

The two faces of anonymity: Effects on group decision making

The Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE; Postmes, Spears & Lea, 1999; Reicher, Spears & Postmes, 1995) deals with two different aspects of anonymity. It distinguishes between the anonymity of sources (*identifiability*) on the one hand, and the anonymity of targets (*anonymity*) on the other hand. According to SIDE, the social impacts of anonymity and identifiability are governed by different processes: cognitive and strategic. The *cognitive process* occurs when a certain group identity is salient: under these conditions, anonymity may obscure intragroup differences and thereby accentuate the salience of the group identity. Thus, anonymity of ingroup members may cause stronger influence of the ingroup norm. If personal identity is salient, however anonymity is supposed to foster behavior that fulfills the need for individual distinctiveness. The *strategic aspect* of SIDE is that identifiability exposes one to a possible outgroup. If this outgroup has the power to punish undesirable behavior, people will adapt their behavior to avoid sanctions, hence comply to the outgroup's norms. This strategic conformity to the outgroup norm is most likely in situations in which no other member of the ingroup is visible or able to support the identifiable person (Spears & Lea, 1994).

As a consequence of the association of anonymity with one and identifiability with the other part of the SIDE, research until now has tended to focus on anonymity *or* identifiability. One of the few exceptions — the work of Douglas and McGarty in this volume — suggests that identifiability and anonymity can not be treated as independent from one another, because their impacts on strategic behavior were found to interact. Their study shows that identifiability of the source only has an impact if the members of the group (targets) are anonymous. If targets are non-anonymous, identifiability has no effect. These results suggest that a reconsideration of the impact of anonymity and identifiability may be in order, both with regard to their strategic and cognitive consequences. This chapter aims to examine the consequences of identifiability for the orientation to an ingroup norm in the cognitive aspect of the SIDE (for a discussion of the importance of anonymity in the strategic aspect see Douglas & McGarty, this volume).

In the remainder of this paper, I examine the paradigm that is usually employed to test the cognitive aspect of SIDE (e.g., Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 1998). A central shortcoming of the anonymity manipulations used in these studies is illustrated. An alternative procedure is adapted from research on persuasive communication, and I report a study employing this manipulation. On the basis of this initial

study, and keeping results of earlier studies in mind, I propose a refinement of the cognitive aspect of the SIDE. Finally, two experiments are reported that put these predictions to test. These studies also focus on the underlying cognitive processes—one of the major deficiencies in the research on the cognitive aspect of the SIDE (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1999).

Anonymity in Persuasive Communication

The predictions of the cognitive aspect of the SIDE have been confirmed in a number of studies: Anonymity of ingroup members causes stronger influence of the ingroup norm, if social identity is salient (e.g., Postmes et al., 1998; Postmes & Spears, 2000; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1996; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990). This process is supposed to be mediated by the salience of social categorization. The more the members of a group know of one another (i.e., the less anonymous they are), the more differences they can observe. Thus, the SIDE argues that in a non-anonymous setting the ingroup is perceived as less homogenous than in an anonymous setting, and I would add to this that anonymity should therefore increase a group's *entitativity* under these conditions (Campbell, 1958). In any case, the salience of social categorization is undermined in non-anonymous groups. However, the empirical support for this mediating process is much less clear-cut than for anonymity's impact on normative behavior (Postmes et al., 1999).

In the studies examining anonymity's cognitive consequences, anonymity was manipulated by displaying vs. not displaying pictures (e.g., Postmes et al., 1998) or biographical information (Postmes & Spears, 2000) of all ingroup members to the participants. Spears et al. (1990) used an alternative procedure: They let participants chat via computer when they were co-present in the same room (hence visible to each other) or not. In all these studies, however, anonymity and identifiability have been varied simultaneously. Participants not only saw pictures or individuating information about the ingroup members or not (a manipulation of anonymity), but also were under the impression that other group members had the same information about them (a manipulation of identifiability). Thus, the experimental investigations of the cognitive aspect of the SIDE have tended to confound anonymity and identifiability.

