would make lenders more likely to provide capital. Solutions often relied upon hiring financial consultants to evaluate the corporation and statements to assure the continuation of competent management. The cases examined suggest that by concentrating on saving jobs through legitimated organization structures, the control question was pushed aside until the capital was secured. Once funding was in place, structures which permitted worker control or even innovative forms of participation were either precluded by previous decisions or came to be ignored by reemployed workers enthusiastic at having overcome the odds and purchased their company.

The following descriptions illustrate that the initial cases were characterized by great uncertainty about how to proceed. Neither the employees nor the consultants had developed competence to deal with the idea of worker participation embedded in the idea of worker ownership. Those consultants who participated in the earliest cases were frequently engaged in other cases which followed and often tried to duplicate previous strategies. The result was a reasonable success rate in completing firm purchases and very little success at establishing structures for worker owner participation in decisions, let alone control.

*The first generation: Buyouts, consultants and firm control structures*

Though the legal mechanism of tax advantage Employee Stock Ownership Plans was established by 1974, the first real instances of its use in employee buyouts were not until three years later. In 1977, Cornell researchers followed a news report to Herkimer, New York where a library furniture factory had been purchased by a combination of worker, community, government and bank financing. In exchange for documents and interview material on the entire process, the academic researchers agreed to

take calls from other groups seeking help in community/employee firm buyouts. Thus, the academic researchers became information conduits and in effect consultants in order to carry out research on the newly emerging phenomena. In this particular case, there were no initial concerns with creating structures of worker control, but executives instituted conventional mechanisms such as suggestion boxes. Union officials did not articulate demands for participation in decision-making but expressed the expectation that now that they were owners, managers would have to listen to them.

The accountant used to establish financial structure in this case was soon involved in another buyout case. He was retained as a consultant by D. . . the president of what would become Saratoga Knitting Mill. When D. . . set up an open door policy to permit worker participation, he simultaneously told employees that the accountant, Mr. K. . . made it clear that there would have to be a conventional hierarchical management structure in order to give confidence to bankers and assure the lending of needed capital. D. . . who did not create structures of participation, when presenting his successful buyout story at a university commented that 'the monkeys own the factory.' Other 1970's generation cases such as South Bend Lathe and Okonite were created without mechanisms of participation for worker owners. Only the Vermont Asbestos Mine attempted some form of structural change by appointing a union officer to the board of directors. However, the union official was not permitted to communicate any information from board meetings to other employees if the material pertained to labor process or bargaining issues.

In observing the fortunes of these companies to the end of the 70's, an increasing level of manifested conflicts became evident. We at first called this the end of the honeymoon period (Stern and Hammer, 1978); Whyte characterized the 70's cases as having no interest in worker participation or control issues (1987). In retrospect, the academic researchers probably miss diagnosed the events of the time. The clients (worker groups) had not had the capability of articulating their desire for structurally guaranteed forms of influence. They believed in



an American myth that ownership meant control. Weakly stated beliefs that worker owners would be listened to were easily ignored in the pressure cooker situations which developed and which demanded swift action to save threatened plants. The consultants addressed the buyout demand and were as unable as they were unwilling to deal with control issues. The primary rationale was that lenders would see unconventional control structures as threats to firm financial stability and withhold needed capital.

At the Vermont Asbestos Mine, the worker owners sold their shares to a local entrepreneur for 40 times their original investment because management was seen as completely unresponsive to workers as owners. Substantial quality improvements at Saratoga Knitting and the Library Bureau soon disappeared as workers came to see that what they had purchased was their jobs and not operations level participation rights. Library Bureau workers soon discovered that voting and managing stock to change corporate directors or policies was well beyond their existing competence as well as the knowledge of their union officials. Most dramatic was the Wall Street Journal headline and picture of South Bend Lathe workers picketing outside their plant. The story was captioned 'Workers Strike Against Themselves.' In that case, the strike was nominally over wages because participation rights are not a legal mandatory subject of bargaining in the US and therefore not a legal basis for striking. Interviews with workers made clear that the fundamental conflict was over participation in firm policy making and operations. The clients were in clear conflict with the organizations created on the advice of consultants to these first generation cases.

The rash of conflicts produced two effects. Worker groups seeking to buy threatened plants began to articulate control issues on an equal basis with the purchases themselves. Consultants committed to establishing participation arrived on the scene creating often intense conflicts with consultants holding the conventional buy first, participate later paradigm. The new consultants brought with them new social inventions – structures designed to

provide guaranteed participation within a capitalist framework of business.

*The second generation: To participate or not to participate, that is the question?*

The first generation was transformed by the accumulation of information in the hands of researchers, consultants and worker groups, who witnessed some success in employee buy-outs as a job saving strategy, but convulsive struggles within firms following the successful purchase attempts. A pool of lawyers, accountants and academics with experience had developed. However, the professionals began to be divided over the status of participation as an equal or primary concern relative to financing versus those who held to the financing first perspective. The paradigm differences produced conflicts among professionals and within client groups. Ultimately, the conflict may have been quieted by the institutionalization of the ESOP form of stock ownership. Its legitimation by the legal and accounting professions as well as the US Federal government produced a mechanism through which employee owned stock could be used either as a mechanism for democratically structured worker influence or a tool for continued management control. ESOP flexibility gave professional consultants the tools to respond to client demands without needing to invoke the threat of institutional rejection. Table 1 compares the characteristics of first and second generation consultants.

