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Lucretius and the Unconscious

Lucretius has often been interpreted in isolation from his intellectual context and viewed as a disciple of Epicurus who was uninfluenced by other thinkers. While a plausible case can perhaps be made that Lucretius was acquainted with many aspects of the *Bildungsgut* of antiquity, some scholars have removed him from his historical setting in a different way — by making him a forerunner of late 19th and 20th century intellectual developments. One example of this has been the recent efforts to identify in Lucretius a notion of the psychoanalytic unconscious.[1] On closer examination, however, these attempts can be shown to be anachronistic interpretations which assimilate *De rerum natura* to our contemporary intellectual concerns — or so we would like to argue, as part of the project of restoring Lucretius to his proper intellectual background.

As a way into the general problem of the unconscious in Lucretius, it might be helpful to begin with a passage from the prologue of *DRN* III which has been taken as a paradigm of Epicurean diagnosis and therapy and which, it is sometimes claimed, crucially relies on a notion of the unconscious. Lucretius is here describing the fear of death (III.38-58):

funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo
omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam
esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.
nam quod saepe homines morbos magis esse timendos
infamemque ferunt vitam quam Tartara leti
et se scire animi naturam sanguinis esse
aut etiam venti, si fert ita forte voluntas,
nec prorsum quicquam nostrae rationis egere,
hinc licet advertas animum magis omnia laudis
iactari causa quam quod res ipsa probetur.
extorres idem patria longeque fugati
conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi,
omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt,
et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant
et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu' divis
inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis
acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.
quo magis in dubiis hominem spectare periclis
convenit adversisque in rebus noscere qui sit;

[1] On the question of how to determine the age of psychoanalysis, see J. Derrida: 'My Chances/Mes Chances: A Rendez-vous with some Epicurean Stereophonies', in: J. Smith and W. Kerrigan (edd.), *Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, and Literature* (Baltimore, 1984).

nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo
eliciuntur <et> eripitur persona, manet res.

According to Martha Nussbaum,[2] for example, Lucretius is offering part of a general symptomology of the fear of death — that is, he is bringing together a collection of destructive outward behaviors and showing how they are caused by an unacknowledged fear hidden from the agent and thus unconscious. It is part of the central task of Epicurean therapy, so the argument goes, to make such unconscious fears manifest and to get people to acknowledge their power. In times of crisis, those who usually deny that they fear death, or that this fear plays a large role in their lives, can be brought to see its destructiveness and to acknowledge it; and this is crucial to their overall cure. Nussbaum reads the end of this passage as an illustration of this therapeutic moment, in which individuals drop their habitual defenses and their 'true voices' (the *verae voces* in line 57) are allowed to be heard.[3]

While the images of words of truth arising from the heart and the removal of a mask might remind a reader of the insights and discoveries of a psychoanalytic cure, it is far from clear that any notion of the unconscious is at work in this passage. Lines 45 and 46 suggest that the avowed denials of fearing death are really only displays of bravado — boasts which quickly break down in tough situations. Such people, it seems, simply are being hypocritical; they claim not to fear death in order to win praise for their courage, but in tough circumstances turn out to be cowards.[4]

More charitably, they may be unafraid while making their claims, and simply ignorant of how they will react in future adversity. When they are making propitiatory sacrifices to the *D. Manes*, they demonstrate their belief in some sort of conscious afterlife. This, however, conflicts with their earlier avowals, since in claiming to believe that the soul is composed of blood or air, they asserted their belief in the soul's mortality.[5] We do not need to invoke the notion of an unconscious, however, in order to explain any of these contradictions, nor does this passage provide evidence for any particular psychological innovations. From the presocratics on, it is part and parcel of the philosophical tradition to claim that our beliefs and actions are inconsistent, and that we are prone to a certain amount of hypocrisy and self-deception when we espouse half-digested philosophical theories, especially wrong ones. These characters in Lucretius are not appreciably different from, say, socratic interlocutors who also, when push comes to shove, are shown up for their various hypocrisies and self-deceptions. It might be, of course, that such discrepancies between words and actions are amenable to psychoanalytic diagnosis in terms of economies and conflicts between our unconscious and conscious life. But no such claim plays any meaningful role in Lucretius' mode of analysis or in his therapeutic methods and goals. He is merely, in the tradition of diatribe generally, pointing to inconsistencies in beliefs — or between beliefs and actions — which make one vulnerable to ridicule and censure.