Research on the pure variation of anonymity has been conducted in another context. In a series of studies on persuasive communication, Wilder (1990, study 3) reports an experiment in which he varied the anonymity of targets without confounding this manipulation with identifiability of sources. The participants in this study listened to either ingroup or outgroup speakers who were either anonymous or non-anonymous to them. Anonymity of outgroup members caused the effect predicted by the cognitive aspect of the SIDE: Anonymous speakers had less persuasive impact on the participants than non-anonymous outgroup speakers. For ingroup speakers, this effect did not occur. The apparent contradiction that these findings imply for what SIDE would have predicted is partially resolved by the results of another study (Wilder, 1990, Study 4). In a replication the clustering of information in a free recall task was assessed as a measure of salience. Results showed that

salience was high when the outgroup target was anonymous, whereas salience was lower when the outgroup target was not anonymous. In contrast, anonymity had no impact on the salience of group membership of an ingroup target: Ingroup targets were individuated regardless of their anonymity. One can conclude from these results that in Wilder's studies the social identity that ingroup targets and participants shared may not have been salient — a precondition for the effect of anonymity according to the cognitive aspect of the SIDE.

In a recent study (Sassenberg, 1999a, Study 2) the effect of anonymity of the ingroup in an intergroup context was tested using a procedure similar to Wilder (1990). The main difference with Wilder's Study 3 was that participants did not listen to audio taped statements, but read them from a booklet. To constitute an intergroup context, participants were exposed to alternating statements of ingroup *and* outgroup members. Anonymity of ingroup and outgroup was varied *independently* by showing vs. not showing pictures of ingroup or respectively outgroup members next to the statements. Gender was used as a social category and therefore assessed as a third independent variable. Norms of these groups were opposite: In a pretest female and male students differed significantly in their attitude concerning nuclear power plants. Women thought that nuclear power plants should be dismantled as soon as possible, whereas men had a pro nuclear power opinions. To reinforce these norms, participants were informed about them at the beginning of the study. Afterwards they were presented with four statements from ingroup members and four from outgroup members, that conformed to the group norms. Dependent measures were agreement with statements from ingroup and outgroup members, social identification and group homogeneity. The participants' individual opinion concerning the topic was also assessed.

In an analysis based on the whole sample, neither anonymity of the outgroup nor anonymity of the ingroup affected the agreement with the statements. Unfortunately, the opinion about nuclear power plants of one third of the sample did not correspond with the assumed group norms. For these participants, the fit of the social category and the topic might have been too low. Since fit is one of the preconditions of salience (Oakes, 1987), the social identity *male* or *female* might not have been salient for a substantial proportion of the participants. A closer look at the measures of gender identification and ingroup homogeneity confirmed these assumptions: Participants whose beliefs corresponded to the assumed group norms showed higher social identification with and perceived homogeneity of the ingroup, compared with participants who did not subscribe to the ingroup norm. On the basis of these findings, we excluded participants who did not subscribe to their ingroup norm.

In the remaining sub-sample the predicted effects were found. The expected interaction between anonymity and source of statements (ingroup vs. outgroup) on agreement was found. In the anonymous condition, participants agreed significantly more with statements of ingroup members and significantly less with statements of outgroup members than the participants in the non-anonymous condition (see Figure 1). This two-way interaction was qualified by a marginally reliable three-way interaction indicating that the two-way interaction is caused mainly by the male participants. For the female participants no differences between the anonymous and the non-anony-

mous ingroup concerning the agreement with ingroup or outgroup statements were found. This gender difference may be caused by a ceiling effect. Another possible explanation is the more individualistic orientation of men compared to women in general (e.g. Cashdan, 1998).




Figure 1: Agreement with ingroup and outgroup statements by anonymity of ingroup.

In addition, a two-way interaction between anonymity of outgroup and source of statement could be found. When the outgroup was anonymous, participants agreed more with ingroup statements and less with outgroup statements, compared to when the outgroup was not anonymous.

In sum, this study extends Wilder's (1990, Study 3) findings by showing that in an intergroup context, the anonymity of the outgroup *as well as the anonymity of the ingroup* causes a stronger influence of the ingroup norm. This result is in line with the predictions of the cognitive aspect of the SIDE and corresponds with earlier studies that used a combined manipulation of anonymity and identifiability. Despite this encouraging finding, this study does not resolve the question of whether the results of the earlier studies on the cognitive aspect of SIDE are caused by anonymity or by identifiability. In order to explore this question further, it is important to take a closer look at the possibility that identifiability to the *ingroup* might affect normative behavior.