In 1980, Hammer and Stern began a study of firms which were attempting to place worker representatives on corporate boards of directors. (See Hammer, Stern and Currall, 1991). On arriving at the Rath Packing Company in Waterloo Iowa, the union vice president discussed the difficulty he faced in convincing his executive board that worker control of the company was imperative to prevent the conflict he had read about at other worker owned firms. He asked that we convince the board of the necessity of establishing union control. As researchers on a project, not consultants, we took the initial position that making this advocacy argument would be inappropriate for us. Again we were confronted with the issue of trading

data for services. We decided that we could give the executive board a research presentation on what had occurred at the other six or seven cases we had studied. Of course, the content of that research included the conflicts which erupted over the control issue. Two days later, we received a call indicating that control was now being given equal status with the purchase itself and inviting Professor Hammer to serve on the new board of directors.

In the Hyatt-Clark Industries case, an organizational psychologist with a strong commitment to worker control became a consultant to the union officers. He had experience in the Rath case and ultimately came to sit on the corporate board representing the union. The new CEO of the firm was a lawyer who had been the consultant and chief architect of a successful employee buyout at the Okonite Company. Okonite was structured with completely non-voting stock and Rath was organized with union control. Each consultant represented a different perspective on how to manage a corporation. The CEO for example, insisted on no voting rights on the stock by arguing that banks insisted on management control of the firm. The union also had a lawyer, Mr. L who along with the professor of organizational psychology, came to play crucial roles in the next case to appear. The CEO retained the Arthur D. Little group to carry out the economic feasibility study.

Two years later, in 1982, the Atlas Chain Co. buyout began. Mr. L. was retained as advisor to the union local though the union hired a leading Philadelphia law firm to structure the buyout. The professor of organizational psychology became an informal advisor. The union also hired an organization, Philadelphia Area Cooperative Enterprise (PACE) to structure the Employee Stock Ownership Plan. PACE had gained experience and reputation through work on a worker buyout of grocery stores from the A & P chain in Philadelphia. Arthur D. Little was again hired for the economic feasibility study.

The assortment of consultants highlights two critical issues. 1) The group consists largely of those with experience in previous cases. 2) The group is decidedly oriented toward worker cli-

ent interests in structured participation. However, there were shades of difference. Mr. L the primary advisor held participation on equal footing with finance, but felt that financing had to be arranged first. His strategy was to solicit assistance from banks, political officials and government agencies. PACE was firmly committed to a democratic participation first position. Conflicts developed within the process over priorities, but the tasks were divisible in such a way that progress could be made on all fronts simultaneously. The flexibility of the ESOP mechanism and its institutional acceptability made the creation of democratic participation no longer threatening to established norms, relations of production or expectations of resource holders.

The ensuing history of these firms varied with respect to economic performance and labor management conflict. Many of them failed economically, while others have persisted in altered form. However, the focus of this paper, the activity of professionals in consultant roles held a prominent position on the cases.

This subset of examples is taken to be representative of scenes repeated in other parts of the US with regard to employee ownership. Consultants tended to be called upon in multiple situations, experience grew and alternative firm structures appeared. However, even the democratically structured ESOPs were a far cry from truly transformed relations of production. Rather a participatory modification had taken place, change created and the new forms of democratically controlled stock institutionalized within the established structure. The powerful constraints of social structure slowed the change process; professionals acting as consultants were probably not the primary agents of the only moderate change, but they acted in ways which greatly influenced the actions of worker groups.

### **Conclusions: Professional practice and social change**

The initial argument here was that professions develop within a given social structure and therefore reflect the existing relations of that

structure in their professional practice and knowledge. The Foucault position describes both professionals and clients as inextricably caught within the professional discourse, and leaves little room for changes in professional-client relations. But change does occur. When professional practice is confronted with issues unfamiliar to its techniques and knowledge or by clients who on following the professionals best practice advice fail to obtain their goals, the discourse may be opened. The Habermas model provides a better description of the circumstance in which the professional learns to deal competently with a new situation. However, unlike the expressive model prediction, change was contingent upon an adaptation process within and between professional discourses (like law and accounting), while power relations between professionals and clients were not altered.

The conservative bias of professional practice stemming from its embeddedness in the social structure is evident here in the diagnosis and solutions proposed by consultants in the first generation of US employee buyout cases. However, professionals did not intentionally thwart the wishes of worker (or worker/manager) client groups. Rather they defined situations as well as they were able in the context of the social structure within which they practiced.