[2] Nussbaum (1994) 196-201.
[3] Nussbaum (1994) 199.
[4] For an insightful reading of this passage in the context of the Epicurean analysis of irrational desire and anxiety, see Konstan (1973) 20-22.
[5] For an important discussion of this passage, see Peter Aronoff's forthcoming thesis, *Lucretius on the Fears of Death* (Cornell, 1997).

At this point, it might be worth making a more general observation. When an author is describing actions and claiming that those actions are motivated by wrong beliefs — and that people do not always know when their beliefs are wrong — there is inevitably a kind of tension between a more straightforward explanation of their behavior and a more complex one. If we were to ask one of these Lucretian characters: 'why are you pursuing money?' he might respond 'I'm trying to get money so that I can bolster my security.' It is part of Lucretius' more complex analysis to claim that the reason such a person desires security is because he fears death, though it may well be the case that particular agents who are pursuing money have not made or understood this connection between their pursuits and their fear of death. But notice, one way of capturing their lack of awareness of the role that the fear of death plays in their lives is to say that they have failed to follow out the appropriate chains of connections between their beliefs. It is not that this lack of awareness is 'unconscious' in any meaningful psychoanalytic sense, however: it is just that they have not seen or understood the connections between their beliefs. It will be useful to keep this model of 'unawareness' in play, since scholars sometimes have too quickly assimilated to a psychoanalytic model passages in Lucretius where inconsistencies in an agent's conscious beliefs are being exposed.

To illustrate this, it will be useful to look at another passage often cited as evidence for unconscious motivation (III.870-887):

870 proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum,
post mortem fore ut aut putescat corpore posto
aut flammis interfiat malisve ferarum,
scire licet non sincerum sonere atque subesse
caecum aliquem cordi stimulum, quamvis neget ipse
875 credere se quemquam sibi sensum in morte futurum.
non, ut opinor, enim dat quod promittit et unde,
nec radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit,
sed facit esse sui quiddam super inscius ipse.
vivus enim sibi cum proponit quisque futurum,
880 corpus uti volucres lacerent in morte feraeque,
ipse sui miseret; neque enim se dividit illim
nec removet satis a proiecto corpore et illum
se fingit sensuque suo contaminat adstans.
hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum
885 nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se
qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum
stansque iacentem <se> lacerari urive dolere.

At first glance, the phrase *caecum stimulum cordi* might suggest an unconscious element that a person who worries about the post-mortem fate of his body fails to acknowledge and that conflicts with his conscious avowals. Hence, some scholars take this as evidence for an unconscious fear of death.[6] Lucretius, however, explains

[6] James Jope, for example, writes that the person described in this passage 'unconsciously (*inscius*) imagines "another self"... Lucretius suggests an underlying motivation [which is] presumably the insecurity arising from ignorance of the true nature of the soul ... *caecum* emphasizes the unconscious nature of the goad' (Jope (1983) 231). Charles Segal also claims that this passage, along with others that speak of something dark and hurtful beneath the surface of behavior, indicates 'Lucretius' grasp of something that we would call the unconscious' (Segal (1990) 24). Segal, however, is not making a strong claim,

this as a common conceptual error and one that occurs in one's conscious imaging of one's own death: when thinking about one's corpse, it is all too easy to ascribe to one's body the same capacity for sensation that one has while alive. This passage thus requires no appeal to unconscious fears to explain the inconsistent beliefs of someone who fears for the fate of his body after death. While these beliefs and their conflicts are troubling, the source of their disturbance is not some psychic transaction between an agent's conscious and unconscious life.