Cognitive Consequences of Anonymity and Identifiability

Work by SIDE scholars on the strategic consequences of identifiability has tended to associate identifiability *to an outgroup* with conformity to this group. By contrast, identifiability to the ingroup has been associated with decreased conformity to the outgroup due to empowerment. In addition, it has been argued that conformity occurs

primarily if the behavior is punishable by the outgroup. Non-punishable behaviors, in contrast, may be used by the ingroup to accentuate their *real* social identity, in line with ingroup norms. Indeed, several studies that examined the effects of identifiability and visibility have tended to support this analysis of strategic consequences of identifiability (Reicher et al., 1995).

The experiments of Reicher, Levine, and Gordijn (1998), who examined the effect of identifiability to the ingroup, demonstrate an interesting finding that is not directly related to the strategic aspect of the SIDE: Participants who were visible to their group showed lower identification with this ingroup. Melcher (1996) reports similar results for another identifiability manipulation: Using a bogus pipeline procedure he found lower correlations between social identification and conformity to ingroup norms in an identifiable than in a non-identifiable condition. Because sanctions did not play a role in Melcher's study, it would appear that the lower correlation between social identification and norm conformity seems to be indicative of lower social category salience rather than being a consequence of strategic behavior. Taking both results together one might infer that higher identifiability to the ingroup lowers the salience of social categorization. This might have an impact on behavior, especially if the intergroup context is not highly salient: in a similar fashion to settings where anonymity is low, identifiability of the source might undermine the perception unity within the group. More specifically, identifiability to the ingroup might individuate people because it causes an awareness of being perceptible to the other members of their group, therefore creating an interpersonal context.

Following this line of thought, one can deduce the following hypotheses for the consequences of identifiability to the ingroup:

- The higher the identifiability to the ingroup, the lower the salience of the group.
- The higher the identifiability to the ingroup, the lower the influence of ingroup norms.

Additionally, from the cognitive aspect of the SIDE model one can add:

- The higher the anonymity, the higher the salience of this group.
- The higher the anonymity, the higher the influence of ingroup norms.

These predictions were tested in a recent study (Sassenberg, 1999b, Study 1) with a two by two design, in which anonymity and identifiability were varied independently of one another. The cover story was used to make participants' social identity salient — in this case as a student of the University of Göttingen. At the same time they were informed about their group norm. This University has a rather left-wing reputation compared to other Universities. The students discussed two political items via a text based computer conference within three-person groups. A group polarization paradigm was used, and participants indicated their opinion before and after the discussion individually.

Anonymity was varied by showing vs. not showing pictures of group members to the participants. The pictures were randomly selected out of four, matched by gender. *Identifiability* was varied by taking pictures of the participants and telling them that their picture was shown to the group, versus by not taking any pictures of participants

nor showing them to the group. Participants in the identifiable condition felt subjectively more identifiable than those in the non-identifiable condition.

Dependent measures of group polarization, social identification with the university and the three-person group were assessed. In addition, the communication content was coded for violations of coherence, i.e. statements in which the topic of an ongoing discussion is changed. This kind of behavior is a successful strategy to show distinctiveness. Likewise, in a highly salient intergroup context Öhlschlegel and Piontkowsky (1997) found more violations of coherence between groups than when the intergroup context was less salient. I expected to find a similar pattern of results in an intragroup context: since distinctiveness will be sought when the salience of common group membership is low, more violations should occur between individuals. In coding for violations of coherence I followed Öhlschlegel and Piontkowsky's (1997) coding scheme, distinguishing between violations of neutral and local coherence. Violations of *neutral* coherence are statements with the same topic as the preceding statement, but which offend the preceding statement or its speaker. In contrast, violations of *local* coherence change the topic of conversation. Additionally a third category for the rest of the utterances was used.

Contrary to the expectations there was no main effect, nor an interaction, of anonymity and identifiability on the social identification measures in ANOVAS. Overall, participants showed higher identification with the University students than with the three person group. This difference vanished in the identifiable condition. This can be interpreted as weak support for the hypotheses that identifiability affects salience.