Because professionals failed to address some client defined needs and then saw failures in cases in which their advice was followed, fractionation appeared within the community of practice. Practitioners with a democratic participation paradigm accumulated knowledge from previous cases of consulting failure and developed solutions to the defined need. Some practitioners, particularly lawyers worked on developing a legal device which would resolve the problem in an institutionally acceptable way. Accountants cooperated in the development because tax incentives to establish ESOPs were included. Other practitioners, confronted those with a negative or indifferent position on participation. The result was a broadening of both professional practice and control structures within firms. Ironically, some evidence exists that the 'evil bankers' who were charac-

Table 1. Characteristics of Consultants

First Generation	Second Generation
1. Financial concerns	1. Financial and control issues
2. No previous knowledge	2. Experience with previous cases
3. No interest in participation	3. Participation as requirement
4. Limited professional skills and techniques	4. Competing techniques within the profession

terized as demanding conventional management structures had very little concern about who controlled corporate stock (NCEO, 1985). The picture we have painted does not argue that professionals are inherently agents of the dominant social structure but are surely products of it. They demonstrate enormous levels of autonomy when they are able to make adjustments within their professional discourse without losing status and control relative to clients. In this particular case social learning appears to have taken place, followed by confrontation between established and more innovative ways of thinking. Professional practice gained the competence and tools it lacked at the start of this particular wave of buyouts. Though there was little movement to transform relations of production, there was small change within capitalist practice to open the door to worker influence in policy decisions. The greatest change which resulted was the development of the Employee Stock Ownership Plan as a financing and corporate restructuring tool. The options available to structure employee owners voting rights made ESOPs appealing to a wide range of corporate purposes. Employee ownership through ESOPs has currently stabilized in the U.S. at approximately 10,000 firms including about 20% of publicly traded companies (NCEO, 1994).

References

Abbott, D.A. *The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.  
 Blasi, J. *Employee ownership: Revolution or rip-*



- off? Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishers, 1988.
- Carruthers, G.B. and N.W. Espeland. Accounting for rationality: Double-entry bookkeeping and the rhetoric of economic rationality. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 97, No. 1, pp. 31–69, 1991.
- Forester, J. Critical theory and organizational analysis in Gareth Morgan (Ed.), *Beyond method: Strategies for social research*, Sage Publications, 1983.
- Forsyth, B.P. and J.T. Danisiewicz. Towards a theory of professionalization. *Work and Occupations*, 12, No. 1 (February), 59–76, 1985.
- Foucault. (First published 1965). *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.
- Foucault. *The order of things: An archeology of the human sciences*. New York: Vintage Books, 1973.
- Freidson, E. *Profession of medicine: A study of the sociology of applied knowledge*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
- Friedson, E. Professions and the occupational principle. In E. Freidson (Ed.), *The professions and their prospects*. California, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.
- Galanter, M. and T. Palay. Tournament of lawyers: The transformation of the big law firm. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Goode, W.J. The theoretical limits of professionalization. In A. Etzioni (Ed.), *The semi-professions and their organization*. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
- Gustavsen, B. *Dialogue and development*. Stockholm: The Swedish Center of Working Life, 1992.
- Haber, S. *The quest for authority and honor in the American professions, 1750–1900*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Habermas, J.U. *Toward a rational society*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
- Habermas, J.U. *Theory and practice*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Habermas, J.U. The theory of communicative action: Volume One and the *Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
- Hammer, T.H., Currall, S. and R.N. Stern. Worker representation on boards of directors: A study of competing roles. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 44 (July), 661–680, 1991.
- Heinz, P.J. and O.E. Laumann. The legal profession: Client interests, professional roles and social hierarchies. *Michigan Law Review*, 76, 1111–1142, 1978.
- Johnson, T.J. *Professions and power*. London: Macmillan, 1972.
- Lasch, C. *The culture of narcissism*. New York: Warner Books, 1979.
- Layton, T.E. Jr. *The revolt of the engineers: Social responsibility and the American engineering profession*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Le Goff, J. *Time, work and culture in the middle ages*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- McKnight. Professionalized service and disabling help. In I. Illich (Ed.), *Disabling professions*. London: Marion Boyars, 69–91, 1977.
- Montagna, P. Accounting rationality and financial legitimation. *Theory and Society*, 15, 103–138, 1986.
- National Center for Employee Ownership. Attitudes and practices of bankers toward employee stock ownership plans. *Research papers in employee ownership*, 1985.
- National Center for Employee Ownership. Is the slowdown in ESOPs long term?, *Employee Ownership Report*, 14 (Jan/Feb): 1, 1994.
- Rothman, A.R. Deprofessionalization: The case of law in America. *Work and Occupations*, 11, No. 2 (May), 183–206, 1984.
- Stern, R.N. and M.T. Becker. The effects of task environments on strategies for controlling clients. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 16, No. 4 (October), 477–493, 1973.
- Wenger, M.G. The case of academia: Demythologization in a nonprofession. In J. Gerstl and G. Jacobs (Eds.), *Professions for the people: The politics of skill*. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1976.
- Whyte, W.F. Social inventions for solving human problems. *American Sociological Review*, 47, No. 1 (February), 1–13, 1982.

Robert N. Stern is a professor in the department of Organizational Behavior, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

Asaf Darr is a graduate student in the department of Organizational Behavior, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.