There is an additional reason that such passages cannot be said, on any reading, to resemble a psychoanalytic theory of unconscious motivation. This reason has to do with the content of the particular motivation at issue, the fear of death. For Freud, the unconscious is the seat of our primary wishes, the region in which the pleasure principle reigns. As such, it cannot admit the idea of one's own death at all, and thus, logically, could not harbor a fear of it either. Freud makes this point repeatedly in various works,[7] perhaps most clearly in *Unser Verhältnis zum Tode*:

> We ask: how does our unconscious relate to the problem of death? The answer must be: in almost exactly the same way as primitive man. In this respect as in so many others, prehistoric man lives on unchanged in our unconscious. That is to say, our unconscious does not believe in its own death, it behaves as if it were immortal. What we call our 'unconscious', the deepest layers of the soul, which are made up of instinctual impulses, does not recognize anything negative, any negation (it collapses opposites into a unity) and therefore does not recognize our own death, to which we can give only a negative content. The belief in death thus does not correspond to anything instinctual in us.[8]

Freud acknowledged that the fear of death was a powerful emotion in many people's lives, but he had difficulty explaining it and always sought to emphasize that it could not be unconscious. At the end of the passage just quoted, for example, he writes: 'the fear of death, under whose influence we stand more frequently than we ourselves know, is, on the other hand, something secondary and usually a result of guilt feelings.'[9] The suggestion that we are frequently influenced by this fear without knowing it, which might seem to echo Lucretius, is not explained, and in his other writings on the subject he reiterates his view that the fear of death is a derivative of other conflicts and not a part of the unconscious.[10]

since he is using the term unconscious in a casual, colloquial sense: he defines it as 'a common ground connecting all the dangerous and disruptive passions' (24). This is, as our discussion will show, quite different from the psychoanalytic concept. Segal later displays an awareness of the limits of a comparison between Lucretius and psychoanalytic thinkers when he points out that Lucretius has no idea of drives or instincts and is thus more optimistic than Freud about our ability to change the way we feel and act regarding death (187).

[7] In *Die Traumdeutung* (1900), Freud discusses children's incapacity to comprehend death (Freud (1991) 261), and in *Totem und Tabu* (1912) he explains that 'primitive peoples' are similarly baffled by the concept (Freud (1982-IX) 365). The unconscious of 'civilized' adults is frequently compared to the minds of children and 'primitives' (indeed, Freud studies the latter two to learn about the former), and is said to have the same inability. (All references to Freud, except to *Die Traumdeutung*, are to the volumes of the 1982 Fischer *Studienausgabe* (Frankfurt). Translations are our own.)

[8] Freud (1982-IX) 56.

[9] Cf. Konstan (1973) 26 for an account of guilt in Lucretius which does not, however, appeal to the unconscious.

[10] In *Das Ich und das Es* (1923), as well, he writes: 'the fear of death ... presents a difficult problem for psychoanalysis, since death is an abstract concept with a negative content, for which no unconscious correlate can be found. The mechanism of the fear of death could only be that the ego to a large extent

There is one passage in *Unser Verhältnis zum Tode* which at first glance is reminiscent of *DRN* III.870 ff. Freud observes that 'one's own death is, indeed, unimaginable, and no matter how often we make the attempt, we find that we always remain on the scene as a spectator.'[11] The conclusion he draws from this, however, makes clear the difference between an Epicurean and a psychoanalytic understanding of the role of death in human psychology: 'thus in the psychoanalytic school of thought, we could venture to say: no-one truly believes in his own death, or to put it differently: in our unconscious each of us is convinced of his immortality.'[12] For Freud, our inability to visualize our own deaths is the result of an unconscious conviction which is not implied to be harmful and which, even if it were, would not be amenable to change through rational discourse alone. The latter point is one of the central tenets of psychoanalysis. Freud and his associates came to believe very early on that simply explaining symptoms to a patient was not enough to alleviate an illness. They therefore began to study the means of overcoming resistance and to explore the phenomena of transference and countertransference. While there have been a multitude of disputes about psychoanalytic techniques, anyone who believed that reason alone could cure psychical distress would not be an analyst.

For Lucretius, on the other hand, those who worry about the fate of their corpse are making a strictly conceptual error. It is his goal to make readers aware of this, thereby freeing them from the painful effects of such mistakes. While the philosopher's 'therapy' might be described, as psychoanalysis famously was, as a 'talking cure', the means by which it is to be effected is radically different from that used on the couch. Therefore, drawing parallels between the two methods, while tempting, risks obscuring both what is historically significant about psychoanalysis — namely, its focus on what it considers to be ineliminable, irrational, unconscious elements in human psychology — and Lucretius' fundamental faith in reason.