Similarly, the predictions concerning group polarization were not confirmed: There were no main effects for the independent variables, but a highly reliable interaction between anonymity and identifiability was found. Participants in the non-identifiable / anonymous condition and the identifiable / non-anonymous condition showed higher polarization than participants in the identifiable / anonymous condition and the non-identifiable / non-anonymous condition (see Figure 2). In the anonymous conditions the effect of identifiability fit the predictions. Likewise, the effect of anonymity was as predicted in the non-identifiable conditions. In the non-anonymous condition and the identifiable condition, however, the predictions for identifiability and anonymity, respectively, were contradicted.

Before examining these results more closely, it might be useful to take a look at the results of a replication (Sassenberg, 1999b, Study 2). In this replication some shortcomings of the preceding study were remedied. A first possible flaw in the original study was that, participants interacted for half an hour. As Postmes (1997, Study 3.1) reports changes of norm relevant communication behavior over time in discussion that lasts only 15 minutes, effects that arise in the discussion might interfere with the manipulations (see Schittekatte & van Hiel, 1996 for similar results). To avoid such unforeseen effects of the interaction process, in the replication no actual communication took place.

A second problem in the original experiment might have been that the experimental procedure offered participants two groups to identify with: the social category students of the University of Göttingen and the interacting three-person group. Additionally, participants identified with the student category as this categorization was




Figure 2: Group polarization towards the ingroup norm by anonymity and identifiability.

made salient, but they might have felt identifiable to the three-person group, i.e. participants were identifiable to a meaningful subgroup of their ingroup and not just to some ingroup members. This identifiability manipulation might have affected the salience of both groups in a different way than the usual manipulation of identifiability to any members of the ingroup. Thus, in the replication only identification with the local group was made possible and identifiability to this group was manipulated.

Finally, the measure of salience employed was improved. Measures of social identification are often used to measure salience, but in most of the studies examining the cognitive processes underlying SIDE effects this has been without success (e.g. Postmes et al., 1998). This might be due to the fact that social identification is not identical with salience, even if they are related. The standard measure of salience — the ‘who-said-what’ paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978) — can only be applied in an intergroup setting. Therefore an alternative measure was used in this study: In a setting with one group, it would appear that entitativity, the perception of the group as an entity instead of as a loose aggregate of individuals, might be closely related to salience.

In the replication study, anonymity and identifiability were manipulated in the same way as in the preceding experiment. The *procedure* was modified as follows: Before the decision task was presented, participants completed an estimation task with fake positive feedback at the group level to generate a salient social identity at the local level of the four-person group. Previous research has indicated that this task enhances group identification (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995). The experiment was actually run in individual sessions. After the estimation task the participants were asked to indicate their opinion about a choice dilemma questionnaire (CDQ) item (Kogan & Wallach, 1964), and to state their reasoning in one or two sentences. After a short break they received false feedback concerning the ostensible opinions of the

three other group members. The arguments and opinions suggested a (pretested) norm of caution for the group.

Dependent measures were participants' agreement with their group members, their anticipated group decision, and their impressions of the group. The latter questionnaire included items measuring social identity, personal attraction of group members, and a measure of entitativity of the group. The entitativity scale consisted of 8 items, two for each gestalt concept taken into account by Campbell (1958): proximity, similarity, common fate and good gestalt. Participants had to decide which of two pictures represented their group better. These pictures represented what could be considered as entitative or non-entitative groupings on one of the gestalt concepts mentioned above (see Figure 3 for some example items). After completing these questionnaires, participants answered one final question about their individual opinion concerning the CDQ item.




Figure 3: Sample items from entitativity questionnaire for (a) common fate, (b) proximity, and (c) good gestalt. Participants indicated to what extent one of the two figures was a good representation of their group.

Altogether there were three measures of social influence: agreement with the ingroup members' statements, the difference between first individual opinion and anticipated group decision (referred to as choice shift), and the difference between first individual opinion and second individual opinion measure (referred to as group polarization).

The findings were more or less a replication of the results of the previous study: There was no significant main effect nor interaction of anonymity and identifiability on social identification and no main effect of both independent variables on all three social influence measures. However, the interaction effect of anonymity and identifiability on social influence replicated the findings of the previous study. This interaction was significant for the agreement with the ingroup members' statements, and approached reliability for the two other social influence measures (choice shift and group polarization). In all, then, a consistent pattern emerges across two studies: When participants were not identifiable, normative social influence occurred only in the anonymous condition, not in the non-anonymous condition. Conversely, when participants were identifiable to their group, social influence appeared to be stronger in the non-anonymous condition.