In this context, it will be useful to turn to a passage which raises with particular sharpness the question of whether Lucretius has a conception of unconscious motivation. This is the famous sketch of anxiety, unhappiness, and boredom at the end of *DRN* III which many have found so striking (*DRN* III.1053-1075):

> si possent homines, proinde ac sentire videntur
> pondus inesse animo quod se gravitate fatiget,

abandons its narcissistic libidinal cathexis, that is, gives itself up ... I believe that the fear of death comes about as part of an interaction between the ego and super-ego' (Freud (1982-III) 324). In these works, the fear of death, although it may be the result of an unconscious conflict between different psychical agencies, is a conscious symptom experienced by the patient. Freud's concept of the death drive, first formulated in *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920), does begin to call into question whether or not the unconscious can conceive of death. In this essay, Freud suggests that there may be a primary, unconscious drive toward death, which is constantly operating in tension with the sexual, creative drives. However, he repeatedly stresses the tentative and provisional nature of this concept and, as the preceding quotations from some of his post-1920 writings indicate, seems not to have incorporated it into all of his later thinking. Whatever his vacillations on the issue, the relevant point is that even in those works in which Freud does suggest that death plays a role in the unconscious, he postulates a wish for death and a drive towards it, not a fear of it. The same is true of those of his followers who accepted and elaborated upon the idea of the death drive, which has remained controversial among psychoanalytic thinkers.

[11] Freud (1982-IX) 49.

[12] Freud (1982-IX) 49.

1055 e quibus id fiat causis quoque noscere et unde
tanta mali tamquam moles in pectore constet,
haud ita vitam agerent, ut nunc plerumque videmus
quid sibi quisque velit nescire et quaerere semper
commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit.
1060 exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille,
esse domi quem pertaesumst, subitoque <revertit>,
quippe foris nilo melius qui sentiat esse.
currit agens mannos ad villam praecipitanter,
auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans;
1065 oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villae,
aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quaerit,
aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit.
hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit,
effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit
1070 propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger;
quam bene si videat, iam rebus quisque relictis
naturam primum studeat cognoscere rerum,
temporis aeterni quoniam, non unius horae,
ambigitur status, in quo sit mortalibus omnis
1075 aetas, post mortem quae restat cumque, manenda.

We jump from pursuit to pursuit, Lucretius claims, never knowing what we want (line 1058); feeling a great weight in our minds, we seek to lay it aside through constant change and novelty — but frenetic activity does not help, and we do not understand why.

How are we to understand such passages in the context of Epicurean psychology? One might say — and this is what proponents of the unconscious say — people do not know what they want, and Lucretius thinks that there is some hidden unconscious fear that is the causal source of their unhappily flitting from one unsatisfying pursuit to the next.[13] In other words, there is something motivating them, but they do not know what it is — so it must be something unconscious. However, if we say X does not know what he wants, we may mean several things. In some sense, these unhappy figures in Lucretius certainly do know what they want — they want to go to their country home, or to run back to the city. Lucretius' point, and this is a point that he obviously shares with every other Greek and Roman philosopher, is that most people do not know what they really want or what will bring them happiness. But does the mere fact that they do not understand the causes of their unhappiness and that these

[13] James Jope, for example, writes that 'this description of anxiety as a burden of the mind and the entire atmosphere of the passage are reminiscent of psychoanalysis' (cf. Jope (1983) 229) and argues that this similarity is further evidence of Lucretius' notion of unconscious motivation. Here again, the apparent affinity between the two systems of thought is misleading. While anxiety is indeed an important idea in psychoanalytic theory, Freud's views of the causes of anxiety are quite unlike those of Lucretius. For the latter, persistent anxiety is a result of an ignorance about death and a resulting fear of it. In Freud's work, anxiety, while a multifaceted concept, is usually connected with repression. In *Das Unbewußte* (1915), all repressed affects are said to be 'exchanged' for anxiety (Freud (1982-III) 138). In other works, anxiety is said to be the product of desires which have been repressed: sometimes, as in the case history of Dr. Schreber, these are sexual longings (Freud (1982-VII) 194); at other times, as in *Totem und Tabu* (1912), they are 'wishful impulses' of all kinds (Freud (1982-IX) 139). In all of these Freudian formulations, anxiety is not produced by ignorance, and knowledge is not enough to remedy it. Thus while the two thinkers may diagnose humanity's ills in a similar way, their prescriptions for cure are significantly different.

very causes can motivate their actions make these causes 'unconscious'? Precious little in this text suggests that this must be the case. First of all, there is no indication that such people do not consciously fear death. Indeed, Lucretius has just spent 200 lines detailing the various ways that people overtly complain about their impending death. Moreover, the passage itself is preceded by the claim that one should not, in Bailey's rendering, 'chafe to meet one's doom — when Epicurus himself died.'

Lucretius does not, therefore, seem to be embarked on the project of making manifest a latent fear. Rather, he seems to be assuming that people are aware of their fear of death but fail to understand how that fear can affect the rest of their lives and make them unhappy. The emphasis of his therapy is not to uncover new fears or to bring previously unacknowledged and repressed emotions into awareness, but rather to make us rationally understand the wider causal connections and power that the fear of death has, and to demonstrate why that fear is 'empty' and 'wrong'.

Another way to clarify the differences between Lucretius' psychology and one which relies on the unconscious is to look at Lucretius' explanation of dreams. The study of dreams, as is well known, was of central importance in the development of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. P.H. Schrijvers has shown that dreams also play a significant role in Lucretius' discussions of the fear of death — precisely that area in which some scholars claim to find an idea of the unconscious.[14] However, when one actually compares the two theories of dreaming, it becomes clear that they are based on fundamentally different psychological assumptions and models of mind.

Lucretius' most famous statement on dreams is at IV.962 ff. In sleep, part of the spirit is cast out of the body, and the limbs grow weak and languid. Then we begin to dream (DRN IV.962-972):

et quo quisque fere studio devinctus adhaeret
aut quibus in rebus multum sumus ante morati
atque in ea ratione fuit contenta magis mens,
in somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire;
causidici causas agere et componere leges,
induperatores pugnare et proelia obire,
nautae contractum cum ventis degere duellum
nos agere hoc autem et naturam quaerere rerum
semper et inventam patriis exponere chartis.
cetera sic studia atque artis plerumque videntur
in somnis animos hominum frustrata tenere.

This passage has lately been taken by some as additional evidence for the unconscious. Martha Nussbaum, for example, reads it as a suggestion that '[f]orms of habitual activity contain characteristic structures of pleasure and attention..., which influence thought even at the unconscious level. Thus lawyers dream of pleading cases, generals of fighting battles.'[15] She argues that this passage sets the stage for the discussion

[14] Schrijvers explains that Lucretius thinks that the appearances of the dead in dreams are among the reasons people believe in a life after death. One of Lucretius' ways of dispelling this belief and the fear of death connected to it is to show that dreams are illusions which result not from divine intervention but from natural causes (Schrijvers (1980) 137).
[15] Nussbaum (1994) 165.

of love that follows and prepares the reader 'to understand how the mythology of love that permeates his society can corrupt not just the conscious but even the unconscious life of each person.'[16] It is perhaps a measure of the influence of Freud that many readers automatically think of the unconscious when dreams are mentioned, as Nussbaum seems to have done. Although it deals with dreams, however, this passage advances a theory of the relationship between waking thought and dreaming which is at odds with any psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious.

To begin with, in Freud's account of the relationships between consciousness and the unconscious, he focusses on the particular ways in which psychic material can come to be controlled by one or the other. These are always described in dynamic, economic, and conflictual terms. Consciousness and the unconscious are not to be understood as localities, but rather as 'two kinds of processes of excitation or ways of discharging it' or alternatively, as two agencies or authorities (Instanzen).'[17] Thoughts do not move between systems; rather, 'a cathexis of energy has been transferred to or withdrawn from a mental formation, so that the psychic structure in question has come under the control of a particular agency or has been withdrawn from it ... [W]e are replacing a topographical way of representing things with a dynamic one.'[18] Most importantly, unconscious thoughts or feelings are understood to be subject to censorship, and cannot emerge into awareness except by overcoming a resistance or by taking an indirect, disguised route which evades this censorship, as in slips, jokes, and of course, dreams, the famous '*Via regia* to a knowledge of the unconscious in psychic life.'[19] While later psychoanalysts differed with Freud on many points, the ideas of conflict or struggle between conscious thought and the unconscious, the censorship that operates between them and the repression it produces are constitutive elements of any psychoanalytic discourse.