The results for personal attraction and entitativity in the replication shed some light on the process underlying these findings. There was a main effect of anonymity on personal attraction and entitativity. Participants perceived their group as more of an entity in the anonymous than in the non-anonymous condition, and group members as more attractive in the non-anonymous than in the anonymous condition. Thus, perception of the group as an entity was influenced by the anonymity of ingroup members. No other effect of anonymity and identifiability on entitativity or personal attraction was found. It would therefore appear that entitativity is not a mediator between anonymity and identifiability on the one hand, and normative influence on the other. Instead, the effect of anonymity on entitativity might indicate that anonymity *moderates* the social influence process. In a highly entitative group, as in the anonymous condition, social identification should be more relevant for behavior than in a less entitative group, as in the non-anonymous condition. To examine this idea, regression analyses were computed separately for the anonymous and the non-anonymous condition. In these regressions, social identification and ingroup homogeneity were predictors of the agreement with ingroup statements. As expected, social identification and ingroup homogeneity predicted a significant amount of variance in the anonymous condition but not in the non-anonymous condition (see Table 1). Post hoc tests revealed the same pattern in the previous two studies. Thus, anonymity seems to foster social influence processes which are norm based, and social identity seems to be especially influential in anonymous groups (see also Postmes et al., 1999).

This of course raises the question of which alternative cause for social influence can be found under non-anonymous conditions. One possible cause might be personal attraction: If a person is attracted to another person, he or she might be motivated to conform to this person, as suggested by results from research on affiliation and physical attraction (for a summary see Baron, Kerr & Miller, 1992; Baron & Byrne, 1993). To test this prediction, some additional regression analysis were computed in which

Table 1 *Multiple correlations (R^2) between agreement with statements of ingroup members (dependent measure) and social identification and ingroup homogeneity (predictors) respectively. personal attraction (predictor) by anonymity condition*

	Social identification ingroup homogeneity	personal attraction
<i>anonymous</i>		
Agreement	.38*	.13
<i>non-anonymous</i>		
Agreement	.16	.15

Note *: $p < .05$

personal attraction was a predictor of social influence. However, personal attraction did not predict a significant amount of variance in either condition (see Table 1). Thus, the cause of attitude change in the non-anonymous condition remains unclear. In line with self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985) there is a further possible explanation: The low perceived entitativity and the high personal attraction might indicate that the non-anonymous condition constitutes an intragroup context. If this is true, attitude change might not have resulted from conformity to a social norm, but from the need for individual distinctiveness (for similar explanations of social influence under salient personal identity see Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Spears et al., 1990). At the same time, the group norm offers the framework within which socially relevant comparisons can be made (Turner, 1987). This could possibly explain why attitude change occurs even in the non-anonymous condition despite the apparent absence of strong self-categorization.

To test this alternative explanation, we examined the violations of coherence as described in the second study mentioned above. If the attitude change in the non-anonymous condition results from the need for distinctiveness on individual level, the proportion of violations of coherence should be positively related to the amount of attitude change. In contrast, if attitude change in the anonymous condition is caused by social influence of the ingroup norm, the highest amount of attitude change should occur in groups with comparatively few violations of coherence. In other words, because violations are a strategy to express distinctiveness, they should have the opposite effect to social identification in mediating social influence.

The results confirm the expectations (see Table 2). In anonymous conditions, there was a tendency for higher attitude change to occur in groups with a lower proportion of violations of coherence. The statistically more reliable results are found in the non-anonymous condition: More violations of local and of neutral coherence resulted in stronger attitude change. This means that the more members of a group present themselves as distinct, the more attitude change will occur as a result of their discussion. The results of this analysis indicate that in non-anonymous groups attitude change results from the need to emphasize individual distinctiveness within the

group, whereas in anonymous groups social identification forms the basis of social influence exerted by the ingroup norm.