The Lucretian passage on dreaming, on the other hand, is conspicuously lacking in any suggestion of dynamism, process, conflict, or censorship. The kind of thought it describes is different from waking thought only because the senses, which are our guides to telling the true from the false, are disabled by sleep. As a result, we cannot determine which of the many images that the mind perceives are real (*DRN* IV.762-765):

> hoc ideo fieri cogit natura, quod omnes
> corporis offecti sensus per membra quiescunt
> nec possunt falsum veris convincere rebus.

In Freud's view, in contrast, the salient characteristic of sleep is not that the senses are unable to perceive outside stimuli, but that they are largely uninterested in doing so.[20] This can be seen by the fact that a sleeper may dream on through the noise of traffic or conversation, but awaken at the much quieter ring of her alarm clock or the sound of her name. Memory, moreover, performs some of its most spectacular feats in dreams: Freud cites several examples of the reproduction in dreams of information

[16] Nussbaum (1994) 166.
[17] Freud (1991) 596.
[18] Freud (1991) 596.
[19] Freud (1991) 595.
[20] Freud (1991) 68-69.

the dreamer had either long ago forgotten or had never been aware that he knew.[21] For psychoanalysts, it is not the senses or memory but rather the mind's censoring agency which becomes partially relaxed in sleep, allowing wishes, especially those that are normally forbidden entry to consciousness, to be expressed in dreams.

Although Lucretius does describe dreams involving thirst, bedwetting and orgasm which could easily be accounted for by a theory of dreams as wish-fulfillments, he never advances this explanation. In fact, these latter dreams seem not to fit the explanation given earlier of how dreams arise as a result of the mental perception of images which cannot be verified or dismissed by the senses. They nevertheless support the main point Lucretius wishes to make: namely, that dreams have natural, physical causes and are not divinely inspired.[22]

The lines that immediately follow the Lucretian passage on dreams, finally, eliminate any possibility that he is suggesting a fundamental difference between the kinds of perception and thought that people experience in sleep and when they are awake. The effects on the mind of repetition and habit which were said to be the cause of dreams are there shown to be at work in waking life as well (*DRN* IV.973-980):

et quicumque dies multos ex ordine ludis
assiduas dederunt operas, plerumque videmus,
cum iam destiterunt ea sensibus usurpare,
reliquas tamen esse vias in mente patentis,
qua possint eadem rerum simulacra venire.
per multos itaque illa dies eadem obversantur
ante oculos, etiam vigilantes ut videantur
cernere saltantis et mollia membra moventis...

Indeed, it is Lucretius' view of the similarity between waking and dreaming consciousness that Freud takes issue with in the very first chapter of *Die Traumdeutung*. Freud quotes the Lucretian passage on dreaming at IV.962 ff. in a section entitled 'The Relation of Dreams to Waking Life.' Reviewing previous writers' views on the subject, Freud cites Lucretius among those who have considered dreams a continuation of waking life, while others believed them to be an escape or departure from it.[23] Freud's own position, in contrast, is similar to that he ascribes to Hildebrandt, who observed both 'the strict separation and seclusion of dreams from real and actual life and on the other hand, their constant encroachment upon each other and their constant mutual dependence.'[24] Dreams, in other words, will always draw upon the events, images, and language of everyday life, and can invent very few elements of their own; but they give expression, however distorted, to desires that are barred from consciousness and can only emerge when the ego's defenses relax somewhat in sleep.

Thus, in the very text which provided a foundation for psychoanalysis, there is an explicit realization that Lucretian psychology is a non-starter for any analysis of

[21] Freud (1991) 30 ff.
[22] Schrijvers (1980) 149-150.
[23] Freud (1991) 26.
[24] Freud (1991) 43.

dreams, and of the mind generally, which includes the unconscious. If our general argument has been right, this should not be surprising. Key psychoanalytic notions such as repression, censorship, and conflict between conscious and unconscious agencies have no place in Lucretius. We should avoid, therefore, assimilating Epicurean therapy, which depends on a rationalist psychology, to psychoanalytic models which depend on a quite different analysis of the mind and motivation.