Table 2 *Correlations (r) between attitude change toward to group norm, and violations of neutral/local coherence by anonymity*

	violations of neutral coherence	violations of local coherence
<i>anonymous</i>		
attitude change	.30	-.38+
<i>non-anonymous</i>		
attitude change	.64**	.40+

Note +: $p < .10$; **: $p < .01$

Summary and Conclusions

The main goal of the present chapter was to investigate the cognitive effects of anonymity and identifiability within the framework of SIDE. In most research, the double-faced nature of anonymity has not been acknowledged. As a consequence, studies examining the cognitive implications of anonymity and identifiability have tended to confound these variables. As a first step we focused on anonymity. In a persuasion paradigm the effect of anonymity on normative influence was tested using a manipulation of anonymity that was unconfounded with identifiability: As predicted by SIDE, anonymity of ingroup and outgroup members lead to higher agreement with the ingroup norm, and to more rejection of the outgroup norm. This result is in line with findings of earlier studies on the effect of anonymity on social influence which have used a manipulation of both anonymity and identifiability at the same time (see Postmes, Spears & Lea, 1998 for a summary).

In a second step, two further studies were conducted to test for the cognitive effects of identifiability. On the basis of findings in earlier studies of identifiability to the ingroup (Reicher et al., 1998), identifiability was expected to reduce the salience of the social category. In two studies using a group polarization paradigm it was confirmed that anonymity caused stronger social influence of an ingroup norm when participants were non-identifiable, as predicted by the SIDE. In contrast, when participants were identifiable, anonymity had the reverse effect: Participants showed more attitude change in the non-anonymous condition than in the anonymous condition. Examining the correlations between attitude change and indicators of the underlying cognitive processes add further clarity to these results. Anonymity of the group is associated with social influence as exerted by the common social identity of the group. In contrast, when the group is not anonymous attitude change seems to be caused by the need for individual distinctiveness. Thus, anonymity moderates the

processes by which social influence is exerted. In this regard, results are remarkably consistent: The different social influence processes and the differences in perceived entitativity of the ingroup consistently indicate that there is a trade-off between the salience of social identity in anonymous groups, and the salience of personal identity in non-anonymous groups. In this regard, the moderation effect is in line with the predictions of the cognitive aspect of the SIDE.

Identifiability might affect salience in a same fashion. Some empirical support for this assumption can be found in one result of the second study: Participants in the identifiable condition identified less with the social category and more with the local three-person group, compared with participants in the non-identifiable condition. If one adds to this the results of Reicher et al. (1998) and Melcher (1996), there seems to be converging evidence that identifiability to one's group may lower the salience of the social category. This is certainly an interesting possibility that would merit further research. If low anonymity and high identifiability co-occur, salience of social identity can be undermined to such an extent, that personal identity prevails. This provides the conditions for social influence that is no longer exerted by ingroup norms, but by the need to show individual distinctiveness (as expressed by violations of coherence). One favorite way of displaying this distinctiveness is by reactance against the social norms of the group, and this paradoxically also acknowledges the centrality of social norms in the study of group processes.

The results of earlier studies in which anonymity and identifiability were confounded are consistent with the findings presented here. In comparison with earlier studies, the manipulation of identifiability in the studies reported here (Study 2 and 3) was very strong, because an explicit announcement was made at the start of the discussion that the other group members would see participants' pictures. In contrast, in earlier studies the participants could only infer that the other group members received their picture, because they had received those of the others, too. Thus, the non-anonymous condition in studies with a confounded manipulation of anonymity and identifiability might be comparable to the non-anonymous / non-identifiable condition in the studies reported here. When taking this into account, the results of both types of manipulations correspond perfectly, and the present studies are consistent with earlier ones.

To conclude, it would appear that identifiability *to* the ingroup and low anonymity *of* the ingroup cause similar effects, under conditions in which no sanctions have to be feared from non-conformity to group norms. Both identifiability and a lack of anonymity undermine the salience of social identity. Thus, although identifiability has been at the centre of strategic investigations inspired by SIDE, a consideration of the cognitive effects of identifiability is long overdue in SIDE research. The findings reported here also suggest that future research might benefit from examining the underlying cognitive processes by using entitativity as a measure that is somehow related to salience. Taking entitativity into account, might also clarify some of the effects reported in this volume. It would appear that the measure of salience proposed here is particularly well suited to the particular cognitive representations of the group in the paradigms used in cognitive SIDE research. I therefore hope that this alternative measure will help to turn SIDE's inside out.

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